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ABSTRACT
SOCIAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT IN PLURALISTIC SOCIETIES: A STUDY ON THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEBANESE IDENTITY
SEPTEMBER 1997
MARWAN MAKAREM GHARZEDDINE, B.E., AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT
M.A., COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY/ TEACHERS COLLEGE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor William Matthews
An individual's social identity development in pluralistic societies going through an
integration process has been little understood. A study was conducted on the Lebanese
individuars social identity development. Based on a study of the theories of the psychology of
social identity development, four Lebanese Identity development stages were proposed where an
individual's social identity progresses from an unintegrated Lebanese, sectarian group identity,
towards a more integrated Lebanese Identity.
To test the validity of these stages, two research studies, a qualitative and a quantitative
study, were conducted to explore the Lebanese social identity. In the qualitative study, open
ended interviews of a number of Lebanese community leaders were conducted and analyzed.
While the four proposed identity stages were reflected in the subjects' views, the majority of their
views reflected a higher stage of identity development where the emphasis was on a civic
society and the satisfaction of the individual's rights and needs as a basis of the integrated
Lebanese social identity. These results were in agreement with the proposed Lebanese Identity
development stages.
Moreover, a quantitative research study examined the relationship between an
individual's various socio-economic factors and their level of identity development. The results
revealed that there is a strong relationship between an individual's level of identity development
and the following socio-economic variables: Sectarian identity, profession, level of education,
vii
source of data collection, and nature of dual Lebanese nationality. In general, it was concluded
that individuals had higher levels of Lebanese Identity development when they enjoyed a more
secure life, had higher levels of communication and exposure to others in society as well as
higher levels of education.
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INTRODUCTION
The Statement of the Problem
Technological changes in the last century have made old cultural and geographical
barriers between different human populations less significant. As more and more ethnically,
religiously, and culturally different groups attempt to live in the same societies, the problem of
understanding the change and development of people's social identities in such pluralistic
environments becomes of utmost importance.
This is, however, not a new problem. Many old societies have been facing the problem
of developing social identities in pluralistic contexts. Some examples come to mind, where long
standing identity problems have afflicted people living in such areas as Northern Ireland, the
Balkans, and Lebanon, just to name a few.
Although there have been numerous research studies on the racial, minority, or majority
identity development of individuals living in majority societies, no research has been conducted
on the psychological process of common identity development among individuals living within
the same multi-ethnic society such as the Lebanese social group.
In Lebanon, past studies on the social identity of individuals have failed to explore the
development of the Lebanese identity from a psychological human perspective. More
specifically, the levels of consciousness of the common Lebanese identity and the development
of that identity among individual Lebanese citizens have never been explored or described in a
theoretical study.
Understanding the psychological development of the Lebanese identity among
individuals and its relation to various socio-economic factors becomes especially relevant after
the recent civil war that had its roots in the past disagreements of the different Lebanese groups
around the definition of national identity.
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Finally, understanding the Lebanese experience of identity development will hopefully
shed some light on future approaches to comprehending identity issues that other pluralistic
societies face as they share a common overall social experience.
The Background of the Study
Many countries that are made up of multi-ethnic groups have to deal with the question of
defining their national identity. Most often than not, the different ethnic groups attempt to project
and impose their ethnic identity on the other groups. If one social group is much more powerful
than the other groups, it usually succeeds in imposing its identity and culture on the others. That
is why, as we shall see later, the different identity development models in existence explore the
stages of awareness that minority groups experience as they discover their particular group
identity.
In some cases, though, no particular social group in a country can successfully impose
its identity on the other group or groups, and therefore, the question of defining the country's
identity becomes especially problematic. This is reflected in the numerous conflicts that flare up
around the worid in multi-ethnic countries such as Lebanon, Bosnia, Ireland and Rwanda.
In Lebanon, the various attempts in the past to define the Lebanese identity reflected
particular sectarian lines of thought and have, therefore, resulted in a multiplicity of definitions of
the Lebanese identity.
More specifically, a lot of the discussions around the Lebanese identity in the past were
limited to the question of whether Lebanon and its people should have an Arab identity or a
Westem Christian identity (Hanf, 1994; Salibi, 1965). In his book entitled Lebanon-Coexistence
during the War, which was the result of 16 years of extensive research trying to comprehend all
aspects of the Lebanese Civil War, Theodore Hanf (1994), refers to a number of Lebanese
politicians, political party members and journalists who all believe that one of the main reasons
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behind the Civil War in 1975 was the lack of one agreed-upon national identity among the
different political and religious parties in Lebanon. Instead, according to Hanf, every group
emphasized a certain unique identity for Lebanon, such as a Lebanon that is completely part of
Greater Syria, or a Lebanon that has a clear Arab identity, or a Lebanon with some Arab identity
but also with a Westem influence and orientation.
Therefore, it seems that traditionally, the focus has been on the differences and not the
common aspects in the perspectives of these groups, which naturally led to more divisions in the
society and an increase in conflicts. According to the well-known scholar, Kabbani (1993), some
of the major players that encouraged the differences and not the commonalties among the
Lebanese have been the religious and missionary schools and institutions. By each school
emphasizing its own religious agenda and curriculum, the students were only being taught to
respect and admire their own school's teachings, which, with time, resulted in increasing the gaps
among the various religious groups in Lebanon and eventually the hatred among them (Kabbani,
1993).
Discussions of the Lebanese identity that are focused around the above mentioned
debates are simplistic and do not reflect the whole scope and complexity of the Lebanese
identity issue. Such discussions fail to address those aspects of the country's (people's) identity
that reflect the psychological common experiences resulting from the interaction of the different
sectarian groups and the different cultures through time. Consequently, those simplistic identity
debates fail to focus on the harmonizing aspects of people's identity and instead focus only on
the conflictual aspects.
In order for a group self to exist in any group, commonalties among the group members
have to be present and cleariy defined (Hogg, 1987). The formation of a Lebanese group self is
impossible to attain unless there is a conception among the people of their common
characteristics, common interests, common needs, common goals, and common challenges as
well as the common psychological processes they experience as they interact with each other.
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Therefore, one way to increase people's understanding of their national identity is by
exploring the psychological nature of their identity. This entails understanding the various levels
of identity consciousness experienced by the Lebanese individuals as well as comprehending
how the different consciousness levels relate to each other. Finally, through a developmental
perspective, the Lebanese individual will be able to understand the conflicts and differences in
society as part of the natural process of formation of a unified Lebanese identity.
The Purpose of the Study
This study has a three fold purpose. First, based on identity development models of
specific and general psychological groups, the researcher proposes a theoretical model that
describes the psychological stages of development of the pluralistic Lebanese identity.
Second, the researcher attempts to describe the various aspects of the Lebanese
identity that are reflected by the views of a group of Lebanese individuals representing different
cultural, social, and political segments of society. The proposed Lebanese identity development
model is used as the conceptual framewori^ through which the subjects' views are analyzed.
Third, this study explores the levels of identity consciousness among a random sample
of Lebanese individuals as well as explores the relationship that exists between some of the
Lebanese individuals' socio-economic backgrounds and experiences and their level of Lebanese
identity consciousness.
Research Questions
First, through an exploration of the group psychology theories, the researcher attempts
to answer the following questions: What are the basic psychological principles that shape an
individual's social self? What are the common psychological characteristics of the development
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of an individuars social identity in any social group? And how do these psychological
characteristics manifest themselves in the particular circumstances that surround the Lebanese
social group?
The answer to these questions, in tum, enables the researcher to propose a general
model for the Lebanese identity stages of development based on general human psychological
principles. Such a model can be used as a tentative conceptual frameworic for understanding the
views of the different subjects whose views are to be explored in this research study.
Second, by studying the views of different Lebanese subjects, the researcher focuses on
answering the following questions: How does a cross-sectional representative group of Lebanese
individuals define and perceive the Lebanese identity four years after the end of a 17-year-long
civil war? More specifically, how have the respondents come to understand the Lebanese society
and the Lebanese individual in terms of their relationship with themselves, their human and their
physical environments?
By categorizing the different views that are presented by the subjects studied, the
researcher attempts to determine what specific and general Lebanese issues define the identity
of individuals, and how these views can be understood within a psychological Lebanese identity
developmental model. By doing so. the researcher hopes to be able to refine and expand the
original model proposed at the beginning of the study.
As the first research study explores the worid views held by individuals functioning at
different stages, a second research study attempts to answer the following question: What is the
distribution of a random sample of Lebanese subjects along the four stages of identity
development proposed in this research study? Finally, what is the relationship between an
individuars level of identity consciousness and his or her social and economic backgrounds?
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The Significance of the Study
By basing our understanding of the Lebanese identity and its development on general
human psychological principles, we will be able to approach issues and problems related to the
identity from a solid scientific point of reference. The process of the actual unification of
pluralistic societies, such as the Lebanese society, indicates that individuals with different group
Identities would start to develop a social identity that is reflective of the overall common societal
experience. Therefore, a better understanding of the psychological processes that underlie the
development of an integrated identity as well as the factors that affect its development would
contribute greatly to the psychological unification process.
Through an understanding of the different psychological levels of identity development,
Lebanese individuals will be better able to negotiate and accept psychological changes that they
feel they are going through as a result of their interactions within their society. Moreover, such an
understanding of the levels of identity development also permits individuals from different
segments of society to understand how they can better relate to each other.
Therefore, the model also helps to unify our perception of the different individuals of
society along one common psychological developmental continuum. More specifically, the
developmental model expands the scope of past identity discussions by: First, understanding the
Moslem-Christian dialectic within a wider developmental framework, and second, it also helps
incorporate the views of those individuals in society who do not perceive their identity in terms of
the Moslem-Christian dialectic of the past studies.
Moreover, in identifying the different stages of the Lebanese identity development, we
are able to suggest concrete cultural and educational programs as well as activities that address
the problems inherent in each level of identity consciousness. The ultimate goal here would be
to facilitate the process of strengthening the Lebanese group identity. In addition, understanding
the relationship between the different socio-economic factors and an individual's stage of identity
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consciousness further enables us to understand and develop focused educational programs to
help individuals better negotiate developmental changes of their social identity.
Finally, it is the hope of the researcher that this study may serve a as basis for
educational programs for young Lebanese men and women because it attempts to define the
group psychology of Lebanese individuals in human development terms through stages that cut
across sectarian lines and demystify the nature of the Lebanese problem, and because it
contributes to our understanding of the identity problem in Lebanon in such a way that enables
individuals in society to develop more sophisticated rational means for dealing with the complex
social problems facing Lebanon.
The Nature of the Study
Through a theoretical exploration of general group development and identity
development theories as well as a review of publications related to the issue of Lebanese
identity and Lebanese history, a tentative theoretical model is proposed to describe the stages of
Lebanese identity development. Each stage in this model is operationally defined by a number of
propositions that describe the psychological group and individual characteristics of people
functioning at each stage.
First, through the use of the above mentioned operational definitions, a qualitative
interview analysis of the views of a prominent group of Lebanese individuals is conducted with
the aim of exploring and describing the main issues defining Lebanese identity and its state of
development four years after the cessation of the Lebanese civil war.
Second, a quantitative study is performed on a random sample of Lebanese individuals
in order to determine their distribution among the different stages of identity development as well
as study the relationship between an individual's level of identity consciousness and his/her
various socioeconomic characteristics.
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Literature Review Plan
*
The literature review cx)nsists of the following:
First, previous studies that attempted to explain the psychological basis of formation of a
group self in the minds of people as well as the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
presence of such a group self and its relationship to the individual's self identity are explored.
Second, a study of the group development stages as described by Wheelan (1994) in
her study about general group processes is reviewed.
Third, some group identity development theories are explored. More specifically, the
"Black Identity Development" theory suggested by Bailey Jackson (1976) and the minority
identity development theory proposed by Sue & Sue (1990) are analyzed and common themes
are emphasized.
Fourth, general behavioral pattems of Lebanese social groups are explored through a
review of literature concerning the history and nature of Lebanon and its identity.
The goal of such a literature review is to integrate relevant aspects from the different
psychological group theories into the construction of a Lebanese identity development model.
Hypotheses
First, it is hypothesized that the Lebanese identity consciousness can be described in
four different stages similar in some basic aspects to other identity development stages of
other groups.
Second, it is my hypothesis that the major themes found in the qualitative analysis of the
interviews can be categorized into one of the four suggested stages.
Third, it is hypothesized that, due to the effects of the war in Lebanon, the majority of the
responses will reflect a high level of awareness of the common Lebanese identity.
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Fourth, as for the survey, it is my hypothesis that the male group of subjects will be
found to be functioning at a lower awareness level of the common identity than the female group
of subjects.
Fifth, the amount of time the subjects have lived during the war will correlate positively
with the level of identity development.
Sixth, the level of education will correlate positively with the individual's level of identity
development.
Seventh, the group of younger subjects will reflect a higher level of awareness of the
overall common Lebanese identity.
Eighth, different sectarian groups will differ in their level of identity development.
Definition of Terms
The Stages of Lebanese Identity Development
It refers to the psychological levels of Lebanese identity consciousness of an individual
as reflected by his/her perception of himself/herself, his/her environment, and the relationship
between the two.
Adequate Lebanese Identity
It refers to the Lebanese identity definition that leads the different members of society to
live harmoniously with each other, and which is based on a rational and objective understanding
of a Lebanese individual's self, environment, and the relationship between the two.
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Inadeoiiate LebaneseJdeniiiy
It refers to a Lebanese identity dentition that is potentially conflictual to members of
society, and which does not reflect a Lebanese individual's objective and rational understanding
of himself/herself, his/her environment, and the relationship between the two.
Lebanese Grpup
It is the group of all the Lebanese citizens regardless of their sectarian belonging,
political party affiliation, or ethnic origin.
Ibe Lebanese Group Self
It is a description of the characteristics of that part of the individual self identity that is
shared with a large number of other Lebanese individuals regardless of their religious or
sectarian belonging.
Sectecianism
This word is used to denote the negative aspects that result from sectarian
ethnocentrism, sectarian division and sectarian conflict within the same multi-sectarian society.
Moreover, it also refers to the rigid aspects of religious identities that are not adaptive to
environmental changes, and which are, thus, not life and growth promoting.
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Assumptions
The assumptions in this study are three-fold: The first set of assumptions has to do with
the nature of group identity fonmation while the second set relates to the sample subjects that are
being studied, and finally, the third assumption deals with the nature of the methodology chosen
for this study.
1- There are common psychological processes that underlie the development of the identity of
individuals in any human group. This assumption justifies the use of various identity
development models of other groups and, specifically, Jackson's BID theory and Sue and Sue
minority development theory as a bases for the development of the Lebanese identity stages
that is proposed in this study.
2- A rational understanding of human phenomena can help people develop rational ways to
avoid conflict and destruction.
3- Whenever two group cultures interact, a new culture develops that is related to the two above
mentioned cultures but that is different from both. Similar to the union of two people, their
offspring carry some of the characteristics of the parents but are yet different from them.
4- It is possible to actively participate in the development and the consciousness-raising of the
Lebanese identity by verbalizing, understanding, and defining its character and
communicating these to individuals in society.
5- Due to the subjects' prominent roles in the Lebanese society, it is assumed that the different
views verbalized by them are generally reflective of the most significant Lebanese identity
issues among the overall Lebanese group.
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Limitations
In this study, I am interested in understanding the Lebanese individual's perception of
the Lebanese identity. Since no psychological research studies have been conducted in the past
around this subject, it is necessary to decide on a starting point from which the Lebanese identity
could be studied. Therefore, the decision to propose the Lebanese Identity Stages of
Development from theories of group development of other general and particular groups is
considered as a first step in the understanding of the Lebanese identity. As is the case with all
theories, this theory should always be subject to further refinement and improvement with the
goal of further understanding the common human basis of the Lebanese identity.
Moreover, the choice of a limited number of group representatives, and not regular
Lebanese citizens as the subjects of the first research study, limits the study in many ways.
First, it has to be accepted at the time being that the subjects' views largely reflect their
community's opinions and perceptions. This might not necessarily be true, but it is impossible at
present to determine and make a differentiation between the subjects' idiosyncratic views and
those views that really reflect their groups' perception.
Second, the subjects are a limited cross-section of group representatives and, therefore,
a more comprehensive study would cover a greater number of elite subjects.
Third, the lack of previous research studies in this area makes it necessary to ask very
general, open-ended questions in order to obtain a conceptual starting point for future studies.
Consequently, however, this limits the cunrent study from being able to understand the subjects'
perceptions around certain issues in more detail.
Fourth, the fact that this proposed study does not explore the opinions of a large number
of average Lebanese citizens through open ended questions around their understanding of their
Lebanese identity is considered a limitation that deprives the research at hand from drawing a
more comprehensive picture.
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In order to compensate for the above mentioned limitations, the researcher has included
a quantitative study that sheds some light on the identity characteristics of a broader and more
representative sample of subjects. Therefore, while this second study complements the results
of the first research study and can further increase our understanding of the Lebanese identity
among individuals, it, in tum, suffers from a number of limitations.
As mentioned above, the absence of past empirical studies around the stages of
Lebanese identity development leads the researcher to conduct a survey study to explore the
general characteristics of the sample under question. A more detailed study of how specific
factors affect the Lebanese identity development can only be done after we gain some initial
understanding of the various factors affecting the Lebanese identity as this study is attempting to
do.
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CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUPS
In the following chapter, I will focus my literature review around three general aspects of
group psychology with the ultimate goal of. utilizing this knowledge in understanding and
analyzing the Lebanese group and the Lebanese group identity. I will initially review some
contributions of the theories of evolution to our understanding of group behavior. In other words,
the goal of this section is to explore the role of group behavior in the evolution of man as well as
the role of natural selection in the evolution of groups. Later, I will review the major contributions
of the field of psychology that revolve around our understanding of group behavior and the
behavior of the individuals constituting these groups. More specifically, this review will focus on
two aspects of group functioning, mainly, the individual psychological basis of group behavior as
well as the psychology of group development and individual identity development of group
members.
Evolutionary Origins of Group Functioning
In this section I will attempt to explore the major factors that have guided the evolution
and natural selection of group behavior among human beings. Therefore, I will briefly discuss the
evolutionary relationship between an individual's survival and his development of group
behavioral traits. Moreover, the role that Man's cognitive development has played in the
evolution of group behavior will be emphasized as well as the importance of the development of
group culture along with the development of more sophisticated cooperative and competitive
skills.
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The evolutionary origins of group functioning among humans have been discussed by a
great number of evolutionary theorists including sociobiologists, anthropologists, psychologists,
ethnologists and sociologists. The two basic questions for scientists have been: (1) why did group
behavior develop among individuals and (2) what role has group functioning played in the
evolution of man in general?
Relationship between Individual and Group BPhav'f>r
Some answers to these questions have been suggested by sociobiologists. Sociobiology
is the branch of biology that explains social behavior among all species in terms of evolutionary
biology that relies on Darwin, Mendelian and Hamiltonian ideas (Reynolds, Falger & Vine, 1987).
The central idea in sociobiology surrounds the role of natural selection in the evolution of any
biological system.
In his book. On the Origin of Specie.s Darwin's (1859) initial formulation of natural
selection emphasized the central role of the individual in the evolutionary process. Darwin
theorized that natural selection occurred at the individual level where the battle for survival
indicated that only the fittest individual would be capable of donating his genes to future
generations.
On the other hand, Wallace (1864)-the co-discoverer of the concept of natural selection-
emphasized the vital role that groups must have performed in the evolutionary process of man.
Wallace believed that an individual's ability to function in groups, which would have helped him
In securing food and shelter by overcoming with others the challenges that the environment had
imposed on him and his community, would have become subject to the process of natural
selection. In the same way, Wallace explained that since the individual's physical characteristics
became of lesser relevance to him, his moral and mental qualities must have been given more
weight by the human race.
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Later, in his book. HM^escenLomaa, Darwin (1871) placed much less emphasis on
the individual's role in the process of natural selection and instead stressed the roles that
intergroup conflict as well as intragroup cooperation must have played in the evolution of Man.
Therefore, group interaction became much more significant to an individual's survival. In other
words, group selection took over individual selection so that gene-based characteristics were
naturally selected as to how they benefit the group as a whole rather than the individual alone.
The better the individuals functioned within a group, the more selection at the group level took
place.
It is important to emphasize that pure individual and pure group selection are only the
two extremes of a continuum (Wilson, 1975). According to Dawkins (1982), the concept of
natural selection is used here in a comprehensive form meaning that it must have taken place at
many various levels, from the genetic level to the individual and family levels and. later on, to
the level of larger groups. This means that a comprehensive analysis of human evolution
requires that we understand how the different levels of selection, that is, individual, kin, group,
genetic and cultural selection interact and function (Melotti, 1987).
Basis of Man's Relationship with other Men
How can we explain the evolution of the ability of individuals to function in groups and
what is the relation between the evolution of purely group functioning capacities and individual
capacities to function independently from groups?
According to Dunbar (1987), the Darwinian analysis of group behavior regards group
behavior in terms of its adaptiveness to its environment and how this particular adaptiveness
affects future gene frequency. Concepts such as natural selection, genetics and particularly
inclusive fitness are the comerstone of the evolutionary explanation (Reynolds et al., 1987).
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Inclusive fitness, a term borrowed by sociobiologists, is intended to interpret how a
particular behavior of a group member within his own group increases his chances of donating
his genes to future generations. On the most basic level, in his theory. Hamilton (1964) explai
how an individual's genes will extend when he acts in such a way as to, first, increase his own
fitness or fruitful reproduction and, second, increase the fitness of other group members who are
bearing the same genes. This would, in tum, mean that the individual must have evolved traits
that help him transmit his genes to the future generations as well as help other group members
carrying similar gene pools to transmit their genes too (Hamilton, 1 964).
Group behavior among kin members is seen to have a high fitness value for an
individual because a group can function as an organized unit whose members can enjoy the
benefits of the division of labor and better guarantee their genetic survival (Dunbar, 1987).
Furthermore, transmission of family norms that regulate the family members' relation to each
other and the wealth of survival techniques happen at a more basic level than for larger groups.
Dunbar (1987) offers a more detailed picture and gives the following explanation: The
individual's genetic survival is dependent on his ability to reproduce offspring who, in tum, must
survive to the age of sexual maturity. However, before the individual accomplishes this goal, he
must first consider other important survival problems that he faces on day to day basis. In other
words, besides finding and consequently mating with his mate, the individual has to think of
protecting as well as securing food and shelter for his family so that they can survive into next
the generation.
However, since the human being's energy and time are restricted, it is unfeasible for
him alone to implement the pert'ect solutions for all these problems (Dunbar, 1987). Therefore,
he ends up compromising his idealistic solutions by replacing them with "an optimal mix of
solutions that will yield the largest number of descendants" (Dunbar, 1987, p. 49). The human
tendency for inclusive fitness further explains why the most naturally occurring groups in
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societies are families and kin groups. The prevalence of this most basic group behavior is due
to the Simplicity by which different members come to understand their common plight.
Parallel Development of Complex Oroup F»inct ioninn AbilitiP. .nH r.^nitive Ahii.tiac
With further human evolutionary changes, the organizations of groups was not restricted
to distinct blood relations. Man developed a higher awareness of his environment which enabled
him to develop a deeper understanding of his dependence on distant others and, therefore, to
relate with more complexity with group members who were not necessarily blood relations.
Therefore, having a higher awareness of an individual's inclusive fitness with others was
associated with a higher level of cognitive evolution.
More specifically, before developing cognitive awareness, our human ancestors must
have depended on knowledge of their environment through their own experience of their
instincts. A major change in the nature of human functioning occurred with the development of
human language and cognitive awareness.
During the development process of the human brain, man not only became capable of
owning and being aware of a mental map that represents the world around him but also became
consciously able to play with complex ideas and information (Vine, 1987). Moreover, Vine
(1987) continues, human beings gained the capacity for self-objectification, which has been
stressed by the symbolic interactionist theories stemming from the ideas of G.H. Mead. The
development of this capacity results in a higher level of relatedness between group members.
Man's interaction level with others developed from just being based on affective attachments to
a new level where cognitive schemas are additionally used.
Humphrey (1983) argues that man's capacity to possess a mental map enables him to
understand and predict a range of cognitive possibilities including the other individuals' state of
mind. Ultimately, this mental capacity would prove extremely socially advantageous within
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groups since it would provide the individual with the proper means to predict the behavior of
others in advance and perceive their common shared characteristics and goals (Humphrey,
1983).
Similarly, Vine (1987) explains that these schemas enable a human being to represent
mentally the social world in his mind where, he can also enact the behaviors of others and relate
them to the self. This capacity for empathy also enables an individual to represent in his mind
the shared collective unconscious (Vine, 1987).
Moreover, since early on in man's evolution, Man's enhanced communication skills was
the means through which social intelligence evolved and was. therefore, an essential condition
for a productive adaptation to occur. The development of such skills facilitated the process of
coordinating goals and the ability for planning and executing constructive collective activity to
realize them. Consequently, the development of human language, which began with simple
symbolic abilities, paved the way for a complex transmission of acquired knowledge. This kind
of social leaming was the foundation for a rapid cultural revolution (Vine, 1987).
The Rple of the Individual. Group Culture, and In-qroup/Qut-qroup Conflict and
Cooperation in the Evolution of Humans
Therefore, individual selection is not the only type of selection for, as Durham (1979)
points out, there seems to be an intricate relationship between individual, group selection, and
culture. On the one hand, Durham (1979) maintained that the cultural qualities of a social group
are, to a large extent, the outcome of intemal individual level selection. This does not mean that
these qualities are usually in contrast with the interests of the group since the existence of a
stable and functioning social group is necessary for the long-term reproductive success of its
members. Hence, the individual's chances for survival is maximized when group members
develop a culture where there is a balance between the adaptive qualities at the individual level
of selection and group level of selection .
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Moreover, the development of culture suggested that man's evolution was no longer
dependent on the slow changes in an individual's genetic makeup but much more on the
transmission of leamed adaptive behavior to the next generation. According to Alexander and
Borgia (1 978), culture, which emerged as the result of war, can be easier transmitted than genes
and more abruptly changeable. It is because of culture that tensions and differences between
human populations get so much reinforced so as to create a state of competition in the same
group as well as between groups. Furthermore, it is because of culture, represented by what one
generation teaches the other, mainly knowledge and group organization, that group selection
among humans occurs and is effective (Alexander, 1974).
In 1978, Alexander and Borgia further explained why, in their opinion, the human species
is virtually a perfect illustration for effective selection at group level and the role of culture in
that. The first reason is because human groups are made up of competing and hostile groups
that have treated each other in similar ways as other species as well as have been able to
quickly develop different competitive abilities due to their cultural innovations.
Secondly, human groups are the only species that is capable of working as a unit due to
its ability to plan, predict and implement certain actions that are directly related to increasing the
competitive positions of the group, whether through eliminating unsettling behavior from within
the group or through taking direct collective action against competing groups.
Moreover, Bigelow (1969) elaborates more on the concepts of cooperation and
competition and offers the following explanations: The primary biological advantage of primate
group life was guarding the young and the females from predatory animals. However, while the
use of weapons gradually provided humans with a sense of relative immunity from these
animals, other groups of people began to represent the major new danger to them. As a result of
that, Bigelow concludes that both intergroup competition and intragroup cooperation increased
with the latter becoming of utmost importance to the group.
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More explicitly, Bigelow (1969) explains that cooperation within a group was essential for
survival purposes during a conflict situation with an outside group. On the other hand, Bigelow
believed that those groups who were the least to cooperate with each other during a war situation
were eliminated. Therefore, according to Bigelow, throughout man's evolutionary history, groups,
who were known to be much more organized than others and who were more conscious of the
importance of cooperating with other groups and acted accordingly, were considered to be more
successful.
The Rple of Stereotyping in Cultural and Group S<»|firti^n
Melotti (1987) cites Spencer who. in his study of evolution in 1893. was searching for a
code that defined the field of human ethics in a scientific manner. Instead of finding what he was
looking for, Spencer discovered that human beings through evolution have come to hold a
double standard of morality. He called one standard the Code of Amity,' and the other the
'Code of Enmity.'
He explained that groups, by necessity, have found through their evolutionary voyage
that they have to provide self-defense against the outside while obtain cooperation and
friendship from the inside. This lead individuals to acquire two modes of thinking: The state of
enmity towards the outside encourages the evolution of a language of aggression, conquest and
revenge while intemal peace meant that men evolved a second mode of thinking and behaviors
favoring justice, honesty, cooperation, etc..
In extreme cases, what we have described above can result in what we call group
ethnocentrism. More explicitly, group ethnocentrism is when a group manages to live in a state
of in-group out-group differentiation in which the members of that group emphasize behaviors,
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such as relative peace, solidarity, loyalty, devotion and internal cohesion within their own group
as much as feelings of hostility towards outgroups whom they perceive as substandard,
subhuman, and evil (Van der Dennen, 1987).
Abraham (1983) stated that, such extreme attributes, when used by one group against
another reflect sophisticated elaborations of the act of categorizing groups into friendly and
unfriendly factions, known as the acts of dehumanizing and stereotyping. A stereotype is defined
as a magnified belief identified with a category whose function is to rationalize our behavior in
relation to that category (Allport, 1954). Pinderhughes (1979) believes that the act of engaging
in stereotyping may be a reflection of a genuine psychobiological need for cognitive stability
about one's environment. According to this scholar, human beings have a drive to establish
loving as well as aggressive relationships and, therefore, need to categorize their reality into
positive and negative factions.
This tendency to dichotomize is so much integrated in the human psyche that it also
leads members of one group to produce irrational thoughts and beliefs about themselves that will
separate them from their enemy. Bigelow (1969) argued that each group needs something, such
as an intimate idea or a fantasy, that every member can identify with and around which they can
all cohere. The creation of such irrational thoughts and ideas, as opposed to rational ones, seem
to help the members of a group promote and maintain their internal cohesion as well as keep
themselves segregated from their enemies.
Conclusion
In summary, group behavior evolved as the result of man's increased awareness of his
interdependence with others for maximizing the chances of transmission of his genes from one
generation to another. Moreover, a progressively higher cognitive ability is associated with an
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increased understanding by the group members of their common goals and interests as well as
the intricate relationship that exists between an individual's welfare and the overall welfare of the
group.
Through the forces of evolution, individuals developed the capacity to learn and
accumulate traits that allowed them to work cooperatively with other individuals with the intention
to attain certain common goals that were beneficial to all of them. Group members, in addition to
the successful transmission of their genes from one generation to another, also transmit their
accumulated solutions to environmental problems through the group culture.
Therefore, group culture is associated in man's mind with the accumulated sun/ival
adaptive strategies and traits that have been selected through natural selection. More
specifically, the continual process of competition and cooperation between different groups as
well as within groups results in a constant selection of the most adaptive cultural traits in a group
and the extinction of the less adaptive traits.
Most importantly, adaptation through group selection and culture selection can only take
place as long as these traits woric towards the survival of group members. Therefore, the
evolution of group behavior among individuals means a progressive understanding by group
members of the extent and nature of their interdependence as well as a progressive selection of
group traits that maximize the survival of its individual member's gene pool.
Therefore, we must conclude that, a more developed group and group culture is that in
which the group members have preceded members in other groups in:
1) Developing and finding group solutions to environmental challenges and demands that
ultimately increases the chances of survival and well being of its individual members.
2) Developing an understanding of it's members' interdependence and the knowledge of how to
define and regulate each member's role.
3) Developing the flexibility to assimilate and accommodate more adaptive traits and knowledge
while abandoning the less adaptive traits.
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4) Developing better cooperative skills with non-competitive others as well as developing a better
ability to minimize their loses in competitive situations with others.
5) Developing better means of communicating this knowledge among all its members as well as
developing better means of transmitting this knowledge to the next generations.
Thg Pgvcholooical Basis of Group Funntinpipg
Now that we have explored the evolutionary basis and nature of group behavior, I will
briefly focus in the following section on the psychological mechanisms that govern group
behavior. As we shall see, the understanding of the psychology of groups has revolved around
understanding the emotional nature as well as the cognitive nature of an individual's group
behavior as he interacts with his physical and human environment.
Early Group Theories
Le Bon's Theory on Group Functioning: Emotional Aspects Our initial scientific
understanding of group behavior started with an increased awareness of the emotional aspects
of groups. The eariiest explanations of the psychology of group functioning was proposed by Le
Bon (1897) who spoke primarily about specific kinds of groups, which either took the form of
crowds or the form of racial and national groups.
He likened groups to living organisms whose nature can be compared to some extent to
individual organisms. According to Le Bon (1897), people that constitute a crowd develop a
collective or group mind. This idea of a group mind is what Le Bon calls, "the law of mental unity
of the crowds" (p. 2), which is what makes the crowd a psychological group and hence, not based
on physical proximity.
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The psychology of the crowd. Le Bon believes, works differently from the psychology of
the individuals who comprise it in that the group mind does not consist of the conscious
individual personalities of its members but instead it is a reflection of the unconscious, essential,
and shared attributes of the group in question. Therefore, the collective mind of the crowds is
intellectually inferior; the members of the crowd are driven by instincts and emotion and thus, do
not feel bound by the restraints of reason and logic or civilized life in general. Consequently,
people that constitute the crowd do not possess any feelings of individual responsibilities.
Another significant characteristic of a crowd is the feelings of omnipotence that its
members consider themselves to have. The power that stems from the sheer number of crowd
members provides those individuals with a feeling that they can achieve anything (Le Bon.
1897).
In short. Le Bon was of the opinion that what determines the behavior of the group are
the unconscious forces making it up. These unconscious forces are contained in the cultural
heritage and language of such groups as races and nations. Moreover. Le Bon believed that
groups in essence are slow changing in nature since they function like men according to values,
ideas, sentiments and customs and, therefore, significant changes in the character of large
naturally occurring groups such as nations are rare for "there is nothing so stable in a race as the
inherited ground work of its thoughts" (p. xiv).
Le Bon's Theory on Group Functioning: Individual Basis of Group Behavior Le
Bon believes that the behavior of the crowd and the behavior of the hypnotized individual are
very much alike. In order to understand why crowd members behave in the way we have just
described, Le Bon (1897) discusses three processes that explain such group behavior.
One process is called the "deindividuation process" through which feelings of anonymity
and immense power overcome the crowd members just for being part of that crowd. This
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process leads the crowd members to lose their personal identity and feelings of personal
'
responsibility.
In the second process, or the "contagion process," the crowd members begin to mutually
imitate each other's actions and emotions as a result of which homogeneity and uniformity
prevail. Consequently, personal differences disappear while the shared and collective interests of
the crowd members become primary.
Finally, in the third process, or "suggestion," which is the basis of the contagion process,
the crowd members are easily influenced and easily suggestible by a person or a group whom
they regard with a submissive attitude as well as feel emotionally tied to.
Me Dougall's Theory on group Functioning: Rational Mat^<rp Later on, building on
Le Bon's group theory, Mc Dougall (1921) added more to our group understanding. He proposed
that some degree of collective mental activity is what characterizes a psychological group.
Therefore, he believed that groups are capable of functioning beyond their instinctual level when
the collective mind evolves and, therefore, rejected Le Bon's concept of a collective
unconsciousness.
More specifically, he believed that a group's mental activity has to be focused on some
common idea, goal, subject, need, etc. so that all the members attend to and participate in the
same things. As for the group's emotional activity, he believed that all the group members should
react and feel similarly when dealing with the object of attention. Therefore, this meant that each
member of the group should be influenced to some degree by the feelings, ideas, and cognitive
processes of the other members. In other words, some kind of psychological interdependence
should exist between group members as well as an awareness by each member of the group as
a whole.
Another significant contribution by Mc Dougall (1921) was his description of the
preconditions he thought necessary for group evolution. He believed in the importance of
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continuity of existence of a group. Moreover, he believed in the existence of a group
consciousness among individual group members which stands for some awareness of the group
as a whole and all that defines it. This group self consciousness or group identity is represented
through a body of traditions, customs and habits. Finally, group identity is promoted by
intergroup relations and, therefore, the development of organization or social structure.
Psychoanalytical Thgorv of QrouP Formation: Groups ;^nd Leaders Freud (1921)
began his analysis of group functioning by comparing the crowd member in relation to the
group's leader with a hypnotized patient in relation to his hypnotist. By doing so, he strongly
believed that it was of utmost importance to include the role of the leader in any interpretation of
group behavior. Therefore, he attempts to interpret the basic group processes in terms of the
interpersonal dynamics that occur between the children and their parents. Moreover, regardless
of the group's size, Freud categorized groups into two kinds: functional units and static
conglomeration of individuals.
The functional units, which were the focus of his analyses, are characterized by two
types of relationships that exist in them; one is a relationship between the leader and his
followers and the other is a relationship between the members themselves.
Freud (1921) uses the concept of "identification" to explain the connection that exists
between the group leader and his followers as well as between the group members. The
identification process is a process in which a person, after having developed an emotional bond
with someone, behaves as if he were the other person with whom he had established the bond.
According to Freud, the forces behind group formation are purely instinctual. Therefore,
people become part of groups in order to satisfy their need for love which he defines in a very
general way as "sexual love with sexual union as its aim" as well as "self love love for parents
and children, friendship and love for humanity in general, and also a devotion to concrete objects
and to abstract ideas" (Freud, 1921, p. 90). Therefore, he explains that, similar to a child's
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relationship with his parents, every group member loves his leader sexually. Since an individual
can not act on his desires, his ego compromises by accepting to possess the leader symbolically
through the process of identification where the ego introjects the leader and, hence, part of the
ego becomes the superego, i.e., the ego ideal.
In the same token, the bonds between the group members themselves develop through
identification in which each member identifies with the others after discovering a common
characteristic among them and that is, their introjected group leader or, stated differently, the
same ego ideal. In other words, part of each member's ego is transformed into the same
superego, so in a sense each member's superego is interchangeable with other members.
Finally, Freud (1921) considers this superego to be the basis of civilization or "the
common contract between the brothers." The substance of the superego is a representation of
the original father figure, yet as one generation takes from the one before it, more superegos are
added to the group's social culture of survival. Moreover, he states that this eventually led to the
current state of individuals vs. groups. That is, he believed that in advanced societies an
individual's ego develops from the participation of various groups. Freud (1921) states:
Each individual is a component part of numerous groups, he is bound by ties of
identification in many directions, and he has built up his ego ideal upon the most various
models. Each individual therefore has a share in numerous group minds-those of his
race, of his class, of his creed, of his nationality, etc. (p. 129)
Later Approaches to Group Psychology
Behavioral Theories . Unlike the before mentioned emotionally based approaches to the
study of human groups, the later cognitive approach distinguishes itself by being an experimental
approach. The new theorists stress the importance of providing empirical data to support any
theory of group dynamics.
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One of the earliest theorists to reject the non-experimental approaches was Floyd Allport
(1924). He was a behaviorist who believed that all group phenomena can be understood at the
individual level by applying the rules of stimulus-response psychology. He rejected the ideas of
his predecessors, particulariy Freud, which indicated that the group psychology represented a
different reality than the individual psychology. Allport (1924) believed that "there is no
psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals" (Allport.
1924, p. 4).
Allport believed that when people behave differently in group situations it is because
they leam to respond to situation-specific stimuli which in this case might include other people.
This means that we behave differently in groups because we, individuals, have learned to do so.
Interactionist Theories : Member InterdependenrP Cognitive psychologists stress the
importance of the experimental approach but differ with the behaviorists in their focus. These
psychologists (e.g.. Sherif. 1967) viewed behavior as a reaction to how the individual perceives
his social situation and his environment, i.e., how are extemal social stimuli mediated by the
brain.
Moreover, the idea of a group as being nothing but an aggregate of individuals was
rejected. Sherif (1936 & 1967) believed that an individual's nature changes in a group context. In
order to explain group reality, he applied the Gestalt law of the "interdependence of parts."
Basically, it states that individuals in a group do not experience isolated stimuli but rather
individuals experience the organized wholes. The important aspect of this is that our perceptual
organization of the stimuli into an interdependent and dynamic system means that new higher
order properties are manifested which are different from the individual properties of the stimuli.
Sherif and Sherif (1969) also emphasized that the formation of groups is necessary because it is
only through co-operation and interdependence that shared goals of people could be realized.
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In his studies of intergroup conflict and cooperation. Sherif (1967) introduced the notion
that shared group identities and group organization come as a result of social interdependence
for mutual need satisfaction. Sherif and other psychologists conducted their first experiments on
intergroup conflict in 1949, 1953, and 1954.
One of the experiments was carried, on 11 to 12 year-old boys in a summer camp
(Sherif, 1 962). During the first phase of the experiment, all the boys interacted with each other in
one group where individual friendships developed. In the second phase, the boys were randomly
divided into two groups. This led to the development of new strong intra-group ties and inter-
group conflict that reflected the random division of the boys into the two groups. These new
relations were no longer reflective of the original ties developed by different group members in
the first phase of the experiment.
In the last stage, the experimenters introduced problems and conditions that were
desirable by the groups involved but could not be achieved by each group alone. The result was
that intergroup cooperation developed which eventually broke the old conflicts and led to the
development of positive bonds across group boundaries.
As a result of the above mentioned experiment it became clear that the introduction of
superordinate goals had the effect of the formation of a superordinate group. Furthermore, it
was evident that group belonging was expressed by the creation of distinct symbols of the
collective identity. Therefore, Sherif (1936) believed that when individuals interact in some form
of closed system, they become a total functional system that leads to the development of new
properties for the group as a whole which is represented by the group identity.
Sherif (1962) presented the following generalizations about how groups function:
1) Whenever individuals interact with each other towards the attainment of certain goals,
where these goals require interdependent activity towards their attainment, the result is always
the formation of a definite group organization with differentiated status positions.
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2) A pattern of communication develops among group members which reflects the
organization of the group.
3) As a result of this organization group norms are formed and stabilized which define
the "latitude of acceptable behavior" (p. 5) of each member.
Sherif (1962) also made an extensive empirical and theoretical analysis of the formation
of group norms. He concluded that perception, evaluation and judgment are relative concepts
that are rooted in certain frames of reference that serve as the standards against which one
compares things.
These frames of reference that are common to the group are found in the culture which
provide the social norms in the form of costumes, standards, values etc. Furthermore,
individuals adopt these cultural norms in their self-identity by constructing the ego or the "I" with
the social norms. This socially constructed ego represents the social identity.
Sherif (1962) stressed that even though the references are produced in an external
social context, they are psychologically internalized and then used as references. Individuals
interacting in a group context will, by definition, perceive the same socially produced norms and
will, thus, come to intemalize the same social material.
Interactionist Theories: Group Cohesion and Interpersonal Attraction In addition to
interdependence, cohesiveness of the group as a whole, which is defined as the average
magnitude of the forces acting on all the individual members (Hogg, 1987, p. 90), is the other
major quality defining a group. Moreover, according to a number of scholars, an operational
definition of group cohesiveness alludes to the interpersonal attraction among group members
(McGrath and Kravitz, 1982; Tumer, 1984).
Hogg (1987) further elaborates on the above by stating that an analysis of the social
cohesion model means understanding the development of the forces of interpersonal attraction
as well as the factors that define liking among group members. Examples of such factors are
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Physical Closeness, common destiny, approval by the other, similar attitudes, a common enemy,
cooperation and interdependence to realize common objectives, appealing personality
characteristics, etc.
or
Hogg (1987) believes that it is known that people are attracted to those individuals
groups of people that make them feel rewarded. More explicitly, the reward that such people
feel is due to a satisfaction of a personal need or desire accomplished by the other person(s)
who happened to act in a certain likable way or possess a particular admirable trait or attitude.
Consequently, Hogg states that the decision of a gathering of individuals to form a group
depends on how much they are able of satisfying each other's needs and, hence, are dependent
upon on each other. Finally, when group members have been mutually able of satisfying their
needs through co-operative interaction, positive feelings of power occur in the group making it
attractive and ultimately encouraging its members to stay within it (Hogg, 1987).
A different approach from the ones discussed so far, focuses on the function of similar
values and attitudes between individuals in attraction and group formation. In this approach,
known as the social comparison theory, Festinger (1950, 1954) explains that people are
interested in validating their beliefs and opinions which is the main reason behind their
association with others.
According to Festinger, people, when deprived of all kinds of nonsocial and physical
means to evaluate their beliefs and capabilities, have to resort to comparisons with relatively
similar others. If, as a result of such comparisons, the other persons, not groups, show a
similarity in attitudes to that person, he would feel confident in the correctness and accuracy of
his belief system and, hence, would be satisfying a basic human need, namely, self-evaluation.
Festinger concludes by saying that the basis of group formation is the existence of mutual
interpersonal attraction between individuals who express similarities in attitudes and views.
Another theory that also stresses the role of similarities in attitudes in group formation is
Holder's (1958) theory which is based on the principle of cognitive balance. Since there is a
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need for achieving a balance between different perceptions among humans. Heider believes that
relations that reflect our liking for others as well as relations that reflect our sense of
togethemess and being linked to each other have a tendency to go together.
Social idgntitY Theory; 3e|f-CatpqQrizatiQnj>
.
Another approach that attempts to
explain the reasons behind group formation and cohesiveness is the self-categorizations analysis
or social identity approach. According to Tajfel and Turner (1985. p. 15). a social group is a
"collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category."
When asked to either define, describe or evaluate themselves, those individuals do so in terms
of the social category they belong to. That is, there is in each member's mind a cognitive
representation of the group, which can also be referred to as a social identification and. which
guides in-group conduct (Tajfel and Tumer. 1985).
More specifically, the social identity approach maintains that society is made of social
categories which stand in power and status relations to one another. It is believed that the
process of categorization brings into sharp focus a blurry and disorganized worid by accentuating
similarities within categories and differences between categories (Tajfel, 1957 & 1959).
One of the basic points in the self-categorization analysis that distinguishes it from other
theories in the field is the distinction it makes between intragroup cohesion and interpersonal
attraction. Focusing on the social identities of the group as a whole rather than the personal
identities-which are a reflection of the reactions the group members have to each other in terms
of their personal characteristics and individual differences-is a salient feature of the self-
categorization analysis.
Yet, Hogg adds by saying that "many of the supposed empirical determinants of
interpersonal attraction (e.g., proximity, similarity, shared fate) are still considered important in
group formation but are reinterpreted as leading to category formation or enhancing the clarity
and salience of some in-group category" (Hogg. 1987. p. 102). According to social identity
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theorists, as long as a collection of individuals is behaving in terms of a shared in-group
category, it is a considered a group (Hogg, 1987).
Therefore, the self-categorization process is similar to the process of categorizing
objects or people along agreed upon dimensions which ultimately lead to a highlighting of intra-
category similarities as well as inter-categorv differences (Tajfel. 1981). In addition, the social
self is a reflection of the stereotypes of the In-group while the selfs representation of the others
are also out-group stereotypes. In turn, the stereotypes provide the self with a prototypical mode
of behavior and thinking that are made of prestige, evaluative status, goals, needs, emotional
experiences, behavioral and attitudinal norms and personality traits (Turner, 1982).
Social Identity Theorv: Basic Mechanisrpy, The self-categorization theory, or the
social identity theory, consists of a number of connected suppositions and hypotheses about the
social self-concept, in which the concept of self is pertinent to social interaction and based on
comparisons with other people (Turner, 1987).
There are seven essential assumptions of the social identity theory:
(1) The cognitive component of the individual's psychological structure is the self-
concept, referred to as the self. Every individual's self-concept is comprised of a number of
accessible cognitive representations of self (Tumer, 1987).
(2) Every individual has various concepts of self, which are only united as to make a
cognitive system. These various cognitive representations of self can be easily distinguished
from each other and can also operate relatively independently (Tumer, 1987).
(3) The social self-concept functions based on the specific situation the individual is
experiencing. More explicitly, particular situations trigger certain self-concepts in the individual
as a result of which specific self-images get produced (Tumer, 1987). The reason why a
particular self-concept becomes activated as opposed to others is due to the unique interaction
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that occurs between the qualities and traits of the perceiver and the situation at hand (Bruner.
1957).
(4) The cognitive representations of the self are produced as self-categorizations by the
individual. Self-categorizations refer to the "cognitive groupings of oneself and some class of
stimuli as the same in contrast to some other class of stimuli" (Tumer. 1987, p. 44).
(5) Self-categorizations are classified according to a hierarchical structure of abstraction.
What distinguishes one level of abstraction from another is the class inclusion, i.e., the higher
the level of abstraction, the more inclusive the self-category. Besides, every self-category is
completely a part of a category of a higher abstraction although it is not exhaustive of that more
comprising category. Hence, it is assumed here that "the level of abstraction of a self-
categorization refers to the degree of inclusiveness of the categories at that level" (Tumer. 1987,
p. 45).
(6) Three levels of abstraction of self-categorization are significant in the social self-
concept: First, the superordinate level of the self as human being. This level is characterized by
the self-categorizations that reflect our identities as human beings as well as the common
qualities that we share with other human species. Second, the intermediate level consists of in-
group-out-group categorizations that reflect the social similarities and differences between
people who consider themselves as belonging to certain groups and not to others. And third, the
subordinate level includes the personal self-categorizations which reflect how one distinguishes
between himself as a distinctive individual and other in-group members who only see him as a
"specific individual person" (Tumer, 1987, p. 45).
(7) Saliency of self-categorizations at any level develop through comparisons of stimuli
that are members of the next more inclusive self-category; that is, stimuli can only be compared
as long as they have been categorized as identical or equivalent at some higher level of
abstraction (Tumer, 1987).
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Based on the assumptions we have discussed so far, Turner (1987) inferred the following
general hypotheses:
our
1) The way we perceive ourselves socially, i.e., along a continuum that begins with
self-perception as unique individuals and ending with our self-perception as in-group categories,
leads one to hypothesize that an inverse correlation exists between the salience of the social and
personal levels of self-categorization.
2) The perceived identity (e.g., similarities and interchangeability) that exists between
the individual and his in-group members as well as the perceived differences that exist between
the individual and the out-group, seem to increase as a result of particular factors that intensify
the salience of our in-group-out-group categorizations. Consequently, these factors
depersonalize the individual's self-perception so that the he will no longer perceive himself as a
person with a unique personality but rather "as the interchangeable exemplars of a social
category" (p. 50). In other words, they engage in a process of self-stereotyping.
3) "the depersonalization of self-perception is the basic process underiying group
phenomena (social stereotyping, group cohesiveness, ethnocentrism, ..." (p. 50).
4) Groups fonm when two or more people perceive themselves in terms of some shared
in-group-out-group categorization.
5) Individuals in a given setting are more likely to categorize themselves as a group
when the subjectively perceived differences between them are less than the differences between
them and other people.
Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation
Psychoanalytical Interpretations of Group Conflict In his book, Civilization and its
Discontents. Freud (1930) explains out-group hostilities in terms of his displacement theory. In
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order to maintain group cohesion, members have to obey authority, delay immediate gratification
for the future satisfaction of common goals, and inhibit reactions to frustrations.
Failure to act in this manner might lead to internal group turmoil and, hence, would
isolate the individual from his group on which he is dependent. The solution to this is that the
individual projects his repressed feelings on an out-group and. thus, displaces all his prohibited
feelings on that outside group. It must be noted here that, Freud's theory explains the causes of
conflict in terms of intemal group dynamics and does not consider the probable causes of conflict
particular to each didactic in-group out-group situation.
Dollard et al. (1939), on the other hand, in a book titled Emstcaiimi^ Aggression,
attempted to explain social conflict by incorporating external factors as the causes of intergroup
conflict. The original theory basically integrated Freudian concepts with learning theory concepts.
Basically, Dollard et al. consider that frustration always leads to aggression and that
aggression is always caused by frustration. The idea, which is based on the original Freudian
analysis of the relationship between aggression and the blocking of erotic impulses (Freud,
1917), is that when there is a blocking of erotic impulses, the individual's most basic reaction to
the frustrating situation is aggression. Moreover, the theory states that since it is not always
feasible to aim one's aggressive behavior towards the frustrating agent, the individual directs his
aggression onto another object; that is. the aggression is displaced somewhere else. The
assumption is that, aggression can only disappear and go back to its original resting state if it is
dissipated either into the obstructing agent or some other replacement. In psychoanalytical
tenms, an individual who is frustrated can only get rid of the resulting aggression if he goes
through a "catharsis."
Finally, the analysis presented by Dollard et al. introduces the notion that the type of
aggression expressed is dependent upon a number of factors such as situational circumstances
and intemal variables.
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The realistic conflict
theory Is based on the research done by Sherif (1 962) of intergroup relations between groups of
equal power. Sherifs basic assumption is that conflict between groups arise from competition
from scarce resources. These resources vary from the concrete to the abstract, such as
geographical territory and power and status. This theory makes three basic assumptions about
human behavior which is approached from an economic perspective.
First, people are assumed to be selfish and are motivated to maximize their reward.
Second, conflict Is thought of as arising from incompatible group Interests. Third, it maintains
that the social psychological aspects of the group dynamics are determined by the compatibility
or incompatibility of group Interests.
This type of conflict led Sherif (1962) to believe that the following generalizations can be
made about negative Intergroup relations:
1) When groups engage In competitive conflicts, a victory or a gain of a desired goal by
one of the groups results in the development of unfavorable stereotypes for the defeated group.
These unfavorable stereotypes are standardized by the passage of time and this results in the
placement of the out-group at a prejudicial distance.
2) Along with the rise of the prejudicial attitudes between the groups, self-glorifying
attitudes towards the in-group are strengthened.
Cooperation between the groups, on the other hand, Is promoted by:
1) Introducing superordlnate goals that are compelling for all groups concerned.
2) It Is necessary to vary a superordlnate goal In accordance with the social reality in
order to sustain cooperation over time.
3) Changes In the pattem of relations within the groups involved are necessary and
should reflect the functional relations that exist between the groups and are of consequence to
the groups concemed.
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Another approach
or model that explains the idea of group cohesiveness focuses on the equity theo^. Just and
"equitable" interdependence between group members is the what defines this approach.
Equitable, i.e... fair and just, interdependence causes the interpersonal attraction to occur
between members which then leads to group cohesiveness. In the same token, it is assumed
that unfair and unjust interdependence could either lead to an action to reinstate it or a
discontinuation of it (Berkowitz and Walster, 1976).
Equity theory deals with the relationship between advantaged and disadvantaged
individuals or groups. It assumes that individuals strive to maximize rewartl but in order to do
this they must conform to certain norms of justice. Conflict is explained as a result from the
distress that people feel when they perceive injustice. Justice is violated when there are
disadvantaged groups whose fundamental human rights have been violated (Berkowitz &
Walster. 1976).
Cognitive Interpretation of Oroup Conflicts: Relative Dftphvation Thi^nry stouffer
et al. (1949) and Davis (1959) first introduced the concept of relative deprivation. Similar to the
equity theory it deals with the disadvantaged groups. However, it differs from the equity theory
in that it differentiates between two types of realities. It stresses that it is not the objective reality
that defines the situation, but it is rather relative to each of the groups concerned. Central to this
approach is the assumption that conflicts arise when subjective comparison are made by each
group concemed.
Cognitive Interpretation of Group Conflicts: The Social Identity Theory This
approach deals with all aspects of relations between groups specially ones having unequal
power. Its basic assumption is that people are motivated to maintain and achieve a positive self-
identity.
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Numerous empirical studies have shown that the discontinuous classification of
'
individuals into two distinct groups is sufficient to generate intergroup competition. This
phenomenon could be explained by the social identity's perspective which is based on the idea
that all knowledge is socially derived through social comparisons including about the knowledge
of the physical worid.
Agreement between people through consensus gives one the confidence that one's
views are true. When intergroup social comparisons are made people tend to maximize
intergroup distinctiveness, specially on the dimensions which are socially relevant and reflect
favorably upon the in-group. This, in tum, leads to the formation of negative stereotypes towards
the out-group.
Oroup Development Modeiy
As we have seen in the previous sections, groups are dependent on the emotional and
cognitive states of their individual members as they interact with the environment. Moreover, as
groups progress in time, the nature of their members' cognitive and emotional states goes
through progressive stages of change and development. These changes are experienced by
group members as a development in their social group identities.
There has been a lot of studies written in the past about the identity development of
different minority groups as well as majority groups. Models of the identity development of
African Americans have been developed by Cross (1978, 1987) as well as Jackson (1976), while
Atkinson, Morten and Sue (1993) focused on the development of adult minorities. Hardiman
(1982) and Helms (1984) also proposed two models of White identity development. However,
there has been no models that explore the identity development of pluralistic societies going
through an integration process.
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More specifically, Lebanon is a country made up of a number of groups with different
sectarian identities. As the country proceeds in its integration efforts, we need to understand the
process of identity change that takes place under these circumstances. Therefore, we need to
understand the process of integration as the various members form a common identity as well as
the process of change as the individual abandons some aspects of his past identity while
developing the new integrated identity.
This leads me to conclude that a model of a Lebanese Identity Development should be
based on the general psychological themes described in two types of group development
models. More specifically, in the following section I will briefly explore the psychological stages
of group formation as well as the stages of minority identity development. This will be achieved
by first, examining the main conclusions reached by Wheelan (1994) in her extensive study of
the various theories of group formation and, second, by reviewing the common psychological
themes that underlie the two models of identity development proposed by Jackson (1976) and
Sue and Sue (1990).
Stages of Group Formation: Wheelan's Study
In her study of group processes, Wheelan (1994) reviews the different literature on group
formation and concludes that regardless of the group type, duration, or task, there seems to be
many similarities in the normal developmental process of groups.
According to Wheelan (1994), many groups may not follow the normal developmental
process because they might not resolve a certain stage property and, hence, may get stuck in it.
But for our present study, we are interested in the normal developmental process of groups and
will, therefore, review Wheelan's (1994) findings.
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The First Stage. In general, the first stage of group development is when different
parties come together to form a group. Wheelan (1 994) concludes that this stage is
characterized by a primary concem for inclusion and an overdependence on the leader. She
explains that, at this stage, member interaction is insufficient to establish relationships and,
thus, cannot be a source of support for each other. Moreover, since no coherent culture or social
structure have formed yet, no collective action is possible.
As a result, the leader is depended upon to provide protection and support as well as
relieve tension. He/she is perceived by the members as capable and benevolent and expect
him/her to act towards them as a parent would towards a child. Moreover, the leader is idealized
and thus, his/her competence is not questioned and is taken as a matter of faith.
Group cohesion at this stage is also very strong. Members want to be accepted by others
and nobody wants to be perceived as deviant. Therefore, member's need for safety, inclusion,
and the reduction of anxiety leads to high degrees of conformity. This conformity tends to inhibit
discussion and a false sense of harmony tends to develop. No conflict is present at this stage
between the members themselves or between the members and the leaders. Therefore, very
little real work is done at this stage since wori^ may precipitate conflict and that is what
everybody is trying to avoid.
Once feelings of belonging are at an acceptable level and feelings of anxiety have been
sufficiently reduced, the group is ready to move into the next stage.
The Second Stage. During the second stage, members enter into a state of conflict and
counterdependency. Members fight among each other and with the leader. At the same time,
different members start trying out different forms of coalitions. The presence of fight and conflict
at this stage is important because it helps define the character of the group. Conflict enables the
participants to move from having divergent to unified points of view. That is. they begin to
tentatively define the goals, the tasks, and the different roles of their members.
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The leader^s authority, competence and control are also challenged at this stage. The
leaders are now perceived as having an undue influence and members start feeling manipulated
by them. In some cases, the group is unable to change its own perceptions or the perceptions of
the leader towards the leadership role. This means that the group fails to develop to the next
stage and will regress to the past dependency stage of group development. Group work is not
achieved since the group would devote all its energy into power struggles.
Another characteristic of stage two is the emergence of coalitions where members feel
freer to explore each other and thus form coalitions on the basis of some common factor. This
new reality has the effect of threatening the group's past sense of unity and is thus met with a lot
of hostility and suspicion from the rest of the group members. Still, the step is necessary for the
proper development of the group since different points of view need to be negotiated in order to
reach a consensus.
Thg Third gtgge. Wheelan believes that the third stage is reached if the conflict in the
second stage has been property navigated. This developmental stage is characterized by more
mature negotiations around group issues. The members start defining rules of conduct,
communication pattems, goals, and structures. Therefore, group cohesion increases at this stage
because the members now have a unified sense of mission.
Moreover, members develop more trust since they have gone through the worst part of
the group experience and can thus feel more secure. Therefore, power struggles are much less
than the previous stage and they tend to be related to the tasks at hand instead of hidden
agendas or emotionality. Having released their emotional tension, they can now move into a
more rational mode of operation.
Group perception towards leadership also changes in stage three. Instead of idealizing
leadership or rejecting it as authoritarian, members now view leadership as playing the role of
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coordinator or facilitator. The mythic qualities attributed to the leader in the past stages give way
to the more human qualities of a man with a job to be done.
Coalitions at this stage still exist but are perceived as less threatening to the unity of the
group by other members since the group has dealt with conflict in the past without falling apart.
Moreover, coalitions and subgrouping have the additional function of taking on the subdivision of
woric needed for task achievement. Having focused mainly on defining goals, communication
pattems, member roles etc. during the third stage, the members can now move into stage four
which is mainly focused on goal achievement.
The Fourth $tage
.
This final stage is characterized by problem solving, performance,
and productivity. The plans developed during the previous stage are implemented during this
stage. Moreover, the type of communication tends to change for the proper functioning of the
more complex task oriented group. The approach to problem solving, as in the previous stage,
stays objective and focused on the task at hand. Group members have more experience in
worthing together effectively at this stage and, therefore, there is significantly more goal
consensus and woric starts in eamest.
Minority Identity Development
As mentioned eariier, Jackson (1976) as well as Sue and Sue (1990) have developed
models of identity development of individuals belonging to different cultural groups. While
Jackson proposed a model for Black Identity Development, Sue and Sue (1990) developed a
cultural identity development model that is a refinement and a elaboration on the five-stage
minority identity development model proposed by Adkinson Mortan and Sue (1989). In what
follows, the two psychological models will be presented as parts of four general pattems of group
development.
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SlaflfiJL Jackson referred to the first stage of identity development as passive
acceptance. According to him, the Black person accepts and conforms to the White person's
cultural, social and institutional principles hoping to attain a number of things, such as, a sense
of worth, approval of others, power as well as material resources (money, goods...). Moreover,
the Black person is obliged to accept the standards of the White person's culture and institutions
while totally rejecting and denouncing "all that is Black" ( Jackson, 1976, p. 28).
The word "passive," explains Jackson, refers to the Black person's unconscious way of
not questioning things around him after having been influenced by a racist culture that
emphasizes the Idea that white Is right' and black Is wrong'. Therefore, a Black person In this
stage, Is neither In charge of his own life nor does he possess any kind of personal power due to
his utmost dependence on the White person for providing him with a sense of worth and
approval. Jackson concludes that forces other than the Individual determine what is proper and
Improper thinking and behavior. Such forces are also responsible for determining the Individual's
position In society.
Similar to Jackson's "Passive Acceptance" stage Sue and Sue (1990) conceive of what
they call the "Conformity Stage," where minority persons have a preference for the dominant
cultural values over their own. Their own values are repressed or looked down upon and the
White society's values are highly esteemed.
Members of the dominant group are held as role models and are believed to be superior
in most human aspects. Individuals at this stage try to mimic behaviors and values held by the
dominant culture. They also accept the dominant culture's world view of things and accept their
stereotypes and Internalize them as their own. Persons In the conformity stage find that their own
real identity Is looked down upon by the dominant culture and, therefore, reject that Identity for it
proves psychologically too painful to identify with, i.e., with the negative characteristics of the
group promoted by the dominant culture.
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Stagel. According to Jackson, in the "Active Resistance Stage," people are
characterized by the energy they put into rejecting the white person's cultural, social and
institutional standards. A person in this stage also loses trust in all the criteria that he used to
depend on in the past. Therefore, he rejects all the past societal values and goals espoused by
him.
Similarly, Sue and Sue's believe that, following the conformity stage, the individual
enters into a stage of dissonance
.
They explain that it is impossible for an individual to deny his
or her cultural reality for sooner or later they will encounter information or have experiences that
are inconsistent with their beliefs, attitudes and values that they held in the past. Therefore, an
individual's current self-concept comes into question because of the challenge of disparate
pieces of information that he or she has now experienced. Moreover, an individual can enter into
this stage in a gradual way or, through the experience of a traumatic event, which may lead
some individuals to move faster into the dissonance stage.
Jackson believes that a Black person reacts to this new awareness by becoming very
militant and calls for black unity and power as a way of ridding himself/herself of past white
power. A sense of pride at this stage is derived by espousing high levels of black ethnocentrism.
Sue & Sue, on the other hand, believe that minorities react to this awareness by a stage of
resistance and immersion where the person dedicates himself to reacting to the dominant culture
by rejecting all that is related to it. They believe that this stage is characterized by affective
feelings of shame, guilt and anger. These feelings of guilt and shame come as a result of the
person's past belief system and, hence, anger is directed towards abolishing oppression.
This stage also marks the beginning of a self-discovery process of one's own history and
culture. Feelings of pride and honor come from cultural characteristics instead of past shame
and disgust. The individual strongly identifies with his minority group and feels a strong sense of
connectedness with other members. Now, the cultural values of the minority group are accepted
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Without question. Individuals at this stage restrict their interactions to members of their own
group.
StagfiJL According to Sue and Sue there are two reasons why the individual moves
from the resistance/immersion stage into the introspection stage. First, the individual becomes
drained by the feelings of anger characteristic of the last stage and feels that he/she needs to
redirect his/her energy towards understanding himself/herself and other cultural groups. While
the last stage is reactive towards the dominant culture, the introspective stage is proactive
towards self discovery. Second, the rigidly held views formed about one's own group in the last
stage start to pose a new problem for the individuals. The tendency to submerge into one's own
group beliefs and values is done at the expense of individual autonomy. Therefore, the conflict is
now centered around identifying the boundaries between individual and rigid group beliefs.
Similarly. In the redirection stage, Jackson believes that the Black person stops spending
any energy towards anything that is white and withdraws from the white society. He or she seeks
the company of individuals who are similarly withdrawn from the white culture and are perceived
as similar to oneself. Moreover, in this stage, the Black person's role models cease to be the
oppressor and are now sought among individuals who are perceived to have the same level of
awareness.
Jackson states that the individual at this stage is specifically focused on establishing
goals and values that will enhance his or her life. They seek to define a new identity that
provides comfort and nurturing to the individual. Focus is directed towards establishing what is
good for the black community.
Moreover, Sue and Sue believe that during this stage, the past sense of culturocentrism
starts to give way to a more open attitude towards other minority groups and their experiences of
oppression. Similarities and differences of experiences of oppression of the others become of
interest to the individual's group. Therefore, the past feelings of mistrust, rejection, and anger
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that characterized the individuals in the past stages give way to a more rational quest for the
acceptable aspects of the donninant culture.
StageA Internalization: This is the stage where a Black person experiences the
integration of his newly-formed black identity, with other aspects of his identity. Moreover, the
person does not seek to interact with others that are similar but also include people who are
different.
Therefore, at this stage an individual starts thinking of himself in a more holistic way and
does not identify himself as a black person but also includes his other sexual, spiritual, family,
etc. identities. A person is also free to interact with others in a freer manner for he has already
satisfied his growth and developmental needs. He is now able to understand better his bicultural
nature and he is better able to separate the oppressive aspects of society from the non-
oppressive.
Sue and Sue also characterize the last stage by integrative awareness. They state that
individuals make new attempts to differentiate between the good aspects of the dominant culture
and the bad aspects. There is now an openness towards integrating the good parts into the new
identity. Moreover, the individual understands that he/she is a unique individual as well as a
member of the minority group and the larger culture.
Moreover, Jackson believes that, unlike stage two, the individual's gained awareness of
the nature of power and power relations are not used to fight white standards but rather this
awareness is used to educate others going through stage transformations. Therefore, at this
stage, an individual has respect and understanding of all Blacks whatever their stage of
consciousness is and engages them in a non-patemalistic way to educate and facilitate their
growth process.
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Finally, Sue and Sue also point that an individual has a greater sense of confidence at
this stage, and he/she no longer feels in conflict if he/she wants to disagree with some of his own
group's values.
SMmmarv Outline of Developmental stages of Identity lntenr;,t.nn in Multi-C..ltMr.i nr^npo
Unlike the minority development models of identity development, the dominant culture at
the early stages of identity development of multi-cultural groups is not characterized by the
culture of one specific cultural group. What defines the culture in the early stages of identity
development in a multi-cultural society is the dominance of the culture of division. That is,
regardless of the group constitution of the pluralistic society, what characterizes all groups in the
initial stages of integration is a limited awareness of commonalties among groups and a greater
awareness of the differences between groups as seen by the Wheelan (1994) study. Therefore,
development in such societies means that individuals would undergo a process of rejection of
the divisive culture in order to develop the common identity.
However, before the last stage is reached, individuals initially resist the divisive culture
by trying to impose its own group cultural values as a means to achieve a more homogeneous
culture. This attempt is bound to fail in pluralistic cultures where no group can impose its own
interpretation of culture on other groups. Therefore, these societies enter a stage where their
identity is defined by a new integrated culture which reflects the various cultural values of the
different constituent groups. Again, the process follows a pattern similar to the one described by
Wheelan ( 1994) in her study of group processes.
In the following outline, I will present a general description of the issues that might define
the identity development of individuals going through the cultural integration process. A parallel
will be drawn between the development that individuals undergo in her descriptions of group
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processes, and the development that the members of each of the different groups undergo as
the overall society is going through a process of identity development.
Stage 1:
Self Awareness -
a) Acceptance of divided dominant cultural values
b) Rejection of own personal reality, needs, and values
c) Lack of self esteem and a need for a sense of security
d) Individuals derive self worth from acceptance by leader and own dominant subgroup
culture
Self and others in the larger society:
a) Lack of member/member support in the larger society across different groups
b) No conflict is tolerated and inter-subgroup member differences are suppressed
c) Limited interaction with and insufficient knowledge about other members in other
groups
d) False sense of harmony and group cohesion
e) No collective action or work is possible
f) Strong individual conformity
g) Emotional dependence on leader who is idealized as very competent and benevolent
towards members
Stage 2.
Self Awareness:
a) Beginning awareness of inadequacy of some old beliefs and values
b) Definition of self in terms of rejection of dominant culture
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c) Increased feelings of guilt, shame and anger of past false identity
d) Dominance of emotionality
Self and Othftr«;-
a) Increased need for self disclosure and the emergence of differences
b) Dominance of conflict and an increased feeling of anger and
hostility among different group members
c) Challenge to leadership due to increased feelings of leader
manipulation and competence questioned
d) Development of ties with various members and formation of different
coalitions
e) Beginning attempts to form new values
Stage 3
Self Awareness:
a) Increase in rational functioning
b) Increased awareness of individual needs and values
c) Increased attraction and trust to other members
d) Increased sense of commonalties with others on the individual human level and
decreased focus on differences in personal idiosyncrasies as well as decreased group
ethnocentrism
e) Objective acceptance of positive aspects of the past and present as well as rejection
of negative aspects of the past and present
Self and Others:
a) Increase in rational discussions and negotiations
b) Decrease in hostile feelings and power struggles
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c) Gradual definition of overall group rules
d) Increased group cohesion
3tagg4
Self Awarene.t:«^;
a) Integration of cultural identity with other personal identities
b) Individual geared towards more actjve realization of personal and
new common group identity and group goals
c) Use of new knowledge is geared towards abolishing negative effects of the past
Self and others-
a) Overall group is more focused and work oriented towards abolishing or minimizing the
effects of the past inadequate and inadaptive behaviors, beliefs, and values
d) Increased involvement with others at other stages of development in order to help
developmental transitions
e) Increased efficiency in levels of communication among all group members
Integration
Conclusion
From our evolutionary theories we have seen that group behavior has played a major
role in the development of human nature. Man's most basic group behavior developed out of the
interaction of our ancestral family and kin groups. In those most basic types of groups, man is
seen to have developed group behavior because he became conscious of two major issues:
First, very early on, our ancestors have found that the survival demands of their environments
necessitated their developing cooperative strategies in order to accomplish mutual goals. The
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instability of man's environment and the threats emanating from it meant that both individual
behavior as well as group behavior were to be used in order to subdue the difficulties and reach
the desired goals.
Second, man came to the awareness that his own individual genetic survival meant that
he should cooperate with members of his own group who share his genetic makeup. This meant
that certain behavioral traits were to be selected that would incorporate behaviors that have
positive consequences for both himself and significant others. Therefore, altruistic behavior
*
became an integral part of human behavior in groups.
As man continued on his evolutionary tract, these types of behaviors would be
transmitted and taught by one generation to another and would, eventually, come to be
represented by the culture of the group.
A very similar type of group phenomenon is manifested in the behavior of crowds. Even
though crowds do not represent survival groups as such, the behavior in a crowd stems from a
common collective unconscious which finds its expression when people follow a crowd leader
who is a symbolic representation of the shared attitudes and emotions of a group.
Only the part of the unconscious that is relevant to the temporary emotional situation of
the crowd, and which is represented by the group leader, will find expression as a collective
action. The more the leader symbolized the crowd member's emotional state, the stronger the
collective crowd behavior.
Freud bases his theory of group behavior on a family model. He emphasizes the
emotional aspects of group behavior. A group becomes significant to its members if they can
express their emotional needs for love and association. According to Freud, positive emotions
are expressed among group members when they come to perceive themselves as similar or
interchangeable in a certain aspect with one another.
Again, like Le Bon, Freud considers that the existence of the group leader is of major
importance for group behavior to exist because he is an outside symbol of a shared superego
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Which gets introjected by all members. When group members come to perceive themselves as
interchangeable, they begin to feel more safety in the expression of their love. This stems from
the fact that all members of a group identify with and introject the group leader and, therefore,
they are able to love each other as if they are loving a part of themselves.
Later, all cognitive theorists stressed the importance of interdependence among
members of a functional group. The members are seen to be interdependent in the satisfaction
of mutual needs and goals. These mutual needs and goals arise when the members of a certain
group are able to perceive the shared characteristics among themselves. These shared
characteristics represent many aspects such as, common norms, common destiny, common
attitudes, common enemies, common objective, etc.
Therefore, at the core of the cognitive theory is the assumption that individuals form
groups when they perceive themselves as belonging to the same social categorization. Most
importantly, though, is that these social categorizations are situation-specific, that is, the type of
social categorization experienced by each individual is a reaction to environmental demands.
The perception of the group members that they are being subjected to the same environmental
demands leads to the perception of being members of the same categorization.
These categorizations are, in turn, the means by which individuals come to understand
how to react to the environmental stimuli. In each member's mind, categorizations are
associated with stereotypical behaviors, attitudes and values. Therefore, the stereotypes serve
as a blueprint for common group behavior. Finally, the social identity of a group of individuals
represents the collection of categorizations that are shared by the individuals.
Conflict, on the other hand, is seen as a necessary outcome of group competition. First,
groups compete for scarce resources such as food, shelter, etc. Second, different groups come
to develop different strategies for dealing with the environmental demands and coherence is
maintained within groups by elevating the group's beliefs above the other groups and, thus,
giving rise to negative out-groups stereotypes. Therefore, in all cases of group formation an out-
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group is seen as a source of contrast to the in-group and. hence, it helps the in-group better
define what they stand for in relation to others.
Finally, it is important to understand that groups are not static entities and they develop
in the same way that individuals develop. While some models of group development focus on
the process of group integration that takes place between initially different group members or
group cultures, other models focus on stages of identity development and transformation that
Individuals experience as they abandon the non adaptive parts of their past accepted belief and
knowledge systems and replace it with a new more adaptive and evolved system.
gummarv of Common Aspects of the Group Phenomenon
Integrity and Awareness of a Oroup . A major assumption by all theories is the obvious
necessity for all group members to perceive the group in a unified manner as well as the
necessity for group members to have a clear idea of what the group stands for. This results in a
group of individuals forming a functional closed system with structure and organization. This
new living organism, i.e., the group acts and reacts to its physical and human environment in a
unified fashion. Groups behave in a common agreed upon set of norms, values, history and
future that gives them the integrity needed for proper functioning.
Depersonalization of Individuals. An individual is capable of behaving in groups
because evolution has endowed him with the capacity for depersonalization. An individual
functioning in a group becomes interchangeable or similar at a level that reflects their common
social reality. Moreover, the psychological theories explain how the environment brings about
the part of the self that is the social self and which represents all what is collective and common
about the group members.
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Development of Pond t^ween Group Memhers. In order for group members to
have positive interactions with each other, there is always a need for the rise of positive
emotional bonds. Members have to attain a certain level of satisfaction in their group
interactions. The evolutionary theorists spoke of the reasons behind the development of positive
group images, while Freud stressed the necessity of satisfying the emotional needs by group
interaction. The cognitive theorists, on the other hand, spoke for the need of cognitive simplicity
and balance in order for individuals to enjoy a healthy positive functioning with their
environment.
ln-<iroup Empha$i$ on Commonality, Group behavior is made possible by the
existence of commonalties among group members in many different social aspects. A solid
group identity comes to represent in the minds of its members a common set of values,
attitudes, history, beliefs, behavioral and physical characteristics. Moreover, all group members
in a group have superordinate goals that represent the immediate and long-term direction that
the group is to take.
m\or Role of Environment in Defin ing a Group's Identity Different levels of
environmental demands impose on a group a common reality that is ultimately the reason
behind the need for group formation and behavior, and ultimately shaping a group's social
identity.
Directions of Group Evolution and Development. Group evolution and development
entails an integration process of progressive movement by the different members away from
dependency on leaders, separation of members, and minimal awareness of group commonalties,
towards less dependence on leaders, closer member relationships as well as an increased
awareness of group commonalties. Moreover, this process is associated with the development of
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the individuars social and personal identity guided by a process of psychological separation and
deindividuation from the past oppressive dominating forces and a rejection the oppressive parts
of their past belief systems towards a freer and more independent psychological state. Higher
levels of awareness are reached as individuals become more aware of the human aspects of
their identity and are. therefore, better able to work towards the satisfaction of their needs and
desires as well as relate to the same human aspects of other individuals.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON THE LEBANESE GROUP
Having discussed in the preceding literature review section the major psychological
aspects that define any group, I will devote this review section to the exploration of the Lebanese
group. More specifically, based on the knowledge gained in the previous section, I will attempt to
briefly describe the Lebanese group as follows: First. I will explore the historical development of
the various types of group identity awareness that the people of Lebanon experienced across
time. Second, I will explore the nature of the Lebanese environment as well as the relationship of
the Lebanese individual with his environment in terms of the types of adaptive skills he has used
to negotiate his particular environmental demands and changes. In conclusion, the aim of this
section is to identify the common environmental and psychological patterns that have shaped the
lives of the Lebanese.
The Location of Lebanon
Lebanon is at the crossroads of land and sea routes that link Europe, Asia and Africa. Its
unique geographical location on the Eastem shores of the Mediterranean sea and between three
major continents has meant that it has been at the intersection of the worid's most important
trade routes since the eariiest times (Cobban 1985; Hitti, 1967). This has naturally had a
significant effect on the inhabitants of Lebanon in various ways.
First, Lebanon has always been affected by the state of balance of the major worid
powers. Since eariy times, the tensions between major powers like the Hyksos and the Egyptians
from the North and South, between the Greeks and the Persians from the West and East and
later, or between the Arab powers from the East and the European powers from the West, have
had a significant effect on the lives of the Lebanese population (Gabriel, 1978; Hitti, 1967).
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More specifically, according to Hitti (1967), at times of peace. Lebanon benefited from
trade and, at times of war, it suffered greatly being in the middle of all invasion routes. The
coastal cities of Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre, for example, have a long history of altemating between
being totally destroyed by major world power conflicts, or flourishing greatly as centers of cultural
and economic exchange between the different world powers.
Second, explain Gabriel (1978) and Hitti (1967). exposure to major world powers has
also meant that the peoples of Lebanon had been throughout the ages, and still are. in the midst
of major world cultures and cultural changes. Its earliest was the Canaanite culture which was
later carried by the Phoenicians along with the alphabet to the peoples of the Mediten-anean
coastal cities. Later, the inhabitants of Lebanon were exposed to the Egyptian, Assyrian, Neo-
Babylonian. Persian, Greek as well as Roman cultures. Since then, the state of being of the
inhabitants of the lands of Lebanon have been influenced by the Moslem Arab cultural and
power centers to its East and the Christian power and cultural centers to its West.
The Nature of Lebanon
Lebanon contains a chain of mountains bordering the Mediterranean Sea. Between
these mountains and the sea lies a stretch of coastal land that includes the ancient cities of Tyre,
Sidon, Beirut, Byblos and Tripoli. To the east of the Lebanon mountain range extends the Biqa'
Valley and another mountain range. This narrow stretch of coast-mountain-valley-mountain
separates the Arab hinteriand from the Mediterranean Sea.
That type of terrain made of hills and valleys tended to divide its inhabitants into
separate communities since the eariiest of times. For instance, the ancient Phoenicians, the
people who inhabited Lebanon in approximately 3000 BC. were divided into similar but separate
city states. This type of topography continued to foster separate communities that had little social
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contact until that started to change early in the current century with the advent of better roads
and more advanced means of communication (Hitti, 1965).
Moreover, as we shall see in the proceeding sections, Lebanon's geographical nature
has also affected its historical development. On the one hand, the nature of the mountains made
it somehow difficult for foreign invaders to fuUy or directly control the mountain's inhabitants,
who. eventually, were able to enjoy some kind of autonomy. On the other hand, the strategic
importance of the coastal cities had meant that these cities would experience rapid changes as a
result of the changes in the dominant powers that would seek to control them. In conclusion,
Lebanon's unique mountainous nature as well as its geographical location and its exposure to the
sea through its coasts has had a distinctive effect on the psychology of its inhabitants.
mgntitigS in Lehflnon from the Phoenician Era u ntil the End nf the Greek Fra
Earlv City State Identities
Different civilizations passed through Lebanon over the years and left their marks
there. The eariiest inhabitants, the Phoenicians were culturally and ethnically Canaanites. As
many historians have written (Badre, 1993; Hitti, 1965, 1967; Salibi, 1965), the Phoenicians were
one of the first civilizations to establish independent city states, such as Tyre and Byblos, on the
Lebanese coast. The Greeks were the ones who gave the Phoenicians their historical name,
while, in fact, the inhabitants of each city named themselves in reference to the city they
belonged to. Therefore, the Phoenicians identified themselves with their city of origin even
though they all shared the same culture, race and language. Relationships between the different
cities were those of independent city states.
In conclusion, I believe that the fact that the Phoenician people have never developed a
sophisticated awareness of a common identity must have been the reason why they were never
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able to build a civilization and an empire sinnilar to those of the Greeks and Romans who came
after them. However, it is important to note here that the different Phoenician city states were
self ruled and that they controlled the trade in the Mediterranean Sea by having invaded and
established other coastal cities, such as Carthage and Sicily (Badre, 1993). Furthemiore, they
were also one of the first ancient peoples to invent an alphabet.
Foreign Invasions
^
nrj Identity Atjaptationy
After the Phoenicians, Lebanon was invaded by numerous outside powers. The two most
significant of these came from across its western borders: the Greeks, followed by the Romans.
During those times, even though the Lebanese cities were subject to foreign rules, they were
given by the invading powers a high degree of autonomy in the various political, administrative
and cultural spheres (Deeb, 1993).
During the Hellenistic (Greek) period, for instance, the Lebanese cities did not lose their
character nor even the local dialects that were common at the time. As for the spoken
languages, Greek became the official language, while all the Semitic dialects, specifically
Aramaic, continued to be the people's day to day spoken language (Deeb, 1993).
Moreover, the social classes remained the same with the aristocrats and the religious
authorities receiving special attention and privileges from the invading powers in return for their
loyalty and cooperation in serving as intennediaries between the external ruling powers and the
local inhabitants (Deeb, 1993). During the Roman period, however, one of the privileges that the
Lebanese ruling class was deprived of was the title "king", leaving the Lebanese aristocracy
solely with the title of "rulers," which was a title that better reflected the power realities of the
time (Deeb, 1993).
In short, I can conclude here that those Lebanese cities that submitted to the invading
powers without much resistance were able to survive and adapt to the new cultures. More
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specifically, the semi-autonomy enjoyed by the various Lebanese cities guaranteed that the
people maintained their city identities as well as their cultural heritage while at the same time
assimilating new cultural nomis from the new invading cultures. This also meant that a
submissive and cooperative attitude on the part of the city's indigenous elite was the most
adaptive for the inhabitants of a city.
Identities in Lebanon during the Ronnan and Bv7antinp Pph^hc
The Arab Cultural Identity
By the fifth century AD, the Arabs as an ethnic group were quite dominant in the
Lebanese/Syrian region with Arabic overshadowing the other Semitic dialects (Hazim, 1993).
Moreover, during the fifth or sixth century, the classical Arabic language began to be used as
common literary language among various Arabs from different regions (Salibi, 1979). A
significant number of these Arab tribes were Christians (Hazim, 1993).
The Christian Relig ious Identity
It is historically known that after Syria and Lebanon came under the influence of the
Eastem Byzantine Empire, following the split of Rome into Eastern and Western divisions in 330
AD, many of the region's Christians held different religious opinions regarding the nature of
Christ (Hazim, 1993). According to Hazim (1993), some of these Christians, who were mostly
Arab tribes, began to associate themselves with different Eastem Christian sects. Some of these
Christian sects that did not side with Byzantium on certain political issues suffered from a
differential treatment by the central government, which they resented tremendously (Hazim,
1993). The Christian Maronites, on the other hand, who also were victims of differential
62
treatment by the rulers of Byzantium, were among the first minorifes to seek refuge in the
Lebanese mountains in the sixth century AD after suffering from political persecutions (Deeb.
1993).
Identities in I ehanon during thft Arab/Mn<;|f.m pra
Even though there is some disagreement among historians over the exact origins of
Lebanon's current population, one of the irrefutable historical facts is that all the prominent
religious sects that constitute modem Lebanon were already living in the same piece of land, at
least, since the 11th century AD (Salibi, 1988). According to Salibi, the majority of the people in
Lebanon today can trace back their roots to the tribes that successively migrated from the Arab
Peninsula between the fifth and eleventh centuries AD and settled in the region currently known
as Lebanon. Therefore, the language most widely spoken today is Arabic. Some of the
Lebanese, however, trace their descent to non-Arab regions, such as the Armenian Lebanese,
who originally lived in the northern regions of Lebanon, and the Christian Maronites, who believe
that they first arrived in Syria-and later took refuge in the Lebanese mountains-as "immigrants
from another land" (Salibi, 1988, p. 88).
There are two major religious trends in Lebanon today. Islam and Christianity. Nineteen
different sects compromise these two trends, and they are: The main Christian sects are the
Maronites, Greek Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholics, Protestant Evangelicals as well
as Armenian Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants. The main Moslem sects, on the other hand,
are the Sunnis, Shiites, and Druzes Even though Lebanon has been affected by the presence
of all these sects, it is especially useful to briefiy review the history of four major sects whose
interaction has had the most significant effect on the history of Lebanon, mainly that of the
Sunni, Shiite, Maronite and Druze sects.
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IheJ^oaitaLldentitieg; The ArabJVIosiem/Sunni M;.jnrij3^jj^Diii^
Lebanon remained under the Byzantine dominance until 641 AD. Then, it came under
the Arab Moslem rule, which, in fact, consisted of different Islamic empires that governed the
region for approximately 600 years (Hanf. 1993). The Prophet Mohammed started preaching
Islam in the year 61 0 AD among the different Arab tribes in Western Arabia. After 632. his
successors conquered the lands of Syria and Lebanon and drove the Byzantine forces out of the
region (Salibi. 1988).
From that time until 1516. Lebanon was part of the territory of the different Arab/Moslem
empires, mostly Sunni, that ruled the region. The only exception was the period between 1098
and 1291 when the Crusaders from the West dominated the Lebanese coasts (Salibi, 1988).
Moreover. Arabic became the official language of the govemment after 700 AD when all the
registers and records were completely translated into Arabic. (Hazim, 1993).
For most of the Arab/Moslem rule, the Lebanese coastal cities were inhabited by mostly
Sunni Moslems, who represented the majority of the Moslem Arabs across the Arab regions, in
addition to some Christian minorities. The settlement of mainly Sunni tribes in the Lebanese
coast after the advent of Islam reflected the economic and military importance that these cities
had vis-a-vis the stability and safety of any of the Islamic Empires that ruled the region.
Moreover, all the coastal cities were, most of the time, directly ruled by the central powers of the
successive empires through military commanders (Baydoun, 1993; Hazim, 1993; Salibi, 1979).
The Mountain Ident ity : The Christian. Druze. and Shiite Minority Identities
It is important here to notice that, as Salibi (1988) explains, the history of Arabs in pre-
Islamic times was one of tribes or principalities headed by tribal sheiks or princes. During Islamic
times, however, the Arabs were supposed to owe their loyalty to the universal State of Islam.
64
regardless of who the ruler was or where he was from. Therefore, those Arab tribes from rural or
isolated regions who wanted to maintain some degree of their past autonomy from the central
powers Without being branded as rebels, had to justify their autonomy by interpretations of Islam
that were different from the dominant religious authorities at the time. In other instances, some
Arab tribes who did not convert to Islam but remained Christian, also used their differences in
religion so that they could maintain some degree of autonomy from the dominant powers.
Therefore, it was likely that the religious minority tribal groups that settled in Mount
Lebanon and its surroundings must have had a common denominator, and that is a desire to
maintain some degree of autonomy from the central powers. This autonomy could have been
maintained by espousing a different religious or sectarian identity from the dominant powers, or
by taking advantage of the relative geographical isolation that the mountains offered. Finally,
one can conclude here that three basic facts must have played significant roles in the psychology
of these minority religious communities: (1) holding different religious beliefs, (2) sharing a
common fear of persecution from the central authorities and (3) desiring to maintain some
degree of autonomy.
As was mentioned eariier, the Maronite Christians began to settle in the area during the
Byzantine Era as a result of dynamics between them and the dominant Byzantine powers similar
to the dynamics mentioned above by Salibi. Moreover, during the Moslem rule, mainly between
the 10th and 1 1th centuries AD, similar psychological circumstances led to the last arrival of the
Christian Maronites to northem Mount Lebanon (Salibi, 1988).
Other groups, however, such as the Druzes-a particular sect that developed from Islam-
-began to appear in different parts of Syria around that time, mainly in the southem parts of
Mount Lebanon. Whereas some of these Druzes, who were Arab tribes and indigenous to the
Lebanese mountains, converted to the Druze religion in the 11th century AD, others were tribes
that came from other parts of the region and took refuge in the mountains after adopting the
Druze religion (Salibi, 1988).
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Finally, the Shilte Moslems (the other major sect of Islam) were present in the territory
that separated the Druzes and the Maronites, namely the Kisrawan region as well as the Biqa'
valley, the Baalbek region and Jabal Amil. They differed with the Sunnni Moslems by accepting
"neither the Umayyad caliphs, nor the Abbasids. as legitimate Imams [but] instead, they
recognized different descendants of All as Imams, and therefore became divided into as many
Shiite sects" (Salibi, 1988, p. 10-11).
Relation? between the Various Rgliqious Groups and thP nor^jnant Pnwpr<.
Autonomy, however, did not mean independence for the people of the mountains. The
different tribal groups associated themselves with the leading powers and submitted to their rule
in retum for protection and security. Mainly, as a community, the Druzes, allied themselves with
the ruling Moslem govemments throughout the Arab/Moslem rule and their members were often
conscripted into the army (Hanf, 1993; Salibi, 1988). Moreover, the Druzes enjoyed a closer
relationship with the various Moslem powers than the Christians because they were religiously
closer to the rulers (Khalaf, 1987; Salibi. 1988).
The Maronites. on the other hand, were also allied with the dominant Moslem powers
who permitted all Christians to practice all their religious rituals and beliefs without any
inhibitions. In retum. the Christians, being the people of the Book, were obligated to pay personal
taxes to the Moslem govemment, which also guaranteed their protection in war situations
(Hazim, 1993).
The only exception was when the Maronites rallied around the Crusaders at the end of
the 11th century (Salibi, 1988). Moreover, in 1180. the Maronite Patriarch and his bishops, who
wanted to gain stronger ecclesiastic command over their tribal followers, advocated a union of
the Maronite and the Roman churches. This, however, caused an internal war among the
Christians because many of them opposed a union with the Western Church.
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Ultimately, though, ,ho Maronlte church established a fomal alliance with the church in
Rome, Which still exists until today (Salibi, 1988). This alliance served the Christiahs well when
the ruling Moslem powers were in good temis with the western powe^. At other times, though, it
worked against their well-being (Salibi, 1988).
At this point, it would seenn that the majority of Arab tribes that settled in Mount Lebanon
did that mainly out of their interest in maintaining some degree of tribal and religious autonomies
as well as safety under the rule of the dominant authorities of the time-being that the Byzantine
Empire or the different successive Moslem Empires that followed. Moreover, tribal leaders
or/and religious clergy gave their loyalty to those outside powers that could best guarantee their
safety and secure the highest degree of relative autonomy to their communities.
On the other hand, the Sunni tribes that settled the coastal cities were in a safer
position, satisfied by their majority status, especially that that enabled them to benefit from the
trade opportunities that the coasts offered during peace times. But, like their predecessors, the
different city inhabitants suffered great losses during times of war when they resisted the power
changes that took place at different stages of the Moslem Empires. Those city inhabitants and
city elites who happened to be on the wining side of the warring factions survived and prospered
while others perished.
Therefore we see, once again, that as far as the inhabitants of Lebanon's cities or
mountains were concemed, survival often meant a capacity on their part to adapt to the
changing realities of the power struggles around them. The flexibility of the communities to
change loyalties and to cooperate and submit to the winning forces would have conferred on
them a distinctive survival advantage. That is, such an environment would have made the
selection of such adaptive tactics a primary characteristic of any surviving community and their
elites.
Finally, the closer the identity of the tribe to the that of the ruling powers was, the more
were the advantages conferred on them compared to other tribes with a more distant identity.
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Therefore, since the nature of relations of the various tribes in Lebanon with the dominant
powers were determined by the tribe's religious identification, the religious identity of an
individual became the most salient identity in that environment.
Identities in I Pbanpp from the Ottoman Fp^pire Until Wnr|H lA/^r
I
As we have seen in the preceding sections, until the beginning of the Turicish Ottoman
Empire (1516), the different Lebanese communities functioned under the rule of one or the other
of the dominant Arab /Moslem powers. Each community, through its leaders, chose the alliances
that best served its needs for security, autonomy and relative financial independence. Until that
time, there was never any formal organization between the various Lebanese communities.
This, however, started to change after the occupation of the Lebanese lands by the Ottoman
powers in 1 51 6. This is why many Lebanese scholars trace the roots of the modem Lebanese
State to that period of time (Gordon. 1980; Khalaf. 1987; Odeh, 1985).
The story of the formation of Lebanon into its current form and structure after the advent
of the Ottoman Empire can be likened to the story of the development of a human being as he
progressively develops into a more complicated and differentiated organism. In the following
section, I will briefly trace the major stages of the development of the Lebanese group into its
current state. Therefore, the story of the physical development of the Lebanese group as well as
its changes in nature, structural complexity, and the identity of self awareness of its members will
be examined within the context of the environment and environmental changes that affected it.
The Mount Lebanon Region between the Sixteenth and Eighteenth Centuries
Early Formation. Lebanon came under the Ottoman (modem-day Turkish) rule in 1516.
Instead of organizing their Empire on a military/geographical basis like their predecessors, the
68
Ottomans instituted a sectarian based organization (Hanf, 1993). More specifically, they
implemented a direct or indirect rule over their subjects in accordance with the similarities or
differences between the subjects' identities and themselves (Hanf. 1993).
In other words, the Moslem Sunni Turks initially implemented a direct rule on the coastal
Lebanese cities because (1) the city inhabitants and their rulers both shared the Sunni Moslem
identity while still differed with them on the Arab ^Turkish identity category and because (2) of
the strategic importance of coastal cities. On the other hand, the remote mountainous regions,
which were inhabited by Maronites, Druzes and some Shiite Moslem communities, were ruled
indirectly through the mediation of the indigenous feudal community leaders whose primary
obligation towards the Ottoman Empire was to pay taxes (Hanf. 1993). One can conclude here
that under such an environment, an individual's sectarian identity became even more important
than it had been in the past in terms of determining his status and survival chances under the
rule of the dominant powers.
Here, it is important to note that the mountain community was organized into a common
structure of two social classes, mainly, a feudal class of mostly Druzes and some Christian
families who presided over a class of some Druzes and a majority of Christian peasants. The
land was owned by mostly Druze families because the Druze community had a very close
relationship with the different ruling powers and, unlike the Christians, enjoyed the privilege of
serving in the military of these powers (Hanf, 1993; Khalaf, 1979; Salibi, 1988).
Dependency and Oppression By the end of the sixteenth century, the Ottomans
encouraged Emir Fakhr al-Din II, who was a Druze prince, to organize under his rule, with the
help of their support, the mountain regions, and later to add to that the rest of what constitutes
nowadays Lebanon, that is. the Biqa' valley and the Lebanese coastal cities. Therefore, the
Ottomans supported the Druze leader, whose function was to organize under his rule the
different feudal leaders of the various areas and to collect taxes from them in order to pay his
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Ottoman rulers. The feudal leaders, in turn, had significant power in matters dealing with their
tribal communities, while the Emir had almost no interference in such matters (Hanf. 1993;
Khalaf. 1979; Salibi. 1988).
The mountain leader's political independence for the next two hundred years varied
according to how much he was perceived to pose a threat to the influence of the Ottoman
authorities. During Fakhr al-Din irs relatively politically independent period (1590-1635). before
he was eventually exiled and later executed by the Turks, he encouraged stronger ties with
Europe, built an army and many fortresses, and developed agriculture through modem
technology that was brought in from Italy (Hanf, 1993). Another similar attempt was initiated by
another leader. Bashir al-Shihabi II, in 1821
, but like the first endeavor, it was eventually
suppressed by the angry Ottomans (Hanf. 1993).
What stands out about the period that started with Fakhr al-Din's rule over Lebanon was
the subtle symbiosis that developed during that period between the inhabitants of the mountain
regions (Hourani. 1991; Salibi. 1988). In fact, many later attempts by external powers to fully
separate the mountain communities resulted in failure (Salibi, 1988). Therefore, during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, some Lebanese areas, especially the mountains, started
to have a common social structural organization with only a limited level of autonomy for the first
time ever. Moreover, in general, the mountain regions flourished and their people enjoyed some
stability in their day to day lives. The common patterns that emerged during that period of
dependency could be summarized as follows:
First, during that time, there was only one external power dominating Lebanon. Second,
the Ottomans exercised their domination over the different communities through one
mediating system, mainly by appointing a Prince who would preside over a feudal class of
different sectarian affiliations, who. in turn, would organize the lives of the peasant class and
collect taxes for the occupying power. Third, the Princes, regardless of their sectarian affiliation,
developed different degrees of cultural and economic relationships with European powers that
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helped them modernize many economic sector.. When the relatively independent t>ehavior of
the Prince exceeded a certain Ottoman comfort level, he was disposed of by the Ottomans and
replaced by another more subservient Prince.
Lebanon Between the Fiahteenth and Mi.^eteenth c^nfrioc
Bgqinninq of identity Confusion Various historical accounts have been written about
this period (Hanf, 1993; Khalaf. 1979, Salibi, 1988; Goria. 1985). As the worid's balance of
powers started to change slowly, the different European powers, aware of the existence of
various religious sects in Lebanon, began to take advantage of this unique situation to suit their
own needs and political interests within the Ottoman Empire. This changing political climate
ushered in a more insidious type of domination, oppression and dependency. The effect of this
new situation was that the feudal, religious as well as the tribal leaders of the Lebanese
communities started taking advantage of the competitive nature of the relationship of the
extemal powers with respect to Lebanon.
Therefore, the various community elites started dividing along sectarian lines as a result
of which each community began identifying, allying with and giving their loyalties to the various
extemal powers. Some of these alliances were mere renewal and strengthening of past alliances,
while others were new. Two general rules guided the alliance choices: First, each community
allied itself with the outside power that best rewarded this loyalty in terms of promoting its
interests. Second, communities tended to ally themselves with outside powers that shared their
religious identities, although this was not always the case (Hanf, 1993; Khalaf, 1979; Salibi,
1988; Goria, 1985).
Multi-power Domination and Dependency. Most often, this dependent relationship
between the extemal powers and the sectarian communities was explained and justified in terms
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Of a communitys need for protection. For instance, in 1 740, the French established agreements
With the Turks entitled "foreign privileges." in which they were given the right to "protect" all
Christian Catholic sects in Lebanon that were associated with Rome. Similariy. Russia
"protected" the other Christian sects that were not associated with Rome, while Great Britain
found its way to the region through establishing relations with the Druzes (Hanf, 1993).
In other words, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, instead of a unitary feudal
Class that was subservient to and dependent on one common outside dominating oppressive
power, Lebanon started having a divided class of sectarian leaders who were subservient to
many different extemal powers. That is. the Lebanese society exchanged its.uni-dependence for
multiple dependencies. Moreover, the sectarian identity of an individual became of primary
importance since it became the basis of the dependent relationship with the extemal powers.
It could also be safely argued that, attracted by a greater potential for reward and social
justice and, therefore, better survival chances under an oppressive environment, some of the
elites in the different communities must have looked for support from different extemal powers.
That is. while still utilizing the same subservient and dependent survival strategies of their past
heritage, there seemed to be a better chance of maximizing benefits and survival chances by
"diversifying" their dependence on the different oppressive powers.
Moreover, it seems that another result of this new situation was that each extemal power
would contribute different things to each of the various sects. Thus, for example, while the Sunni
sect community might gain through being trade intermediaries between the Arab mainland and
the Europeans, the Christian community would gain by acquiring new educational, technological
as well as organizational skills from the French, etc. Therefore, even though there was a net gain
for each community, the unparallel development modalities between the communities started
creating real differences between the different sects. However, these newly adopted multi-
dependency survival tactics, as we shall see later, proved to be even more oppressive to the
Lebanese people than what the past uni-dependent situation had been.
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First Sectarian Conflict The first sectarian conflict between the Maronites and the
Druzes broke out as a direct result of this new mode of sectarian multi-dependency on the
various extemal powers. The changes in the balance of power led to a social mobilization by the
previously disadvantaged peasant Maronite Christian community. More specifically, the changes
were made possible through the European powers' political intervention in the area and the
alliances that they created with each of the two sects, i.e., the Maronites sided with the French
and the Egyptians, while the Druzes supported the British and the Ottomans (Khalaf, 1979).
After the Napoleonic conquest of Egypt, the French backed the Egyptian forces who
proceeded to weaken the Ottoman hold over Lebanon and Syria. They were successful in
occupying those territories. As a result of this, and with the help of the Egyptian power, the
Christian citizens reaped the benefits of their alliance and were able to assert themselves and
become big land owners and creditors. The Druze feudal class, who was more privileged than
the Christians during the purely Islamic rules of the past, was significantly threatened and put on
the defensive (Gordon, 1980; Goria, 1985).
For these reasons, many members of the Druze ruling class, along with their followers,
left the mountain regions and sought refuge in other parts (Khalaf, 1979). Thus, for the first time
in two hundred years, intemal social conflict and unrest along sectarian lines started affecting the
mountain region.
Interestingly enough, the reign of Egyptians ended when the Mountain communities,
both Druze and Christian, with the help of the European powers, joined forces in an attempt to rid
themselves of the Egyptian authorities after they started demanding very high taxes from all the
Lebanese people. But once the Egyptian forces left, the Druzes and the Christians tumed
against each other, with the Druzes demanding to regain some of their past influence and
properties (Hanf, 1993; Khalaf, 1979; Salibi. 1988).
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Second structural Transformation gnd the CrPf^tion of g Sectarian nnnnr.i a
serious outbreak of a civil war was averted by another external intervention. In 1841, through an
agreement between the European powers and the ever weakening Ottoman power, Mount
Lebanon was divided into two separate parts, a northern Maronite state and a Southern Druze
state in order to partially satisfy the demands of both quarreling sides of both sects as well as
their foreign protectors. However, the separation of Mount Lebanon into two separate artificial
states did not succeed and almost led to a civil war. due to the fact that many families of both
sects lived in each other's states (Hanf, 1993, Khalaf,1979).
Later, a new attempt was made by the extemal powers to solve the problem through the
establishment of a common advisory council for the two states and their rulers, consisting of
representatives of most of the sectarian Lebanese groups. The function of this council was to
take decisions and advise the rulers of both divided states on taxation matters. This was the first
time in the history of Mount Lebanon that such a council was created to represent the different
religious sects in the area. Moreover, this was the first step in institutionalizing the power of a
sectarian ruling elite who represented the various sectarian communities as well as the different
extemal powers (Hanf, 1993).
Lebanon between 1858 And W.W.I
Second inter-sectarian Conflict. While the first conflict between the different sectarian
communities was a direct result of a shift in the extemal balance of power with respect to
Lebanon and, hence, a shift in the balance of power of the Lebanese communities, an indirect
result of this shift of powers led to a second internal conflict which was caused by an uneven
development in social awareness among the differing communities. Throughout their exposure to
the Republic ideals of the French Revolution and the human rights advances in Europe in
general, the Christian community developed a higher level of awareness about public welfare
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(Khalaf, 1979). Therefore, the past relationships between the feudal master and the peasant
subjects started to be replaced by a new sense of political individuality (Hank, 1965).
Consequently, in 1858. the Maronite peasants in the northern state revolted against their
similarly Christian feudal lords and other property owners thereby creating the first peasant revolt
in the history of the area (Khalaf. 1979). Since the revolt was led by the Church, which was the
main group allied with the French, and a change in the Christian internal leadership did not
threaten the limited influence of the Ottomans, the peasant revolt succeeded in removing the
ruler and all other prominent personalities from their ruling positions and confiscating all owned
land to be divided among the peasants (Khalaf. 1979).
When a year later the revolution reached the other Druze state, the Maronite peasants,
who represented the majority of the peasants even in the southem state, revolted against the
Druze leaders and landlords for the same social reasons like their predecessors. The Druze
leaders, along with their communities and with the support and encouragement of the Ottoman
power, were soon capable of giving this social revolt a religious sectarian meaning and, hence,
beginning a tragic civil war in which hundreds of Christians were slaughtered by the Druzes. It is
significant to mention here that this bloody civil war (1860). which started between the Druzes
and the Maronites, was soon transformed into a general civil war in different parts of the country
whereby the Sunnis and the Shiites were on the Druzes' side and the other Christian sects on the
Maronites' (Hanf. 1993; Khalaf, 1979).
In conclusion, this highlights the insidious oppressive effects of the multi-dependency
tactic. The fact that, through the French, a perfectly normal social transformation was brought
about by only one sect, was naturally looked upon suspiciously by the other sects in such a
sectarianly charged environment.
Third Structural Change and the Institunalization of a Sectarian System with
Multinational Support. The dominant powers, unlike the Lebanese inhabitants, must have
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realized that non of their interests in Lebanon could be achieved if the countr/ was caught in
bloodshed. Therefore. Small Lebanon, which consisted mainly of Mount Lebanon but also certain
suburbs Of Beirut excluding the city itself, was created by the help of the European powers and
the Ottomans in 1861 to end the bloody conflict. Small Lebanon was provided with a privileged
position in the region and. therefore, a special political regime was created for it (Hanf, 1993;
Hourani. 1991).
Taking the responsibility of protecting this newly created entity, all the powers involved
decided that Small Lebanon, a special Ottoman district, was to be governed by a non-Lebanese
Christian and that a representative council of all religious sects was to be established (Gordon,
1980). This new council was the new political body that functioned as a representative of, and an
intermediary between, the Ottomans and the European powers on the one hand, and the people,
on the other. Therefore, feudalism was replaced by a constitutional structure as a system of tax
^^hering for the dominant Ottomans headed by a multi-sectarian elite group (Gordon. 1980).
(Moreover, the council included equal number of representatives of each sect until 1864, when it
began to include a number of representatives proportionate to the actual size of the population of
each sect (Hanf, 1993).
In short, the eariy informal feudal/peasant structure, through which one external power
exerted its influence on part of the inhabitants of Lebanon during the eariy sixteenth century,
evolved into a formal constitutional structure headed by different representatives of sectarian
groups who at the same time served as representatives of the now multiple-external dominant
powers. Meanwhile, those communities and their elites, who were best able to associate with,
serve, and submit to the most appropriate outside powers, thought that they were in the best
position to survive and thrive in the Lebanese environment.
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Identity Differences
When W.W.I ended, the balance of world powers, once again, changed in a very specific
direction. With the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire, the Arab provinces were to be
reconfigured into new states under the mandate of the European Allied Forces (Abdul-Sater.
1983; Hourani, 1991
;
Khalifeh. 1993). A primary concern for the Allied forces was to maintain
their Influence in the area. They could best do this by protecting their relationship with the
Christian sects in Lebanon through providing them with financial and physical securities. The
different groups in Lebanon, however, had different visions of how their future should look like.
The question of the Lebanese identity mainly centered around three options which reflected the
opinions of the different sects.
Greater Lebgnpn. A group of Christians argued for the creation of an economically
viable independent Greater Lebanon which would incorporate the Moslem areas of Beirut,
Sydon, Tyre, Tripoli and the Biqa' valley into Mount Lebanon. This group of Maronites argued
that this Greater Lebanon had always had a special character that differed from the character of
its surrounding areas (Naanai, 1993; Salibi, 1988). The only disadvantage of such an option was
that the Maronites could not belong to an entity where they would have a comfortable majority as
they did under the Small Lebanon of the past century and would thus have to share power with a
significant number of Moslems and their external supporters.
As for the Druze and Shiites, they were not specifically against the idea of the creation of
Greater Lebanon where they would enjoy the position of being minorities among other minorities
as opposed to being minorities among a Sunni majority in a Syrian or Arab state (Haddad, 1985).
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SnmUerLebanQiL Another group of Maronite Christians called for the creation of an
independent Mount Lebanon with strong ties with France. They were of the opinion that this
geographic entity, where they will be a majority, should be given complete independence in the
fomn of Smaller Lebanon. The argument was that they would feel secure from the possible
dominance of the Moslem majority in the Area. The problem with this arrangement was that the
new entity was not thought to be economically viable (Naanai, 1993).
Ubanpn a? Part of a $Yrif<n or Argb Nation The Sunni Moslems in various Lebanese
areas believed that they should be part of either a Syrian or a greater Arab nation and resented
the suggestion that they should be separated from their Moslem Arab environment. For them,
the Syrian or the Arab option meant that they would feel comfortable being part of the Sunni
majority rule. Therefore, they did not look favorably at the idea of a Greater Lebanon where they
would no longer belong to the ruling majority and would become a minority under the influence of
Western powers (Naanai, 1993).
Fourth Structural Formation and the Establishment of Greater Lebanon in 1920
Due to the long close historical relations the French had with the Maronite Christians in
Lebanon, they looked favorably at the idea of creating a greater economically more viable entity
where Maronites would have a slight majority. Therefore, in 1920, the French announced the
creation of the new state of Greater Lebanon which was to remain under their mandate until the
new entity was ready to run its own affairs independently (Abdul-Sater, 1983; Hourani, 1991;
Naanai, 1993). This form of the Lebanese entity was not satisfactory to many groups in Lebanon
as we have explained in the preceding sections. Later, the circumstances surrounding the events
of W.W.II eventually led to the establishment of an independent Lebanon and the end of the
French mandate in 1943.
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Fifth Structura l Fprmation- Official inriffp«»nTlffnr?
Again, a new shift in the balance of power among the external powers that were involved
with Lebanon led to yet another developmental change in that country. As the French Vichy
regime, which was in power in Lebanon, started to weaken by the end ofW W II, the different
Lebanese elites took advantage of this new situation to achieve their independence from the
French Mandate.
The new Lebanese Republic gained it's independence in 1943 as the result of the
cooperation of the Christian and Moslem elites in expelling the French from the country. This
was accomplished when the different sectarian elites, known as the Lebanese Founding Fathers,
agreed that the Maronites would give up their dependence on the French, while the Moslems
would give up their dependence and demands for unification with a greater Arab nation.
Moreover, they agreed to co-operate together in the development of an independent Lebanese
nation (Abdul-Sater. 1983; Al-Jisr. 1993).
The new republic had a parliamentary democracy with a constitution adapted from the
French constitution that guaranteed individual rights and freedoms for all its citizens (Abdul-
Sater, 1983). But in light of its people's past interactions and extemal relations, and due to the
pluralistic nature of the new entity, Lebanon was also to be a nation where the rights of the
different religious groups would be protected and, therefore, the government would be used to
represent the different sectarian groups.
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The Dual Nature of the | ehanese Entity aftpr 194'^
The Lebanese Founding Fathers believed that in order to maintain justice among the
different sects, power had to be shared in such a way that no group could rule without the others.
Therefore, in addition to the constitution, an unwritten informal National Pact was agreed upon
by the different sectarian elites that stipulated how the power would be shared in the new entity
(Al-Jisr, 1993). This national pact was an informal continuation of the sectarian system which had
been institutionalized during the past century as the political system that represented the
interests of various extemal as well as intemal powers.
The National Pact divided power between the Christians and the Moslems following a 6-
5 ratio, with every six pariiamentary positions allocated to the Christians, five were allocated to
the Moslems. Moreover, the president of the Republic was to be elected by the pariiament but
could only be chosen from the Maronite sect. Similariy, the prime minister could only be Sunni
and appointed by the president. The speaker of the house was to be a Shiite elected by the
pariiament members. The special privileges that were given to the Christian Maronites were
justified at the time as a means to guarantee their safety on the part of the Moslems of the
country. Moreover, division of power among the different sects was not restricted to the top
government positions, for this power-sharing formula permeated almost every aspect of the lives
of the Lebanese society (Abdul-Sater, 1983; Al-Jisr, 1993).
It follows that both the Constitution and the National Pact reflected Lebanon's
evolutionary dual nature, that is, its problematic, insecure, and dependent past nature as
compared to a hoped for, secure, safe, and independent future. More specifically, on the one
hand, the constitution determined the rules of an integrated, democratic, modem and
independent Lebanese people and nation. On the other hand, the National Pact, which was an
extension to the power an-angement that had evolved during the domination eras of the past
centuries, and which was ratified on a temporary basis to deal with the pluralistic reality of the
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unintegrated nation that existed in 1943, rendered the Constitution rigid and restricted (Shils.
1966).
Therefore, for all practical purposes, the new Lebanese system was a continuation of the
elite sectarian system of the past that served as a vehicle of submission and dependency of the
Lebanese people on the various extemal powers. In other words, the multi-dependency system
was given new life under the shadow of a modem constitution and a supposedly independent
country.
The Different Definitions of the Lebanese identity
Early Identity Definitions by the Lebanese Founding FathPrc, jhe Founding
Fathers attempted to define Lebanese identity in such a way that would reflect the sectarian
basis that led to the agreement on the National Pact. This identity was best articulated by
Michael Chiha, who was one of the main architects and visionaries in Lebanon during the eariy
independence period.
In the words of Chiha, Lebanon was "basically a beautiful and noble experiment in
peaceful cohabitation of religions, of traditions, of races. It is a natural experiment, which history
offers as a still more decisive demonstration than that of Switzeriand in the heart of Europe"
(Hudson, 1985, p. 163).
Chiha believed that sectarianism in Lebanon is
the guarantee of equitable political and social representation for the associated
minorities.. ..[it] is above all a force for order and peace. ...Lebanon is composed of
sectarian minorities. These minorities appear under the sectarian label because Lebanon
has always been a refuge for freedom of conscience. Its role as a haven has always
been possible because of Lebanon's geographical situation--in a mountainous land
where it has always been possible to defend oneself and in a maritime land from which it
has always been easy to take to the sea.... In spite of many errors and abuses, it is
sectarianism that has taught tolerance to the Lebanese. The Lebanese equilibrium,
based on sectarianism, is not an arbitrary equilibrium. It is by no means prejudice that
has created it, but the necessity for recognizing the parochialism that cover as broad a
range as do those among political parties. With time, these differences may blur and
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slowly disappear. Actually the purpose of Lebanon's existence lies precisely in the
sectarianism that characterizes it and manifests itself first in the arrangement of
legislative power. (Hudson, 1985, p.117)
Moreover, Chiha verbalized the relationship between the Lebanese identity and the
identities of non-Lebanese groups. Chiha writes:
I accept Lebanon's presence in the Arab world and admit that it has an Arab
face'...Lebanon's value is as a bridge between East and West, an interpreter of each to
the other, and a transmitter of culture in both directions; they would take pride in
Lebanon's multiethnicity and be in favor of toleration and sharing power-provided, of
course, that Lebanon's sovereignty and the integrity of the Christian communities were
not threatened. (Gordon, 1983, p.12)
The Definition of the Lebanese tdentitv by the Various "Lebanese" Political
Parties. Others, however, did not agree with Chiha's definition of Lebanese identity; their
definitions still reflected the primary conflicts around the nature of Lebanese identity that were
present during the discussions surrounding the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 and, and
which persisted after Lebanese independence.
These identity definitions were best reflected by the different political parties that
dominated political life in Lebanon after 1943. Some of these parties gave identity definitions in
tenms of a supra-Lebanese identity, while others gave definitions in terms of an intra-group
Lebanese identity. Non of these parties, however, provided a definition of identity in terms of a
Lebanese group level.
Three political Lebanese parties rejected the idea of a Lebanon based on sectarian
identities and instead believed in a secular Lebanon. The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP),
which was established in 1944, became more noticeable with the growing political power of the
Soviet Union. The LCP acknowledged Lebanon's independence in 1959 (16 years after the
country's actual independence) but it kept on working towards political solidarity with all Arab
efforts that were against colonization. The LCP was always taking the political side of the Soviet
Union (Hanf, 1993).
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Another communist party, the Socialist Movement Party, established by Arab nationals,
was a more local Communist party which was interested in absort)ing those Lebanese secular
individuals who were open to leftist ideas. Even though many of this party's significant leaders
were from the Greek-Orthodox Christian sect, its leading body also included people of all other
sects. Its regular members, however, were mainly Shiite Moslems who entered the party just
before the Civil War started in 1975 (Hanf, 1993).
The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), however, established in 1934 by Antoon
Saadeh, was against the idea of Arabism as well as a Lebanese nation, and instead believed in a
greater Syrian nation. The SSNP believed in a secular "Greater Syria" that would provide its
citizens with various opportunities to build a modem nation far from any religious colors. For the
SSNP, "Greater Syria" includes Iraq, Palestine. Syria, and Lebanon. The SSNP, as was the case
with the Communist parties, included members from various religious sects, but mainly Greek
Orthodox and Shiites (Abdul-Sater, 1983).
In addition. The Baath Party, which was established in 1940 in Syria but became known
in Lebanon only in 1951, believed in a secular nation while considering religion, mainly Islam, an
important part of Arab education. Sunni Moslems from Tripoli joined the Lebanese Baath Party in
the beginning; later on, Shiite Moslems from other cities joined too. This party is a national Arab
party; due to its breakdown into two factions in the mid-sixties after the establishments of new
govemments in Syria and Iraq, the Lebanese Bath Party also divided into two, one favoring the
Syrian regime while the other the Iraqi regime (Hanf, 1993).
Other parties based their definitions of the Lebanese identity on the interests of their
particular sectarian communities. The Kataeb Party (the Phalangists), for instance, was
established in 1936 and had its ideology based on Lebanon's complete unconditional
independence and was the major enemy for all the Syrian national and Arab political parties
(Hanf, 1993). However, even though this party is considered to be open to all Lebanese, the
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majority of its members are Maronites and. therefore, espouses the interests of the Maronite
community (Gordon, 1983).
Similar to the Kataeb Party among the IVIaronite community, but on the Moslem Sunni
side, was the Al-Najjadah Party, which supported Arab nationalism and a strong association
between Arabism and Islam (Hanf, 1993). FinaUy, The Popular Socialist Party believed in a
secular and a completely independent Lebanese nation as well as a strong association with the
Arab world. Even though this party attracted a number of intellectuals from various sects, just
like the SSNP, those who usually voted for this party were mainly Druzes from the Shut
mountains. Hence, this party was perceived as representing the interests of the Druze
community (Gordon, 1983, Hanf, 1993).
Survival of the New Entitv from 1943 to 1976
According to Hudson, who conducted an analysis of Lebanon in 1967, the survival of the
integrity of the Lebanese entity was dependent on the capacity of the power elite of the different
sects to maintain a power balance between the different sectarian groups as well as deal
effectively with the forces of change in the country (Hudson, 1985).
Maintaining Power Balance . The same survival tactics used by the different sectarian
elites in the past century continued to be used well into the existence of the new Lebanese State.
For example, in the foreign policy sphere, the relationship between the different sects after 1943
followed the same rules that govem relationships between independent states. The different
groups established alliances with outside regional or international powers as a way to maintain
the internal balance with the internal groups (Hudson, 1985).
Therefore, if the Christians leaders were to disturb the balance of power and cooperate
with Westem powers to increase their influence in the country, the Moslems leaders would then
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cooperate with regional Moslem powers to re-establish that balance. When the external powers
were in a state of confrontation over issues relating to the Middle East, the balance of power in
Lebanon would be threatened (Hudson, 1985).
For example, in 1 958, the Maronite president of the republic attempted to exert pressure
on the opposing Moslem forces in the country Dy allying himself with the United States, which
was interested in limiting the rise of Egyptian Nasserism in the Middle East. The Moslem side
reacted by allying itself with Egypt in order to prevent the re-election of that president, and thus
preventing a tilt in the balance of power. The result was a temporary outbreak of civil war which
lasted until a new president. General Fouad Chehab, was elected. General Chehab followed a
neutral extemal policy and thus re-adjusted the balance of power (Abdul-Sater. 1983; Goria,
1985).
Attitudes toward? Chanqg. According to Hudson (1985), as Lebanon's needs and
conditions developed, the confessional system survived as long as the power elite managed to
control the forces of change that the country experienced. Integration of the different sects was
perceived as a threat to the sectarian system of government and. therefore, it was resisted in a
number of ways. First, the leaders of the different sects cooperated and compromised in order to
avoid conflicts, while at the same time, they fulfilled the demands of their sub-communes in
order to maintain control over them. Second, they cooperated in order to keep the sects apart,
and thus keep them dependent on their leadership (Koury, 1976).
Moreover, the whole sectarian leadership would cooperate in order to thwart any attempt
by a central government to implement integrative reforms that were designed to deal with the
changes facing the country. Such was the case with the sectarian leaders' reaction to the
integrative reforms instituted by General Chehab during his presidency. The whole group of
sectarian leaders formed an alliance and made sure that his reform movement would not
continue (Goria. 1985; Hanf. 1993; Hudson. 1985; Odeh, 1985).
85
Lebanon Aft^r
^
^ja
Causes of Lebanesp Civil War
The Lebanese system and its leadership managed to avoid serious conflict from
breaking out for around thirty years. But two compounding factors led to the outbreak of the Civil
War in 1975. First, the changing nature of the Lebanese entity led to an increase in the social
pressure with which the rigid sectarian system could no longer deal with. More specifically,
changes in demographic ratios, the technological advance of the means of communications, the
increase in education levels and the inability of the political system to adapt to such changes, led
to the breakout of that conflict in 1975. Second, the changes in the internal power balance as a
result of yet another change in the power balance of the extemal alliances of each of the internal
groups (Goria, 1985; Hanf, 1993; Hudson, 1985; Khalidi, 1981; Odeh, 1985).
As was the case in the past century with the rise of the peasants in the mountains, what
started out as a social mobilization on part of the Lebanese leftist forces was soon transformed
into a sectarian war by the right wing forces in the system. While the Maronite Christians were
the ones, this time, in a privileged position, the leftist forces were the ones demanding the
deconfesionalization of the system to address the new inequities in the Lebanese society
(Hudson, 1985; Khalidi, 1981; Odeh, 1985).
The perception was that the majority of the under-privileged in the country belonged to
the Moslem religion, although not exclusively. Therefore, the class movement that fueled the rise
of the multi-sectarian leftist forces was perceived as a Moslem threat on the country's Christians
(Hanf, 1993).
As was the case in the past century, the demands for change were possible because of
shifts in the external power balance, both in the Middle East and the worid. A number of events
In the Middle East led to an eventual concentration of Palestinian military forces in Lebanon in
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the 1970's. This new strong Palestinian presence, most of whom were Sunni Moslems,
threatened the Maronite Christian privileged power status because it shifted the intemal
Lebanese balance of power in favor of the leftist movement, which became closely allied with
these new Palestinian forces. The Christians, on the other hand, responded to this threat by
allying themselves with regional and intemational forces that were opposed to the Palestinian
presence in Lebanon (Hanf, 1993; Hudson, 1985; Khalidi, 1981; Odeh. 1985).
Moreover, as Corm (1 994) explains, soon after the breakup of the war. the various
sectarian elites who were associated with the extemal powers started to utilize certain war tactics
intended to polarize and divide the Lebanese community along sectarian lines. By doing so.
these sectarian elites were taking advantage of the past sectarian insecurities in order to
strengthen their political status among the different Lebanese communities, each of which
started perceiving the military forces in their sects as their protectors against the others. Some of
these tactics included the killing of individuals according to their religious identities as specified
on their identity cards, sniping at civilian communities and bombing of residential areas (Corm
1994).
However, as the war continued, it soon became so complicated and dependent on
outside factors that the country's leadership lost all control of the path of events (Hanf, 1993).
Therefore, the original conflict that was transformed eariy in the war into a Moslem-Christian
inter-group conflict was soon replaced and compounded by additional numerous intra-sectarian
group conflicts with each of the different sides supported by some outside power or state. Soon,
the country became divided into many different sub-groups. As Khalaf wrote in 1987, "the
country is splintered into all sorts of quasi-groups, communities, confessions, neighborhoods,
fronts, and militias-even the street is recognized as a political entity" (p. 254).
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ThQ End of the War apd the Ta'jf A^r^M
In 1989, with yet another significant change in the world's balance of powers as a result
of the threat of the Gulf war between (Iran and Iraq), the Lebanese civil war approached its end
with the signing of the Ta'if Accord, which was signed in the Saudi Arabian city of Ta'if. As Maila
(1 994) explains, the Ta'if Accord is viewed as an agreement between the various Lebanese
warring parties developed under the auspices of the Arab countries and the United States. The
implementation of the Accord would be directly overseen and supported by Syria, whose
relationship with Lebanon was also redefined as part of the Ta'if Accord.
Therefore, the Ta'if Accord represents yet another attempt by the different extemal and
intemal parties associated with Lebanon to find a new solution to its problem. As Maila (1994)
puts it:
The Ta'if Accord is rooted in a well established "tradition" that renders Lebanon more of
a contractual, consociative country than one based on a constitution. According to this
tradition, the formal, legal framework is always subordinate to a pragmatic, consensual
approach to mitigating conflict within the country, and to managing national communal
strains, (p. 31)
According to Maila's analytical summary, on the intemal level, the Accord first
reconfirms that Lebanon is a country based on a pact that stipulates the coexistence of its
various sectarian groups. Moreover, it adds that any authority that does not respect the national
pact of co-existence would have no constitutional legitimacy. It also cleariy declares that
Lebanon is an Arab country that is a homeland for the Lebanese people and whose curent
borders are permanent. Therefore, this new identity definition calms the Christians' fears that
Lebanon would be incorporated into a greater Arab country. Moreover, it accepts the Moslem
definition of the Lebanese identity as being part of a greater Arab cultural identity.
Second, the Ta'if changes the past Christian Moslem power sharing ratio from 6-5 to 6-6,
Moreover, it takes some of the powers of the Maronite Christian president and gives them to the
council of ministers which is headed by a Sunni Moslem. In addition, it strengthens some of the
88
powers Of parliament which is headed by a Shiite Moslem. Third, it reiterates the 1943 idea that
sectarianism as a system of government should be eventually eradicated at some point in the
future.
On the extemal level, the Accord defines the nature of the close and friendly relationship
that exists between Syria and Lebanon as well as the nature of the Lebanese policy towards its
Israeli enemy.
I
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CHAPTER III
LEBANESE STAGES OF IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT
Brief Integration of Literature Rt>vi^vy
The brief exploration of Lebanon's long history was intended to highlight the major
factors that have shaped the psychology of the inhabitants of the lands of Lebanon. More
specifically, we have seen in our exploration of psychological theories that, in order to propose a
Lebanese Identity Development Model, it is important to:
First, define the past survival tactics that have become maladaptive and which have to
eventually evolve into new adaptive ones if survival is to continue.
Second, define the nature of the separation-individuation process that guides Lebanon's
development and growth. That is, it is important to understand the nature of the process and its
evolution from unawareness, fear, and dependency to higher levels of awareness, security,
autonomy and independence.
And third, define the environmental factors that increase or decrease the Lebanese
individual's awareness of his Lebanese identity.
In the same way that communities living in areas with harsh and unstable weather
conditions have to develop specific physical adaptive skills to guarantee their survival, Lebanon
has also had to develop certain cultural and political adaptive skills.
For most of the Lebanese history, the people in Lebanon have been subjected to rapid
cultural changes and have been the victims of successive dominations by a large number of
different groups. Under these conditions of domination and rapid change, the Lebanese have
had to develop a set of survival tactics that could preserve their accumulated cultural knowledge
as well as enable them to flexibly adapt to these changes.
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Moreover, these communities and individuals who wanted to maintain some degree of
autonomy and freedom from the dominant powers tended to settle in relatively isolated and
peripheral areas to the power centers of these dominant groups. Paradoxically, Lebanon, due to
its geographical location and its mountainous physical nature, also served as a haven for such
communities. Therefore, the cultural heritage of the peoples of Lebanon have been
characterized by the two psychological traits: first, a flexible capacity to deal with external
domination and rapid cultural changes, and second, a desire for independence and autonomy.
The history of Lebanon would seem to show that one of the earliest adaptive tactics to
extemal domination and change had been the development of a culture in which communities
expected their leading elite class to possess sophisticated skills that enabled them to accomplish
two parallel tasks: Protect the communities and help them maintain some autonomy in their day-
to-day lives while, at the same time, guarantee that the needs and interests of the invading
dominating powers would be satisfied with minimal loss to the communities in question. A
cultural heritage that maintained a different view around the nature of power relations in the
community and its extemal environment would have been extinguished in the process of natural
selection.
As the major military powers and cultural trends in the world became defined in terms of
Christianity and Islam, a Christian and Moslem group identity became the most significant
identity for those communities living in Lebanon. That is, through these religious identities, a
process of identification would take place between the Lebanese communities and the various
extemal groups.
More specifically, the same subservient adaptive skills to extemal domination used in
the past by the Lebanese communities continued to play a significant role in people's lives.
However, with the goal of securing higher levels of independence from the oppressive influences
of domination, each community chose to submit to the dominating power that best rewarded this
relationship and was, thus, least oppressive, and which was in conflict with the other dominant
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powers that were most oppressive to the community in question. As history shows though, this
same survival tactic became oppressive with time because it meant that the Lebanese
communities had to turn against each other every time the external balance of powers would go
through any changes.
Development and evolution dictate that individuals acquire higher levels of awareness of
their environment and higher levels of power and control over that environment and their
destinies. Thus, as the life of the Lebanese individual became progressively more
interdependent on others in the Lebanese community, the Lebanese communities, under the
direction and help of various external powers, started to develop a structural and physical unity
that tended to reflect the degree of complexity of this interdependence. Therefore, Lebanon
moved from being a group of loosely associated individuals and communities into more
structured and defined entity.
This partial development, however, was not accompanied by enough of a cognitive and
emotional development of awareness of the Lebanese identity and nature. Some of the results of
this developmental lag was, first, a continued psychological dependence and strong identification
with the various extemal powers well into the period after the Lebanese official independence.
This is reflected by the maintenance of a polarized sectarian culture and sectarian system of
govemment.
Second, this developmental lag also meant that the Lebanese people continued to be
subjected to intemal conflicts caused by constant changes in the extemal balance of powers,
which shift the balance of power among the different sectarian communities. Third, by
maintaining a sectarian political system, the Lebanese maintain an environment where the day-
to-day survival of their individuals is highly dependent on their sectarian identities, making it hard
for Individuals to develop other more adaptive significant individual and group identities.
Therefore, a more evolutionary advance of the Lebanese identity would entail an
increased awareness of the negative and oppressive internalized aspects of their identities that
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reflect their past inadaptive skills and their dependence on a sectarian culture and external
oppressive influences. Moreover, evolution would also entail an increased awareness of the
overall interdependence and commonalties of individuals in the society irrespective of their
sectarian identities.
In the following section, I propose a Model for the Lebanese Identity Stages of
Development (SILM; this reversed acronym means Peace in Arabic) that integrates the major
conclusions that have been made in this study up to this point. These stages will be divided into
four levels of awareness as follows:
ProPQged Model of Lebanese identity stages of Development
(SIL M)
Stage I; A Pseudo-lntearated Lebanese Identity
Ind ividual Identity Avyareness
.
A true Lebanese group identity consists of the set of
cultural values, attitudes, and beliefs that guide the individual's interactions with his environment
and with others so as to lead a healthy, free, and productive life.
Lebanese individuals at this stage are aware that they belong to the same country but
still lack the awareness needed to help them acquire or develop the cultural tools that would
enable them to function properly and productively and practice citizenry with members of other
groups. Instead, individuals gain resources and a sense of security by heavily depending on the
cultural values provided by their traditional sectarian identities. Moreover, individuals also look
up to their traditional sectarian leaders for direction and protection. As a result, people tend to
reject or deny their own individual needs, rights, and values and, instead accept the sectarian
value system promoted by the dominant sectarian power elite.
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Pseudo Identity The overall Lebanese identity held by individuals at this stage is
inadequate in the sense that it does not represent a common awareness of. and an agreement
on. common Lebanese cultural values that embody people's interdependency within the society
and their deep and basic common interests and common fate. Instead. Lebanese individuals at
this stage emphasize common global characteristics that do not reflect significant commonalties
between the Lebanese people.
More specifically, the acceptance of the sectarian value system means that an
individual's primary loyalty is to his/her sectarian group. Therefore, people at this stage accept
the premise that members of the other sects are fundamentally different. The Lebanese identity
at this stage has strictly two features: First, a common awareness among the Lebanese of
belonging to the same country; second, because of their need for security, the Lebanese at this
stage share a common desire to avoid conflict in spite of the differences that individuals feel
exist between the different sectarian groups.
In fact, the lack of a true definition of the Lebanese identity in the minds of members of
this group leads them to use identities of other outside groups as a reference for their own
identity definition. That is, some individuals at this stage may feel a special closeness with non-
Lebanese groups that are from their same sect, and, therefore, would define their Lebanese
identity in terms of the identity of those strangers even if that meant excluding other Lebanese
groups from the Lebanese identity.
For instance, Christians might identify very strongly with the dominant westem cultural
values, attitudes, and beliefs while denying or suppressing all other aspects of their true
Lebanese identity experience that reflects other cultural values. The same could be said about
other Lebanese sects whose reference group might be other Arab countries in the Arab worid.
Therefore, members from each group derive pride and self-esteem by adopting characteristics of
extemal groups.
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Memt?er/Ua«er Relationship Lacking both individual and social awareness, people
at this stage are not able to develop adaptive cultural values that would guide their behavior
within the larger Lebanese environment. All group members look to the leader for direction;
therefore, individuals at this stage are highly dependent on the sectarian leadership class.
Leaders are seen as protectors of an individual's sectarian rights which are supposed to be
constantly threatened by other competitive sectarian groups.
The relationship between a member and a leader is similar to the relationship between a
*
child and an adult. Sectarian leaders are idealized and given mythical characteristics. They are
considered to be as all loving and benevolent as well as always having their subject's best
interest in mind.
Moreover, sectarian leaders are perceived by individuals at this stage as possessing a
special type of intelligence that enables them to deal with problems and make the best decisions.
Hence, individuals of this stage do not feel the need to get involved in understanding the real
issues affecting their lives. Instead, they are more interested in the appearances of certain
events, such as. which other sectarian leader met with their own leader and how both looked
(happy or sad faces) after the meeting was over. The issues that were supposedly discussed
between the two leaders are of no genuine interest to people of this stage.
IVIember/Member Relationship
. Members of different groups in the Lebanese society
have very little understanding of their interdependence and individuals restrict their interaction to
members of their own sectarian group.
Whatever relationship an individual might have with members of other sects is usually
characterized by a high degree of superficiality and artificial politeness intended to maintain good
relations and to avoid potential sectarian differences from surfacing. This interaction pattem
among members of the overall Lebanese society prevents them from leaming about each other
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and therefore, prevents the development of trust between members of different groups, which
further strengthens the false sectarian culture.
Communication pattems at this stage are also highly centralized and restricted, since
members depend on their sectarian leaders to communicate their needs to the central authorities
as well as to other members of their own group and other groups. Finally, an individual's lack of
interaction with members of other groups and his dependence on the leadership to resolve
conflicts prevents the development of independent conflict mediation mechanisms within the
larger culture.
State Qf Conflict and Cohesion At this stage individuals are not yet capable of
having an interest In an integrated society. Instead, they believe in a tense side by side
coexistence maintained between the different groups by the constant efforts of their sectarian
leadership to negotiate conflicts.
This is reflected in the fact that individuals at this stage believe that the government
should be made up of the different sectarian leaders whose primary function is to coordinate and
balance the activities of the different sectarian groups in order to avoid inter-sectarian conflicts.
This false sectarian culture creates a volatile inter-group conflict potential which is used
by the different dominant sectarian leaders in their power struggles. As long as the sectarian
leadership group can maintain a satisfactory power balance among themselves, they suppress
any conflicts and exert a lot of pressure on their group members to maintain a strong inter-group
cohesion or coexistence.
This constant attention given at this stage to sectarian issues diverts people's attention
from the real social issues that are non-sectarian in nature. Moreover, the excessive energy that
individuals at this stage devote to the maintenance of inter-sectarian balance and avoidance of
conflict means that, as a group, people at this stage are very unproductive.
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^^^ef^^Si^^^^ffe^^JS-^^^ The false sectarian culture that individuals
accept at this stage is oppressive because it only emphasizes the differences and fears among
people in the Lebanese society. The effect of this is that people's ignorance and lack of self-
awareness of themselves and their Lebanese reality is sustained; this prolongs people's
dependence on the oppressive sectarian leadership and the sectarian system of govemment
which are, in tum, supported and maintained by external powers instead of popular intemal
support.
Moreover, individuals at this stage are not aware of the problems the Lebanese sectarian
system creates, and has been creating for a long time; therefore, they reject the idea that the
sectarian system discriminates against individuals. For instance, the Lebanese at this stage
accepts the fact that certain govemment positions in the country are allocated to specific sects
while denying the negative discriminatory effects of this system on an individual's right for equal
opportunity and freedom.
In the same token, they also discard of the fact that the sectarian leadership can be
abusive in its representation of them. Consequently, Lebanese individuals in this initial stage are
not aware that they are not in control of their own fates and that their growth and survival are
both dependent on forces external to themselves.
Moreover, individuals at this stage deny that a sectarian system is always dependent on
external powers where the changes in the external balance of powers create constant frictions
among the various sectarian communities.
Stage II: The Ethnocentric Stage
Development of a Sectarian Ethnocentric Identity . Sooner or later, an individual's
false self-awareness is bound to be challenged by environmental pressures. Events or obstacles
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in the person's life develop that make him aware that he is holding an inadequate set of values,
attitudes and beliefs, that have been unquestionably internalized in the past.
As individuals gain a satisfactory sense of security within their environments, they start
realizing that their old belief system restricts their independence, personal growth and freedom.
As a result of this realization, a feeling of dissonance develops which makes the individual
realize that he needs to become more aware of himself and his personal experience with his
environment.
The individual at this stage, however, is not able to identify his real needs and values,
and therefore, true individual awareness and identification of the real source of oppression do not
materialize. Instead, individuals going through this stage enter into a reactive state that is
characterized by a high level of emotionality. This emotional energy is in the form of anger and
rejection that are directed towards whoever or whatever is perceived as the source of the
individual's oppression and false consciousness.
This period is characterized by the gradual breakdown of the individual's social system of
beliefs, which starts by the individual's rejection of the old definition of the Lebanese identity.
More explicitly, the loss of belief in the old cultural values, embodied by the false Lebanese
identity of the last stage, creates a vacuum that leads individuals to look for a replacement.
Before the individual is to recognize the full sources of oppression, he goes through a phase,
namely the second stage, where all the sectarian tensions built within him in the last stage have
to be released.
At this second stage, individuals start becoming aware of the discriminatory effects that
are present in the sectarian culture. This happens when individuals start realizing that their future
and their chances in life are pre-determined by their membership to their sect. However, a lot of
individuals at this stage are unable to accept the fact that their whole social culture is oppressive.
Instead, an individual's need for psychological stability leads him to hang on to his familiar
sectarian identities and use it as a basis for defining a new Lebanese social identity.
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Individuals at this stage of identity development reject their old Lebanese identity as well
as the sectarian identities of other sectarian groups that are seen as responsible for the
individuals" limited rights in the Lebanese society. Precisely, the individuals' line of reasoning is
as follows: If we could marginalize the existence of the other sectarian groups, our rights in this
society would not be limited and restricted. In conclusion, the individuals at the second stage
tend to define their new Lebanese identity in its most militant sectarian form by completely
rejecting and opposing all other sectarian identities.
Member/Leader Relation;>hip
.
As expected, along with the loss of belief in the old
system comes a change in attitudes regarding the type of leadership. Individuals at this stage
start to realize that they are being manipulated by their sectarian leaders to accept the
discriminatory sectarian culture; however, they are still not completely conscious of the full
extent of this manipulation.
The individuals' anger at this stage leads them to reject moderate leaders of their own
sects who are seen as failing to promote the individuals' interests and protect the individuals' full
rights as well as leaders of the other sects who are seen as responsible for their oppression.
Instead, sectarian leaders that adopt militant positions tend to appeal to individuals at
this stage because they give expression to the individuals' diffused anger. Moreover, these
militant sectarian leaders encourage angry individuals to develop this new false sectarian identity
that is defined in terms of its hostility towards other sectarian groups. By keeping individuals
focused on sectarian issues, sectarian leaders ensure that the sectarian system from which they
operate and from which they derive their power continues to survive.
Conflict and Cohesion. Individuals at this stage reject the past conciliatory sectarian
culture that calls for inter-group cohesion and the suppression of sectarian differences. On the
contrary, through the encouragement of the most ethnocentric militant sectarian leaders.
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individuals believe that there are irreconcilable differences between themselves and members of
other groups which they are no longer ready to deny. Hence, any member of the "other group is
assumed to be a competitor, while any member of the same group is regarded as naturally
cooperative.
Therefore, individuals at this stage manifest high levels of ethnocentrism and show no
regard to any feelings of Lebanese nationalism. The cohesion of the whole national group is
much less important for individuals at this stage than the cohesion of their respective sectarian
groups. Hence, one sees many of them calling for the separation of the different ethnic groups
into independent ethnic entities.
Moreover, the individuals' loss of loyalty to the Lebanese group as well as their primary
concem with the supremacy of their own group over other groups lead individuals to associate
and cooperate with any group alien to the Lebanese society that would help them attain their
goals.
Because of the influence of stage one on them, many individuals at this stage feel
absolutely no loyalty to the Lebanese identity and are very open to adopting any new identity that
promises to respect their basic human rights for equality and freedom. Therefore, a very large
number of Lebanese people going through this stage decide to distance themselves from the
Lebanese society and immigrate to other countries. Others choose to withdraw into their private
worlds and refuse to participate in any activity with the oppressive forces.
Member/Member Relationship. Unlike the individuals in the first stage whose
interaction with others was characterized by its limited, indirect, and superficial nature,
interactions among individuals going through this stage are characterized by their high level of
intensity. These individuals are highly emotional; their anger, fear, and suspicion motivate most
of their interactions with their environment. In fact, they direct their anger at all others who are
perceived as causing the problem.
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Therefore, the nature of these intense interactions between individuals is determined by
whether they belong to the same sectarian group or to a different one. At this stage, anger is
directed at the members of other sects and contact with them is conflictual and competitive in
nature, while members of the same sect, including complete strangers, are looked upon for
support and safety.
Moreover, same sect members are also pressured to maintain high level of cohesion
among themselves. Individuals are forced to conform to and accept the most ethnocentric
aspects of their sectarian group, which is the culture imposed on them and promoted by the
extremist sectarian power elite who derive their power from extemal parties. So once again, the
individuals' own will, values, and attitudes, which differ from the dominant ethnocentric culture,
have to be suppressed, hidden, or denied. As to their attitudes to members of other opposing
groups, they dehumanize them, see them as absolute evil, inferior and definitely threatening.
The End of Stage Two. By the end of this period, the individual's way of thinking would
have developed from a belief that conflict exists on the sectarian level, which can only be
resolved by force, to the beginning of the realization that force is futile. Moreover, the original
clarity of seeing the conflict in black and white terms, i.e., through sectarian eyes, is abolished
forever. The individual will become aware that there is something more complicated at play here.
The simplicity of sectarian logic is left behind after the person moves on from this stage.
Stage III: The Lebanese Identity Formation Stage
Development of Stage Three Awareness. Individuals move on from a stage two
consciousness level when they realize that their extreme ethnocentric identities are not
satisfactory. The individuals' continued dissatisfaction at the end of stage two is caused by the
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following three factors: First, the pressure to conform and subjugate their personal needs to the
needs of the militant group during the second stage starts becoming very oppressive; second,
they discover that engaging in long periods of hostility towards others is psychologically and
materially very draining and destructive to the individual and to all those around him; third, the
overall negative social atmosphere of the last stage creates an intra-group competitive and
hostile environment that leads the individual to become more careful and suspicious of members
of his own group.
Therefore, individuals that move into the third stage of identity development are those
who become aware of the oppressive effects of the sectarian culture as well as the coercive
effects of their own ethnocentricity and the ethnocentricity of others around them. Such
individuals are no longer ignorantly accepting of social injustice as they had been during the last
two stages. In fact, for the first time during their development, they are able to recognize the true
sources of oppression and identify those who are responsible for it.
Identity Definition. At this stage, individuals start developing an awareness of their true
individual and Lebanese selves. Once the Lebanese's anger and emotions had been played out
during the last stage, the individual becomes now capable to perceive himself and his
environment in a more rational way. Therefore, the individual at this stage begins developing his
new identity based on a true reading of the facts about himself and others around him. More
specifically, people at this stage focus their energy on developing a better understanding of their
individual needs, values, and desires as well as their true relationships with others. By doing so,
they start developing a new Lebanese identity based on overall community needs and human
values where the Lebanese person's individual rights and the overall public rights take
precedence over group sectarian rights.
Moreover, the individual's new awareness of the true sources of oppression at this stage
helps him develop his new identity independent of any oppressive influences. This change can
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be seen in two ways: First, the past oppressive sectarian group cultural values are ignored and
dismissed as the search for the new identity begins. Individuals at this stage have more
autonomy and. therefore, they hold on to the sectarian values that they individually feel
comfortable with, regardless of what the sectarian group culture is. Second, the higher individual
awareness that people possess at this stage leads them to develop a Lebanese identity that is
separate from other non-Lebanese cultural influences with which the individual used to identify
with in the past two stages. Instead of adopting the cultural values of one specific external group,
individuals at this stage begin a process of adapting cultural values from the many groups to
which they are exposed to in a way that would fit their needs and improve their lives. Therefore,
the identity formed at this stage is a true Lebanese identity since it consists of the cultural values
of an independent and integrated Lebanese people.
Real concrete concems such as food and shelter, family survival, educational
opportunity for self and/or for children and proper public services, are the primary focus of
individuals at this stage, as opposed to the highly irrelevant and ideological issues that falsely
preoccupied them during the last two stages.
Finally, the identity that the individual starts developing at this stage is more dynamic
and flexible to the needs and circumstances of the real internal social environment as opposed
to past subssiveness to extemal pressures by external groups.
Member/Leader Relationship The individuals' new sense of awareness and
independence also leads them to change their leadership preferences. Individuals at this stage
perceive leadership in a much more realistic way than in the past. As individuals enter the third
stage, they realize that many of the sectarian leaders from the different sects collude with each
other in promoting a divisive and thus oppressive sectarian culture that helps them maintain their
power base supported by the sectarian system of power. In fact, they recognize that their
feelings have been manipulated during the last stage by those extreme sectarian leaders who
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encouraged individuals to develop a false ethnocentric identity revolving around fear and
hostility towards other groups from the same Lebanese society.
Therefore, sectarian leaders are no longer idealized and seen as infallible and
individuals develop a skeptical attitude towards all sectarian leaders regardless of their group
belonging. Naturally, persons at this stage become highly sensitive to manipulation by sectarian
leaders and now reject those leaders who attempt to stir sectarian feelings among the Lebanese
people.
Instead, individuals support and feel admiration towards competent leaders who are
seen as sincerely working towards the common good of all the Lebanese by helping individuals
and communities to lead a more comfortable life. Consequently, third-stage individuals support
democratically elected leaders who are communicative and open with their constituents and who
help people by coordinating their efforts in attaining their basic needs.
Conflict/CohesiPn. By entering the third stage of identity development, the individuals-
beliefs that 1) conflict exists on the sectarian level and 2) conflict can be resolved by emotional
means, start to change as they begin to realize that fear, anger, and hatred towards members of
other sects is misplaced and futile. A person starts to recognize that the oppressive sectarian
system discriminates against all the Lebanese individuals regardless of their sectarian belonging.
Even though there is an inherent conflict between individuals at this stage and others still
functioning at other levels of identity development, including the individuals' corresponding
sectarian leadership group, conflict at this stage is no longer denied nor acted out. But, unlike the
extreme emotional reaction of the last stage, individuals at this stage feel alienated from the rest
of the sectarian culture and society and simply withdraw from it as a way of peaceful protest.
Meanwhile, individuals start to develop rational ways for conflict mediation and conflict
resolution. Disagreement between individuals is confined to disagreement over issues and it
does not lead to personal animosities.
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Individuals at this stage get support from others who are perceived as going through the
same stage. Therefore, unlike the first stage where the major force behind the group cohesion
was the avoidance of conflict between groups, group cohesion between individuals going through
this stage is based on a sense of common experiences of their oppressive environment.
Moreover, they are all motivated by the common desire to develop the proper cultural tools that
would enable them to live together in a new environment that respects an individual's basic
rights and freedom.
In conclusion, individuals at this stage become more receptive to engaging in
cooperative behaviors with others who have common goals and common interests regardless of
their social groups and, hence, start forming coalitions that are cross-sectarian in nature.
Member/Member Relation.sh ip . As individuals start gaining a more rational awareness
of themselves and others, they become very careful of who they get close to and no longer
develop emotional relationships that are simply based on sectarian membership. Instead, they
start developing a more sensible awareness of the common plight and common experiences that
they share with others.
Moreover, individuals at this stage start to identify and associate with those individuals
who are perceived as having a similar level of awareness regardless of their sectarian belonging.
They also begin to identify themselves as a group whose values reflect a true integrated
Lebanese culture as opposed to a divided sectarian culture.
This increased awareness of commonalties with others is aided by more open and direct
communication between members at this stage. The content of communication at this stage is
centered around developing better means to resolve day to day concerns and to satisfy basic
needs as well as the verbalization and rational discussion of the oppressive effects of the
sectarian culture.
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Finally, even though individuals at this stage start discussing their feelings about the
effects of the sectarian culture, members from different sectarian groups are still not ready to
discuss openly their personal feelings about the effects of the conflict that existed between them
during the last stage.
Stage IV: The Lebanese Identity integration Stagp
Identity Definition, Individuals move into their fourth stage of identity development
once they have a solid sense of self and awareness of the commonalties between self and others
in the society. In addition to forming a core set of basic cultural values that reflect the mutual
dependency and common interest of all members of society, the Lebanese individual finally
develops positive flexible cultural values and mechanisms by which he is capable of constantly
integrating and adapting to the cultural changes that the Lebanese society is exposed to due to
its special geographical and demographic realities. More specifically, the Lebanese starts to
actively discard and replace the past adaptive skills that promoted submissiveness and
dependency and emphasizes its positive adaptive heritage that reflect autonomy and
independence from the negative effects of extemal changes and conflicts.
Individuals at this stage have an autonomous identity that reflects a harmonious
integrated self where contradictory and conflictual aspects that might arise from their individual,
sectarian, family as well as national identity have been eliminated. Therefore, individuals at this
stage are characterized by a new sense of safety and security that free up their energy to
become more active and productive in their environment.
First, people are more active than the previous stage in eliminating negative effects that
the sectarian culture has on society while maintaining those aspects that are positive and
enriching. That is, persons focus more of their energy on stopping discriminatory and oppressive
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practices of the sectarian culture while sustaining those elements that promote plurality, diversity
and the respect for individual and cultural freedoms.
Second, having secured their basic needs, individuals at this stage participate and help
develop cultural institutions that reflect and emphasize the diversity and integrative capacity and
experience of the people of Lebanon.
Member/Leader Relationship Similar to the last stage, individuals at this stage support
leaders who wori< for the common good. But having developed more solid sense of self,
individuals at this stage are much more active than before. First, individuals become less
dependent on leaders for social change and show a much higher level of personal initiative than
before. Second, individuals at this stage develop different and varied peaceful means to hold
their leadership accountable for their actions. Third, individuals support and have great respect
for leaders who take responsibility for and are active in eliminating the negative and
discriminatory effects of the sectarian system and culture.
M^mber/Mgmber Rglationghip. Unlike the last stage, where individuals restricted their
interaction with others to only those who were perceived as having the same level of identity
consciousness, individuals at this stage are much more open to all members of society
regardless of their sect or level of identity consciousness.
The increased autonomy and more solid sense of self help individuals at this stage reach
out to others who are seen as going through different developmental stages. Persons become
much more active in helping individuals at different stages negotiate the process of their
development in smooth ways. Moreover, they also start developing new mechanisms by which
all members of society feel that their developmental needs are being met. Therefore, a more
open dialogue develops between individuals who are part of the sectarian culture and those who
have developed a more integrated identity.
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Finally, individuals at the fourth stage respect the developmental needs of individuals at
other stages. However, they are also keen on protecting their personal right to exercise their own
integrated identity. In other words, the individual's right to choose is held as the highest priority
by individuals at this stage.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is important to stress at this point that an individual's identity functioning
level is dependent on the environmental demands placed on him. Even if an individual reaches i
high level of identity development, changes in the environment can mean that he might regress
to past levels as a means for survival.
More specifically, the process of identity development of each individual is basically a
continual process of psychological separation and individuation from past self identity that is no
longer adaptive in the present environment into a new self identity that is more adaptive and in
harmony with the environment. This process entails that: First, individuals discard past identity
aspects that are no longer adaptive while maintaining those past aspects that are still adaptive.
Second, further develop additional identity characteristics that are adaptive to the individual's
changing environment. Third, increased awareness of self and environment takes place along
with an increased sense of security and safety in the environment.
These two processes feed each other in both directions. That is. the more secure an
individual is, the more he is capable of developing higher levels of awareness. Similariy, higher
levels of awareness of the environment mean that individuals can develop a more secure
relationship with his environment. Finally, a decrease in a sense of security can also lead
Individuals to behave in more Irrational ways as if there is a loss of the selfs more rational
awareness aspects and a resort to past less developed aspects of self.
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Therefore, Lebanese individuals might react to the same situation differently at different
times and might react differently to different situations at the same time depending on the
emotional state that the situation represents for an individual. Overall, however, individuals tend
to have a dominant stage of identity development that reflects the longer term emotional state of
security from which they might fluctuate as the immediate conditions necessitates.
Operational Definitions of Lebanese nevelopment Rt^^^Pc
StageJ 1- individuals have a superficial understanding of the commonalties among the
Lebanese people and the Lebanese identity.
2- Primary concern is to maintain peace even though there is a great sense that
significant differences exist between the various communities.
3- Strong belief in a sectarian system of government as a guarantee of
sectarian rights. Individual and sectarian rights seen as interchangeable.
4- Strong belief in sectarian leaders who are trusted and are not questioned.
5- Different Lebanese groups strongly identify with different non-Lebanese
groups.
6- Very little awareness of effects of oppression of others on self.
3tage II 1- individuals realize that their old belief system restricts their independence,
personal growth, and freedom but are not yet ready to understand true source
of oppression.
2- Emotional energy is in the form of anger and rejection of their old Lebanese
identity as well as the sectarian identities of other sectarian groups whose
members are falsely seen as responsible for the individuals' limited rights in
the Lebanese society.
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3- Individuals tend to define their new Lebanese identity in its most militant
sectarian form by completely rejecting and opposing to all other sectarian
identities.
4- Individuals reject moderate Jeaders of their own sects and prefer sectarian
leaders that adopt militant positions.
5- Individual's primary concem with the supremacy of their own group over
other groups lead individuals to associate and cooperate with any group
external to the Lebanese society that would help them attain their goals and
defeat other Lebanese groups.
^tage II I 1- individuals perceive themselves and their environment in a more rational
way and they attempt to define their identity based on a true reading of the
facts about themselves and others around them.
2- The persons at this stage focus their energy on developing a better
understanding of their individual needs, values, and desires as well as their
true relationships with others.
3- Lebanese identity based on overall community needs and human values
where the Lebanese person's individual rights and the overall public rights
take precedence over conflictual group sectarian rights.
4- Individuals become cleariy aware of the oppressive effects of the sectarian
culture on all the Lebanese as well as the coercive effects of their own
ethnocentricity and the ethnocentricity of others around them.
5- Individuals discard and reject the past negative and conflictual sectarian
values and hold on sectarian values that they individually feel comfortable
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with, regardless of what the coercive part of the sectarian group culture
dictates.
6- Individuals develop a skeptical attitude toward all sectarian leaders
regardless of their group belonging and become highly sensitive to
manipulation by sectarian leaders and especially, reject those who attempt to
stir sectarian feelings among the Lebanese people.
7- Individuals support democratically elected leaders who are communicative
and open with their constituents and who help people by cooreJinating their
efforts in attaining their basic needs.
8- Individuals at this stage feel alienated from the rest of the sectarian culture
and society and simply withdraw from it as a way of peaceful protest and
seek support from others who are perceived as going through the same
stage.
9- Individuals are motivated by the common desire to develop the proper
cultural tools that would enable them to live together in a new environment
that respects an individual's basic rights and freedom.
10- Individuals at this stage become more receptive to engaging in cooperative
behaviors with others who have common goals and common interests
regardless of their social groups and no longer develop emotional
relationships that are simply based on sectarian membership.
11- They also begin to identify themselves as a group whose values reflect a
true integrated Lebanese culture as opposed to a divided sectarian culture.
Stage IV 1- Individuals have a fully developed sense of self and awareness of the
commonalties between self and others in the society and are, therefore,
ready to act on their new identities.
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2- Individual's identity reflects a harmonious integrated self where contradictorv
and conflictual aspects that might arise from their individual, sectarian,
family as well as national identity have been eliminated.
3- Having accomplished a satisfactory level of identity definition, individuals at
this stage are ready to become more active and productive in their
environment in terms of working towards the realization of goals and
aspirations and the satisfaction of needs clarified in the previous stage.
4- Individuals are more active and focus more of their energy on stopping
discriminatory and oppressive practices of the sectarian culture while
sustaining those elements that promote plurality, diversity and respect for
individual and cultural freedoms.
5- Individuals actively participate and help develop cultural institutions that
reflect and emphasize the diversity and integrative capacities and
experiences of the people of Lebanon.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
The goal of this study was to understand Lebanese Identity as it is perceived by the
Lebanese individuals from a psychological developmental perspective. Since no study has been
conducted in the past about the psychological development of the Lebanese identity and the
current stage of identity development among various Lebanese individuals, the researcher
utilized two research designs to answer the different research questions presented in the past
sections.
Studv # 1: A Qualitative Research
Of the View? of a Sample of Lebanese Group Representatives
The Qualitative Research Paradigm
The strengths of qualitative research to answer certain research questions have been
described by a number of writers. Bogdan and Biklen (1992) define five features that
characterize qualitative research that can be summarized as follows:
1- Natural settings is the primary source of data in a qualitative research while the
researcher is the primary research instrument.
2- Qualitative research is descriptive where the data collected are in the form of words
or images. Results are presented along with quotations from the data in order to illustrate the
presentation.
3- Qualitative research is concerned with understanding the process through which
people make meaning of their lives, experiences, and their social worid.
4- Qualitative data analysis is done inductively as the researcher builds abstractions,
concepts, hypothesis, and theories from the particulars of the data gathered.
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The lack of previous psychological studies around the Lebanese's individual identity
development made a qualitative research design the best exploratory means to gain initial
understanding of the issues in question. Also, since our initial aim was to understand the
perspectives of individuals about their social identity, quantitative measures could not provide
suitable answers to the subject under question. .
Moreover, even though a general theory around the Lebanese Identity Development was
deduced from developmental theories of other social groups, this initially proposed model did not
accurately reflect all the particulars of the Lebanese Identity development stages. Therefore, a
qualitative analysis of the views of Lebanese individuals regarding their identity greatly enriched
our understanding for the different developmental stages.
Research Design
This study utilized the in-depth phenomenological elite interviewing method as a
preliminary means to explore the Lebanese people's understanding of their social identity.
Phenomenology is the study of the way in which people put their experiences together in order to
develop a worid view (Marshall & Rossman, 1995). This type of study carries the assumption that
there is a structure and an essence that can be determined from people's shared experiences
(Patton, 1990).
Since the goal of this study was to define and discern the subjects' perception of their
Lebanese group identity, a phenomenological study of their social experiences was the best
approach to use towards answering these research questions. More specifically, the study helped
us to comprehend the subjects' perception of the following general aspects in relation to the
Lebanese group:
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First, it was important to grasp their perception of themselves as group members, that is,
how they defined their group identity. Second, it was essential to understand their perception of
the relation of the Lebanese group with its physical and human environment.
The fact that this was an initial exploratory study necessitated that we define the subject
sample of our study in such a way that helped us best gain an understanding of the Lebanese's
social identity. Elite individuals, as defined by Marshall and Rossman (1995), are considered to
be the influential and well informed people in a community who are selected for interviews on the
basis of their expertise in the areas relevant to research. Therefore, the focus of this study was to
explore the views of various Lebanese representative of different social groups, who, in turn,
reflected various perspectives that most of the group's members have of their Lebanese identity.
Researcher's Rol«>
The role of the researcher as the primary data collection instrument in qualitative
research necessitated the identification of personal values, assumptions and biases at the outset
of the study.
My perceptions of the Lebanese identity have been shaped by my personal experiences.
I was almost thirteen years old when the Lebanese civil war broke out. Like a large number of
Lebanese of my age, I spent most of the war years dedicated to continuing my education in the
midst of chaos and destruction. Day to day survival concerns and making it to school, at times,
took on equal importance in my mind and the minds of a lot of people like me. The inherent
message of my parents and the parents of a lot of my peers was that dedication to education and
the pursuit of knowledge and truth was somehow our generation's response to the craziness that
surrounded most of us for almost 17 years.
Prior to that, my experience and perception of Lebanon had been shaped by my parents
and relatives who belonged to the large group of Lebanese immigrants that had settled in
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different parts of the world. My earliest knowledge about Lebanon was my awareness that
Lebanon in the minds of my parents was always associated with the word "home."
Home, to most of the Lebanese that I grew up with during my eariy years, as I perceived
it then, was simply a place where an individual could count on limitless love and support from
faceless people who somehow I knew very well. Lebanon to me was a simple concept associated
with positive feelings and was something worth of a lot of love and dedication no matter what an
individual's circumstances were; circumstances such as those surrounding the lives of
immigrants who had settled in very distant and environments different from that of their
homeland.
My understanding of what Lebanon stood for had, therefore, been shaped by two very
distinct and opposing set of images, memories, experiences, and concepts: War, destruction,
death, chaos, on the one hand, and home, safety, love, dedication, loyalty etc., on the other
f^^nd How could I, and many others like me, make sense of these perceived contradictions?
The answer lied in part of our "Lebanese legacy," and that is our belief in the powers of
education.
My decision to approach knowledgeable individuals about the Lebanese identity was
motivated by my desire to understand and analyze the views and perceptions of the country's
most influential social movers. Their importance lied in that they play a major role in shaping and
reflecting people's perceptions.
Subjects were approached for interviews through various formal and informal contacts.
The researcher presented himself to the subjects as a psychology doctoral candidate writing his
dissertation and is attempting to study the subject of the Lebanese identity from a psychological
perspective. More specifically, it was made clear to all the subjects that the research was not a
politically-oriented research but rather an attempt to understand the human underpinnings of the
Lebanese identity.
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Proceduri>
Collection of data took place during the summer months of 1995 in Lebanon. Subjects
were interviewed at their homes or their offices in privacy and on a one to one basis.
Subjects chosen for this study represented different social groups that can be classified
in the following manner:
1) Representatives of major religious sectarian
groups
2) Representatives of major political parties
3) Representatives of media groups
4) Representatives of different cultural groups, such as peace organizations and human rights
organizations
The interviews were semi-structured and open ended. They were conducted in Arabic
and were recorded in their entirety. These interviews were translated into English and transcribed
by the researcher.
The questions were intended to elicit the interviewees' views about the different
psychological aspects of the Lebanese social self. Therefore, the interview consisted of
questions around four aspects:
1) The perception of Lebanese social self
2) Perceived problems of the Lebanese identity
'
3) Suggested solutions to identity problems
4) Lebanese group goals
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More specifically, the interviews were geared towards answering the following questions:
A) Perception of group self:
1 )
How do the subjects define and perceive the Lebanese identity?
2) What do they think the Lebanese people have in common and what characterizes the
Lebanese individual?
3) What photographic picture do they have in their minds when they think about
Lebanon?
4) How do the Lebanese people differ from other groups? How are they similar?
B) Problems and challenges:
5) What are the problems in the Lebanese identity?
6) What common challenges do they think face the Lebanese people in general and the
Lebanese individual in particular?
7) What are the factors that are working against the peaceful existence of the Lebanese
people within one country?
C) Solutions and goals:
8) How do they think the common Lebanese identity can be strengthened?
9) What do they feel should be future goals and aspirations of the Lebanese people?
10) What are the values that should be strengthened within the Lebanese society?
Keeping in mind that Lebanon had been out of a dangerous war situation for merely four
years during the summer of 1995, the subjects were assured that their personal identities wHI
remain anonymous and, therefore, non of their views that will be presented in the research
analysis could be associated personally with any of the interviewees.
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Data Analygjg
Marshall and Rossman (1995) Indicate that the process of qualitative analysis is based
on data reduction and interpretation. The researcher, therefore, analyzed the data by generating
categories, themes, and patterns that can be detected In the interview responses.
The researcher used the general guidelines of the proposed model of identity
development to organize the participants' various views into different levels of Identity
consciousness. Therefore, through an analysis of the participants views, we were able to explore
the issues that played a part In shaping the Lebanese Individual's at each stage.
Participants' views were classified and presented along a continuum of identity levels of
consciousness. Moreover, the general concepts and themes presented were substantiated by
direct quotations from the interviews. When relevant, some Interviewees' socio-economic
characteristics were revealed in order to give the quotations more conceptual meaning.
Study # 2: A Quantitative Research
Study of a Sample of Lebanese Citizens
Subjects
The survey research was cross-sectional and explored the views of a sample of
Lebanese citizens in order to generalize the views of the general Lebanese population. 724
respondents were selected at random from four different university campuses in the Greater
Beirut metropolitan areas, various homes and working offices as well as from random E-Mail lists
(see table 4.1 below). No stratification of the sample was conducted and, therefore, an attempt
was made to collect the responses of as large a number of subjects as possible in order to
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increase the representation of the various socio-economic characteristics among the subjects.
The data were collected during the first two weeks of May 1997.
Table 4.1
Source of Data Collection
Source of Data Collection Count Ipercent
Lebanese Village 37 5.11
Lebanese University/Main Campus 129 17.81
American University of Beirut/Main Campu* 77 10.64
Jesuite University 12 1.66
Lebanese University/ Jal-EI-Deeb 67 9.25
Homes & Offices 245 33.83
E-Mail 157 21.69
Total 724 100
The subjects' characteristics in terms of age, sectarian identity, profession, place of
residence, nationality, years of war experience, and years of residence outside Lebanon are
listed in tables 4.2 - 4.12 presented below:
Table 4.2
Age Range
Age Range Count Percent
Under 18 11 1.52
19-28 391 54
29-38 183 25.27
39-48 61 8.42
49-58 52 7.18
Over 59 26 3.59
Total 724 100
Table 4.3
Sex
Sex Count Percent
Fem ale 320 44.26
M ale 403 55.74
Total 723 100
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Table 4.4
Sectarian Identity
Count Percent
o u 1 1 1 1 1 ivi (J o 1 c rn 1 88 26.07
Maronite Christian
1 oo HQ "7
O
Druze Moslem 97 13.45
Shiite Moslem 142 19.69
Christian Eastern Orthodox 73 10.12
Christian Roman Catholic 42 5.83
Christian Armenian 19 2.64
Other 25 3.47
Total 721 100
Table 4.5
Personal Status
Personal Status Count Percent
Single 487 67.36
Married with children 37 5.12
Married without children 172 23.79
Other 27 3.73
Total 723 100
Table 4.6
Current Place of Residence
Current Place of Residence Count 'Percent
Lebanon 665 92.11
Europe 9 1.25
North America 37 5.12
Other 11 1.53
Table 4.7
Number of Years Living in Lebanon During the 1976-1989 Lebanese Civil War
Years Lived in War Count Percent
None 47 6.5
1-6 66 9.13
7-12 117 16.18
Over 12 493 68.19
Total 723 100
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Table 4.8
Number of Years Living Outside Lebanon
Years Spent Outside Lebanon Count Percent
None 372 51.52
1-3 107 14.82
4-9 111 15.38
10-15 67 9.28
Over 16 65 9
Total 722 100
Table 4.9
Highest Degree Attained
Highest Degree Attained Count Percent
Lebanese Baccalaureate 122 16.9
Higti School 113 15.65
Bachelor's Degree 305 42.24
Master's Degree 89 12.33
Doctoral Degree 45 6.23
Other 48 6.65
Table 4.10
Yearly Income in Dollars
Yearly Income Count Percent
Less that 2000 $ 52 7.2
Between 2000-5000 $ 50 6.93
Between 5000-20,000 $ 143 19.81
Between 20,000-40,000 $ 62 8.59
Over 40,000 $ 40 5.55
Not applicable 238 32.96
No answer 137 18.98
Total 722 100
Table 4.11
Dual Nationality
Dual Nationality Count Percent
No 541 75.03
Yes, North American 49 6.8
Yes, European 65 9.02
Yes, Other 66 9.14
Total 721 100
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Table 4.12
Profession
rroTession Count Percent
oiuaent 305 42.24
riOTessor or Lawyer 24 3.33
engineer 55 7.62
Mpdirjil nnrtnr ilO 3.19
School Teacher 31 4.29
Employee 138 19.11
Not Applicable 58 8.03
Self Employed 42 5.82
Other 46 6.37
Total 722 100
I
Materials
I
A survey was used in this study because of its economy of design and its ability to
identify attributes of a population from a small group of individuals (Fowler, 1988; Babbie, 1990).
The self-designed research instrument included two sections.
The Lebanese Identity Development Scale (LIDS) . This scale was designed
specifically for this study and it included 16 general statements to help determine each subject's
dominant identity levels of consciousness. Each cluster of four items reflected a specific stage of
identity consciousness. The item preference was graded through a 5-level Likert Scale. A five
point score was given to responses showing high preference for an item and a one point score
was given to responses reflecting low preference item preference.
Moreover, four scale sums were computed for each subject each ranging from a
minimum of four points to a maximum of 20 points. The means and standard deviations were
computed for the scale sums of each stage and the sample's data were normalized along each
stage. Therefore, with four normalized scales, one for each stage preference, each of the
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subjects" four z-scores were compared with each other. The stage with the highest z-score was
determined to be the subjects' dominant stage indicator (Dsi).
The items included in the questionnaire were developed according to the following stage
criterias:
$taqe 1 identity sp^ Ip: This scale generally tests for general belief in the presence of a
peaceful but non integrated Lebanese intra-group existence. The questions included in the stage
1 identity cluster tested the subjects' belief In the presence of commonalties among the
Lebanese various sectarian groups, belief in the importance of the role of traditional leaders as
well as degree of belief in a sectarian based system of government. The stage 1 quesUonnaire
items are numbers 1, 7, 11, 14 (see appendix).
Stage 2 identity senile : This scale tests for the degree of the subjects' belief in the
presence of inter sectarian group hostility and fear. Questions in the stage 2 identity cluster
tested the subjects' preference for militant leader attitudes, degree of belief in hostility of other
Lebanese sectarian groups towards one's own sectarian group as well as level of acceptance of
help from other non-Lebanese groups against other Lebanese sectarian groups. The stage 2
questionnaire items are numbers 4, 6, 9, 12 (see appendix ).
Stage 3 identity scale : This scale tests the subjects' awareness of the oppressive and
discriminatory effects of a sectarian political system. Moreover, it tests the subjects' level of
belief that personal acUon geared towards changing this system is futile. Therefore, questions in
the stage 3 identity cluster tested the subjects' level of disbelief that action can change the
system, the system's leaders' behavior as well degree of withdrawal from public involvement.
The stage 3 questionnaire items are numbers 2, 5, 13, 16 (see appendix).
Stage 4 identity scale: This scale tests the subjects' level of belief that change of the
discriminatory sectarian system can take place through the individuals' active involvement in
public life. The questions included In the stage 4 identity cluster tested the subjects' readiness to
actively resist the negative effects of the sectarian system of govemment, readiness to actively
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encourage the establishment of a common Lebanese civil personal status law as well as
readiness to take on persona! leadership initiatives and rejection of leaders that are not
democratically elected. The stage four questionnaire items are numbers 3,8.10.15 (see
appendix ).
Personal Data ^hP f?t : The survey also included items that determined some of the
subjects' socio-economic characteristics and experiences (see above tables).
Data Analysis After the dominant stage indicator was determined for each subject, a
statistical analysis was conducted to determine the dependence relationship between each of the
subject's various socio-economic variables and his dominant stage indicator. Therefore, a
Chi -Square value was calculated for each of the pairs of Dsi vs. Socio-economic variables
analyzed.
Moreover, a statistical analysis was conducted to determine the dependence between
various views expressed in each of the individual questionnaire items and the various socio-
economic variables in order to take a closer look at the participants' attitudes towards specific
issues.
Finally, a statistical analysis was conducted in order to determine the levels of
dependence between the different items in the questionnaire and the subjects' dominant stage of
identity development. The data generated will be used to examine the degrees of item
discrimination across the four stage scales.
Procedure
Participation in this study was voluntary. The survey distribution was conducted in three
ways. First, the survey was translated into Arabic and was distributed by a number of volunteer
university professors in various classes across four university campuses in Lebanon. Second, a
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number of research assistants distributed the survey to various work settings as well as various
family homes in various Lebanese areas in and around the Greater Beirut Metropolitan area.
Third, e-mail surveys in the English language were randomly forwarded to Lebanese nationals i
various countries. The e-mail addresses were obtained from an Internet directory listing of
Lebanese e-mail subscribers.
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CHAPTER V
QUALITATIVE RESULTS
The question of defining the Lebanese social self as perceived by the group of interview
subjects was approached from a number of different angles. First, the subjects were asked to
define the Lebanese social identity as they understand it. Second, the subjects were asked to
describe any special feature that characterized the Lebanese individual or the Lebanese people.
Moreover, they were asked to describe any commonalties that they perceived the Lebanese
people share with each other.
Another approach to understanding the subjects" definition of the Lebanese self was to
ask them to compare and contrast the Lebanese culture with the cultures of other Arab countries,
with the Israeli as well as the Western culture.
Later, the subjects were asked to describe the factors that are impeding the development
of a unified Lebanese identity as well as the collective challenges facing the Lebanese people in
general. The researcher assumed that there is a lot to be learned about the Lebanese social
identity he understands the problems that face the Lebanese individual in his attempt to realize
his Lebanese social self. Also, the subjects' different views around the post war Ta'if Peace
Accord were explored.
Finally, the researcher attempted to further understand the subjects' perception of the
Lebanese social self by exploring the responses to the last projective question. The subjects
were asked to describe a photographic mental image they associate with the Lebanese identity.
The researcher's goal was to find any common themes in these photographic images that would
characterize the psychological Lebanese social self as perceived by these subjects.
Twenty-four interviews were analyzed. Some interview responses, however, were more
thorough than others. The following themes were emphasized throughout the subjects' responses
in an attempt to answer a number of questions:
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Lebanese Identity
Pre-Lebanese Republic
A number of subjects chose to answer the question about the Lebanese identity by
initially explaining the background from which the Lebanese identity came into existence. One
subject traced the roots of the Lebanese identity to the Canaanite period while others explained
the issue of identity as it was perceived eariy in this century.
Subject 13, a Christian religious leader, started by explaining that all religions in Lebanon
are descendants of the old Canaanite religion.
All the people on this whole shore line, in my opinion, kept the Canaanite religion. We
still worship Baal and Ashtarout. Ashtarout is the goddess of fertility and thus sex since it
is the tool of fertility. Our people is basically a hedonistic people. From here comes our
affinity toward power and domination, as well as our attraction to physical pleasures. We
place a lot of importance on marriage since a very young age. We consider that a giri
does not develop and even have a meaningful existence if she does not have children.
This is an archetype for our people. From here you see that women in all religions in our
area moum the death in the same way.
Subjects 10, 13, and 22 explained that different groups in Lebanon identified themselves
differently prior to the creation of the Lebanese Republic in 1920. They explained that Lebanon,
as we know it today, was not bom in all the areas and among all religious sects at the same
moment in time. They agreed that, in the past, when somebody said he was Lebanese, it usually
meant that he was talking about a person from the Lebanese mountains since the inhabitants of
Mount Lebanon identified themselves as Lebanese before others did.
Others, in today's Lebanon, did not identify themselves as Lebanese. The majority of the
Bikaa' Valley inhabitants and the people in the South and Tripoli considered themselves part of
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the Syrian Damascus province. While the inhabitants of Beirut, according to subject 10. a
traditional Sunni Moslem leader, identified themselves as "Beirutis" and considered that
geographically they were part of Syria until the founding of the Republic of Lebanon in 1920. He
explains that "the difference between the Mountain inhabitants and the others is that the former
identified himself as Lebanese through his geography and the latter through the law."
Subject 13 explains that those that identified themselves as Lebanese in the mountains
were the Druzes. whose religion is considered an offshoot of Islam, and the Christian Maronites.
However, he felt that, historically, being Druze. meant being Lebanese because:
The Christian was in a sorry situation in Lebanon because he had to constantly prove
himself that he is Arab. He has a history of collaborating with foreign forces since thedays of the Crusaders. This is why, the Christians felt they had to be pioneers in the Arab
nationalist movement.
These various identities came to play a major role after the founding of the Lebanese
Republic in 1920. As subject 22. a secular party leader, points out, the French declared the
unification of the various Lebanese areas and the founding of the Republic of Lebanon in 1920
without taking into account the opinion of the majority of the people in Lebanon, which might
have differed with the French plans at the time.
In 1920, as subject 13 explains, the majority of the Sunnis identified themselves as
Arabs and considered that Lebanon should have been dissolved in the Arab nation since they
considered the Lebanese entity as an artificial byproduct of a foreign deal between the British
and the French.
Subject 10 was more specific:
When the French declared the founding of today's Lebanon, you could say that the
people from the mountains liked the idea of unification, while the Beirutis did not mind
the unification. Tripoli considered itself part of Syria too. And the South's loyalty was also
in Syria.
Subject 22 explains that the original justification for the creation of Lebanon was to give
the Christians a place where they would not be considered second class citizens as opposed to
being second class citizens in a larger Arab entity where the majority would have been Sunni
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Moslems. This, however, according to subject 22. placed instead the Moslems in Lebanon in a
second class position. Therefore, in order to avoid one case of injustice, a second type of
injustice was created.
Subject 13 feels that some Lebanese Christians tried to invent a Lebanese identity that
could be traced back to the Phoenicians because they wanted to justify the separation of
Lebanon from the Syrian inland which had a Sunni majority.
In general, therefore, according to subjects 10 and 13. and 22. the people in Lebanon
after 1920 tended to identify themselves as either Lebanese nationalists. Syrian nationalists, or
Arab nationalists.
Confused Identities at Tinrte of Independence
In light of the above responses, it is expected that some of the participants" responses
would reflect these past pre-independence identity perspectives. Therefore, subjects 2. 4. 8, 10.
13. 14 and 16 emphasized the Moslem-Christian conflict around the definition of the Lebanese
identity which could be traced back to the identity definition offered by the constitution at the time
of independence in 1943. As subject 13 puts it: "I believe that the idea of a Lebanese started to
form in the minds of people as we know it today since 1943 as a fetus."
However, subject 2, a leading Moslem Joumalist, explains:
From the very beginning there has been a conflict around the issue of the Lebanese
identity. It started when there was an ambiguous statement in 1943 that Lebanon has an
Arab face. In order for the Christians and Moslems to appease each other, they left the
issue of the Lebanese identity hanging in the air. So Lebanon was not from the West
even though it is with the west and it was not from the Arabs even though it
acknowledges its Arab surrounding. That is it acknowledges its geographic reality but
does not acknowledge its history and politics. This conflict in my opinion was behind a lot
of the political conflicts and political confusion that ensued Lebanon after its
independence. For example, since Lebanon was not exactly Arab then it was not
concemed directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict. And it should not be concerned with the
Arab concems.
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Moreover, subject 16, a Christian party leader, further explains:
The first stage in the development of the Lebanese identity was the 1943 agreement
which provided a negative solution to the Lebanese identity. This agreement I consider
was built around the negative aspects of the Lebanese identity. Basically a negation of
'
the Identity. It said that Lebanon was neither West nor East. Lebanon was neither apassage point nor a center. Lebanon had an Arab face, which meant that it had othertaces^The Chnstians explained this by saying that Lebanon had a Christian face Others
said that It had a Lebanese face that was distinct from the Arab face. Others interpreted
that by saying that Lebanon had a Western face. This was what some called the creative
ambiguity. You leave a shadow around a certain subject that you have no solution for At
that stage, a solution was not possible so we agreed around the Lebanese
independence, that is, we said no to the French Mandate and no to the unification with
Syna. Therefore, there was a number of Nos. The starting point for the Lebanese identity
in 1943 was based on a negation.
Subject 16 continues, however, that this ambiguity helped extend the identity debate that
was present before the 1943 independence in the form of two points of view: The first point of
view said that there is a big Arab homeland, and since Lebanon was part of that homeland, it
meant that there was no such thing as a Lebanese identity but only an Arab identity. The second
point of view rejected the idea of a big homeland and instead defined the Lebanese identity
from a sectarian group perspective where each sect defined Lebanon differently.
These two perspectives, according to subject 8, a traditional Moslem political leader,
gave rise to a number of questions among the Lebanese:
... there was the question of whether Lebanon is for part of its people or is it for all its
people, from then on you started having first class citizens and second class citizens.
Moreover, was Lebanon part of its land or all its land, and was Lebanon a temporary
homeland or a final homeland. There was also a question of whether Lebanon belonged
to the Arab nation.
As a result of all this, subject 14 questions whether there really is a Lebanese identity:
I say that there is no Lebanese as such, but there are Maronites, Armenians, Shiites,
Sunnis, each lives within his religious sect and understands Lebanon through his own
sect's eyes. There are no national Lebanese feelings. Otherwise, how can you possibly
explain that a lot of the Lebanese take a neutral stand with regards to the issue of the
Israeli occupation. How can the Lebanese have national feelings and identify on the
national level when you find in Beirut who would say that Beirut is Sunni. So people in
Beirut from other sects are considered strangers. The same situation applies to
Kisurwan. The South is for the Shiite, the mountains are for the Druze. Therefore, the
Lebanese never unified on the national level but rather they unified within their religious
sects. They are ready to destroy the country as long as the sect wins. The problem of the
Lebanese is that they are not Lebanese.
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Lebanese identity in Terms of its Ara^^ H'^rm^
Some subjects tended to emphasize Lebanon's Arab identity and also expressed their
complaints about what they perceived as problems with other identity definitions espoused by
other groups. Subject 7. a leader of a Moslem political party, explains that:
fh!!° M ^^^^"^ Lebanese identity could carry a number of connotations Somehought of Lebanon as the descertdent of the Phoenicians, while others thought ofLebanon a part of a whole, that is a part of the Syrian lands. And some othe^ and weare included m those, think that we can not separate Lebanon from its Arab
surroundings.
Subject 4, a Moslem leftist political leader, also explains that there is still a conflict
around the Lebanese identity and offers his definition of the Arab Lebanese identity:
Lebanon has an Arab identity. In contrast to everything that is said, no question there is
still a problem, even at this time, around the Lebanese identity. Lebanon is an Arab
country part of the Arab nation. There are those who believe in what is called "the
Lebanization", that is, the Lebanese nation, the Lebanese language There is an Arabic
language and there is a Lebanese dialect. In the same way Lebanon has many dialects.
He adds:
The logic that I am Lebanese in such a way that it is separate from Lebanon's belonging
to the Arab nation has created a state of isolationism in Lebanon's history. It created a
situation where Lebanon is separated from it's nation, and from it's natural Arabic
surroundings. These political movements, and thus these forces, and those individuals
that still abide by these beliefs, have always had close, direct, and positive relationships
with the imperial powers. These forces have served as the head spear of the imperial
powers. Therefore, under the pretext that we are Lebanese, we are not Arabs, the
Lebanese identity, that is, the Arab identity, was almost obliterated by the Lebanese
isolationists who have always been used by all the imperial powers and were recently
used by Israel against the Arab nation.
Moreover:
The isolationists think that all Lebanon should be theirs because they consider that this
country came into existence for their sake. Had they not been here, there would have
been no country! Therefore, if it is not, then they would have part of it for their own. This
is not how you belong to a country. What kind of a country is this that changes size?
In a similar fashion. Subject 14, a Moslem leader, complains that some Christians want
to marginalize the Moslem Lebanese identity:
There is a disagreement on the definition of the Lebanese identity between the Moslems
and the Christians. The Christians consider the Lebanese identity a Christian identity
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t^pm tiJ '^r^'^y " "^"'9'"^'- to them is the country that realizes forhe their Chnstian character with all the elements of the self of that sonarJ nVrPyou notice in the literature of the past Christian leadership that ren ther^^^^^^^Arabization of Lebanon, they are referring to the Moslem threat agains^^this Chnstianparticularity Of Lebanon. When they question the individual's LebanTstets wha^^^have m mmd is that particularity, even if they do not express that openly
He offers the following examples:
When they face the subject of the Arabs buying lands in Lebanon they consider that a
confiscation of Lebanon. Or when we talk about the settlement proS theTdo not
ZllJ ' h'""^k^ °' Palestinians- inability to return to the r Suntrv but itbecomes he problem of the Lebanese because of a potential predominance of theMoslem element over the Christian element. Therefore, that would look as if that wouldhurt Lebanon's special situation. That is why you find that any activity that givesLebanon an Arab touch or a non-isolationist touch makes them start speaking of
f!h!Sn"2,^"fK*''f/'':*^*°" ^^^^ y°"^ Lebanon, and I get my
fhlnfc ^"k 1
think of an isolated Lebanon, instead hethinks of a liberal Lebanon and does not see any problem in the existence of Christians
in L6Ddnon.
Some other subjects emphasized the Arab nature of the Lebanese identity from many
different angles without talking about other definitions with which they might disagree.
Subject 12, a Christian representative, emphasizes a differentiated Lebanese Arab self:
According to him, "Lebanon is an Arab country, but it has its own characteristics."
Subject 20. a human rights advocate, points out Lebanons' responsibilities towards other
Arab states: "Lebanon is part of the Arab countries and has. therefore, a mission to co-operate
with the other Arab countries
... because even if our destiny is not one .... but it is at least very
close."
Subject 10 alludes to different degrees of Arab openness to the West: "Lebanon is an
Arab country with a special relationship with the West."
While subject 8, a traditional Moslem political leader, explains Lebanon's Arab role:
"Lebanon is an Arab treasure because Lebanon is an active witness to Arab civilization."
Subject 7 differentiates: "Lebanon is an Arab country which is made up of a group of
minorities."
In a similar fashion, subject 14 clarifies:
The Moslems, they consider Lebanon just another Arab country out of the many Arab
countries, some of them might think of some distinctiveness with regards to some of the
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freedoms that exist here that do not exist in other Arab countries. The matter becomes a
tl^ufcLnrS rT °' ^"^'^^ o'"^' Arab coun?~hus a etain it s special circumstances.
Subject 5, a leading journalist, expresses hinnself in this way: "The idea of Lebanon is
the idea of Beirut before the war where Beirut was an Arab city an Arab city with a lot of
openness "
Subject 3, political party leader
, is more specific:
Lebanon is an Arab country made up of different Arab groups looking for a place to
express themselves independent of the Sunni Arab majority Lebanon is Arab due to
Its geographic location and common interests with other Arab nations.
Subject 2 clarifies that "our Arab belonging is a historical fact that does not need
agreement. As for an Arab unity, that is a political issue."
Moreover, he feels that Lebanon exits because of an Arab desire on the collective level:
I believe that the Arabs were the first to want an independent Lebanon. They wanted to
show their religious acceptance and openness. The Arab nation wanted to make peace
with itself by showing that it is accepting of the variety in it and that it will give the
different minorities a breathing space in a sea of a Moslem majority.
Lebanegg Identity in Terms of the Moslem-Christian Group Co-existence
Some respondents, mainly subjects 1,6, 8, 10, 12, 13 and 16 emphasized the Moslem -
Christian nature of the Lebanese entity. These views were expressed in various forms.
Subject 16, for instance, emphasizes that a person's identity means a certain loyalty to
the country. Therefore, he complains of other Lebanese whose loyalty goes to other Arab
countries. Moreover, he emphasizes the loyalty to the Moslem/Christian distinctive nature of the
Lebanese identity and complains of the sometimes rigid Arab mentality.
Subject 16 feels that his Lebanese identity means that:
First, I am Lebanese means that I am the son of a unique formula. The unique formula
represents a small country within a conflict between big countries. Moreover, within this
small country there is a big experience which is mainly the experience of the
Moslem/Christian coexistence. The Lebanese identity can only have meaning to me
when we talk about this mix, or existence, or dialogue, or interaction between the
Christians and Moslems. The best way to express what I think about Lebanon has been
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expressed by the current Pope, and that is that Lebanon is more than a countrv it is «mission, a message. The message is dialogue. Lebanon has certain oartS
certain distinctive characteristics and a role'that are not presem in oth^r ^3^0^^^^^and not even m other countries of that worid. When I think of patriot sm and LebaneseIdentity, I am thinking of this rare fomiula that is Lebanon A Moslem Lebanon has nnmeamng, and a Christian Lebanon has no meaning. It is the folia thafma^^^^^^^^^
"°
Moreover, he explains that:
IlL^'!ihfnn
"^'"ded. It says you are either an Arab like them or you
nn thP I Ih "
^" Arabs are the same. There are distinctive characteristicso e Lebanese national level. They accused us of isolationism because they were
pSo^ H^^^^^l'"^ our distinctiveness. We, that is, the liberal minded and westemeducated individuals, view this kind of logic as oppressive in nature.
Subject 8 considers that the geography and the demography of Lebanon constitutes a
treasure, especially the co-existence of the Christians and the Moslems. According to him, "this
has enabled Lebanon to be a permanent institution characterized by the Christian
-Moslem
dialogue which is absent in any other part of the worid."
Whereas Subject 1 emphasizes Lebanon's religious roots:
My Identity is I am Lebanese, Arab, Christian, others are Lebanese, Arabs, Moslems But
being a Moslem or a Christian should not impede us from building a unified country In
actuality, Lebanon is a mission. The Lebanese people should be a very important symbol
for all the worid. Starting from the Middle East which is the source of all religions
Lebanon is the end product of all the religions that originated in this area. The basic
tenant of these religions could serve as a basis for unifying people. I can not imagine
religion telling people to go kill others or go steal others.
While subject 10 defines Lebanon in terms of pact:
In 1943, when Lebanon got its independence, there was what we call the national pact
which is based on a duality. Lebanon is Moslem and Christian. This duality was the basis
of unity among the Lebanese.
Subject 13 offers the following metaphor: "Lebanon is like having a husband and a wife
who have a lot of conflict and who married against their will and are now enclosed in the same
house and have to deal with each other."
Subject 14 offered a somehow similar definition:
We might find that the Lebanese could agree about Lebanon as Lebanon of the united
religions, and they can agree on a free Lebanon, and open liberal Lebanon. I imagine
that these might be the features of my visualization of a common Lebanese identity.
That is on the collective level. But I also say that there is no Lebanese as such, but there
are Maronites, Armenians, Shiites, Sunnis, each lives within its religious sect and
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Lebanon through his own sect's eyes. There are no national Lebanese
Subjects 1. 2, 4, 10, 5, 11, 15. 19. 22 emphasized that a person's Lebanese identity
simply meant that a person belongs to a political entity called Lebanon. Some felt the Lebanese
identity is how we define ourselves to people in other countries.
Subject 15:
I am Lebanese means that I belong in Lebanon to a country that has a government a
political entity, and a certain geography. When I say I am a Lebanese in the outside it
means that I carry a Lebanese nationality, identification card, that I belong to a certain
piece of land and a certain culture.
Others emphasized that the Lebanese are those who live within the Lebanese borders.
Subject 19 explains:
This particular circle of national belonging, meaning Lebanon, it consists of specific
geographical borders and of people that live on this piece of earth under the shadow of
an existing govemment which is capable of making Lebanon a significant circle of the
various circles of feeling of belonging.
UtJanese Identity in Terms of Cultural Variety and Cultural Interaction
Subjects 3, 5, 9 and 11 emphasized that the Lebanese identity is dynamic and ever
changing and is basically shaped by the interaction of the many cultures to which the country is
exposed, especially the Westem and Eastern cultures, and is, therefore, defined by the process
itself rather than the content of its culture.
Subject 3 on the identity's dynamic nature: "Lebanon has no defined identity- it is not
static, it is not possible to talk about a static identity - Lebanon has a developing identity."
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As Subject 9, a Lebanese intellectual, explains:
Lebanon's interactive nature is not Imagined but rather comes out of its very nature TheLebanese s essence of interaction has always existed..
. Interaction of the different
cultures of the world therefore. Lebanon is defined by the process
Ubanese Idgntity in Terms of Active Particination and intpr;.rfinp with th^ Fnyirnnnr-n^
Subjects 1 1
,
15. 17 and 21 emphasized that being Lebanese is defined by the nature of
the individual's interaction with his environment.
As subject 15. a civic leader, explains:
I personally believe that identity is a relationship between what is cognitive and material
Identity has to be rooted in the land and nature. We can not say we are Lebanese if we
do not have a relationship with the land. The manufacturer has a factory in Lebanon.
therefore he is Lebanese the peasant works in the land, therefore, he is Lebanese.
We can not just have a theoretical identity in our heads. It has to be rooted in the
material reality. Relationship between self and nature and the land.
Subject 1 1 , a leading journalist, puts it more succinctly: "Identity starts by act not
thought Identity is being in reality 'Being is becoming' therefore. Being Lebanese is
Becoming a Lebanese."
Subject 17. a political party leader also explains:
A person's identity is dictated by the realities on the ground and these result from what is
called the territorial social union. That means, the sharing of day to day common
existence or life of a people living on the same territory. This is not the same as the
sharing of religious beliefs. It is a common existence. This common existence starts
from a small village to wider social circles that share a common existence. The bonds
that result from the common existence of the people of a village are stronger than the
religious bonds. This bond of sharing a common existence is the most advanced type of
bond that humans have experienced. The other types of bonds are less advanced. You
can expand this type of bond as much as you want. What is happening in Lebanon is an
awareness of this common reality.
Subject 6, however, differentiates between societal interaction and cultural integration:
What works today is societal integration as opposed to cultural integration, it is intended
to increase people's societal interaction without touching upon the cultural issues. The
societal integration makes the issue of cultural differences less important. Lebanon has a
very rich experience in societal integration in the whole area.
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2: What are the characteristics of Lebanon and the Lebanese people?
Lebanese Characteri«yti<:^?
Some subjects were reluctant and others. refused to answer the question around the
characteristics of Lebanon and the Lebanese people. However, some of them offered some
characteristics once they were assured that the intention was not to develop a racial perspective
of the Lebanese people but that the question was intended to increase our understanding of the
Lebanese individual's life and sense of self.
The Physical Environment
Subjects 1, 5, 17, 21, 22, and 23 feel that Lebanon has a particularly nice physical
environment. For instance, subject 5 feels that "there are no special Lebanese characteristics
except maybe that we have the climate of the Mediten-anean
.... but this is the climate of the
Mediterranean and we share that with a lot of non Lebanese people ..."
While subject 1 feels that: "We have an environmental particularity in Lebanon. We
have a beautiful physical environment. That is one of the major Lebanese treasures."
Openness. Flexibilitv. Adaptability, and Cultural Variety
Subjects 9, 8, 15, 6, 7. 19, 20, 14. 16, 17, 18, 20, 21. 22, and 23 feel that Lebanon's
particular geographical location has characterized the Lebanese individual with a continual
openness to various cultural trends and cultural changes.
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As subject 20 explains:
I do not like to talk about any special Lebanese characteristics Lebanon is an
w'^'^TH^ ' 'P^^'"' 9^°gr^Phic location which renders it more open to tSe
Zt'^^Vn^f'l""'''''^'!'''
"""^^^ ^"'^"^^ Lebanon integrates between he
'
Wester and Islamic and Arab cultures.
Subject 1 7 wams, however:
I can not see any distinctive characteristics however, our people have atendency towards openness. It's openness to the Mediterranean Sea The Lebanese
coast opened Lebanon to the Mediterranean and to the West which is something vervimportant. But it could work both ways. If Lebanon does not have a solid character this
openness could cause it to lose its integrity.
According to subjects 6, 8. 9. 14. 16, 19, 20. 21. 22, 23, and 24, this openness has
helped develop a Lebanese individual who is flexible and with a high degree of adaptiveness to
environmental changes. This characteristic was expressed in different ways.
Subject 19: "The Lebanese individual is resourceful he is flexible versatile
dynamic with a great capacity to adapt."
Subject 14:
In my opinion, the Lebanese's historical experiences as a tradesman has enabled him to
become very flexible. Moreover, he has a degree of flexibility that no other people in the
area possesses. Lebanon is rich in it's people and he is needed by all sides. The
Lebanese can adapt to any societal environment. You find that the Lebanese who left
Lebanon have been able to integrate in other societies with a lot of ease. This Lebanese
open-mindedness originates from it's trading heritage.
Subject 16:
The Lebanese individual has personal initiative. The Lebanese is creative, a pioneer,
dynamic, etc. The Lebanese are very flexible people. They have an excellent capacity
for adaptation. The Lebanese can endure and adapt with the harshest of circumstances,
such as the war we had for 20 years.
Subject 9: "Lebanon has a nature resulting from its reality it mission of cultural
interaction. The Lebanese is a pioneer in the Middle East in terms of leading in cultural
innovation and progress."
Subject 15: "We have nice social traditions we have openness the curiosity to
get to know others .... love of knowledge and travel "
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Subject 22 reminds us that "Lebanon has a great responsibility due to this great
advantage it has and this should be used in order to modernize and develop the country."
Moreover, subjects 3, 9, 13, 12, 16, 20, 22, 23, and 24 emphasize that the love for
cultural variety and cultural diversity is an important Lebanese characteristic and it is a deep
Lebanese value.
Subject 24, a leading journalist, explains: " Lebanon's diversity and the religious co-
existence makes it special these are positive characteristics I do not mean a racist
approach it is just a characteristic ..."
Subject 9: "Any one individual in Lebanon has a multicultural-integrated culture."
Subject 17:
The Lebanese is used to diversity. Even though that creates the potential for conflict, it is
still a kind of capital or even a treasure. The Lebanese diversity enables the individual to
go to the United States and adapt very fast, and the American citizen comes to Lebanon
and finds that he can fit easily in many places. It is the same with France. That has
created a heterogeneous character for the Lebanese. Each characteristic could have a
negative side, but I am emphasizing the positive aspects.
The Lebanese Emigrant Tradition
Subjects 10, 14, 16, and 17 also felt that the Lebanese people were characterized by an
emigration legacy due to their trading legacy.
Subject 16:
The Lebanese is characterized by his capacity to move, the Lebanese is one of the
peoples that move the most around the worid. The Lebanese immigration is legendary,
and I think that this has to do with the Lebanese's proximity to the sea. The sea horizon
is different from the desert horizon. The sea is always a way out. The Lebanese even
move inside Lebanon.
Subject 14 explains:
The Lebanese emigration preceded any other Arab emigration. This is due to its trade
heritage. I was often asked, can the Lebanese unify after this long war, and I would say
that the Lebanese is a trader and trade people forget about their losses when the
encounter gains.
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Subject 10 points out that:
tl^.^i*;!?
^"^^^ ^^"^^"^ °^ °f Lebanese emigration There was EqvDt
n linhT n»:r^° '° ^^yP^ "^^^^^ *° ^" tf^e Lebanese idea Othe^ were
:el^e^d"^h"^p?trLrnr " ^^^^-^ ^"
The Light and Park S ides of the LehanPse Personality
A couple of subjects, subject 1 and 4, referred to two aspects of the Lebanese
personality. They feel that the Lebanese have a strong instinct for life as well as death and
destruction.
Subject 4 complains:
It is true that the Lebanese is generous; it is true that the Lebanese is hospitable it is
true that the Lebanese is free, and he is intelligent; he likes education- he likes
openness. The Lebanese loves life and likes to enjoy life. Even if you put a Lebanese in
a desert, he would get a small refrigerator, connect it to the car battery, get some water
and would live m the desert. He has the will to persevere and face challenges But I am
sorry to say that the Lebanese has two negative aspects that render all the other
meaningless. He has a lot of aggressiveness because what was seen during the war is
not normal in civil societies. We were very aggressive, we all fought with a lot of
aggressiveness. All of us experienced an explosion of very dangerous hostilities and
rancor. There is no way that I would not imprint the Lebanese people with what
happened. We should go back and examine what happened. For twenty years we
witnessed aggression and hostility, we witnessed the instincts in ourselves.
Similariy, subject 1 explains:
There are positive aspects and there are negative aspects. The Lebanese people have
demonstrated that they can be overtaken by instincts. Until now we still suffer from some
peoples' behavior which is guided by instincts. But I believe that we have it in us to be
one of the most peace loving and sophisticated people in the worid. It just seems that
every people goes through periods in their histories where they loose consciousness. We
have had a lot of periods in our history where we lived in peace.
Question 3: What, in general, are the cultural similarities and what are the cultural
differences that exist between Lebanon and other Arab countries?
The great majority of subjects were, initially, very resistive to this question. However,
they proceeded to answer the question after they were assured that this question did not suggest
in any way that the Lebanese and the Arab cultures were two completely distinct cultures but that
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rather the goal was to understand in what various ways could we relate Lebanon's Arab culture
and the Arab cultures In other Arab countries. Therefore, the great majority of subjects
emphasized that Lebanon's culture in basically an Arab culture. However, some subjects felt it
necessary to differentiate between the concepts of culture and cultural life, hence, the question
was asked in both its forms. The following are some of the differences that subjects felt existed
between the Lebanese cultural life, or culture, and the cultural lives in other Arab countries.
Lebanon vs. Other Arab Countries
Ut?ang$g Higher Level of Openness to Other World Cultures
Subjects 1
,
5, 1 1 , 17, 20, 21 , and 22 felt that the Lebanese culture was different from
the cultures in the other Arab countries in that it was more open to change and other cultural
varieties.
Subject 7 explains:
Lebanon is distinct from the other Arab cultures in its openness to the other cultures and
civilizations in the worid. There are many civilizations in the worid that are much older
than Lebanon. But Lebanon is distinct in that it is like a kind of window, we are very good
at receiving and integrating. You also see that in the fact that the Lebanese has an
excellent capacity to integrate in the societies where he has emigrated. The other Arab
countries have very little emigrants in the worid.
Subject 1 1 feels that "the difference between Lebanon and the rest of the Arab worid is
its openness towards the sea frontier."
Moreover, subject 1 feels that:
The Arabs have gone through a very difficult period. They went through a period where
nationalist feelings ran high to the extent that they rejected all that was foreign. This
rejection of things from the outside held the Arab culture back. In addition, the foreign
missionaries which where present in the Arab worid, were closed during the above
mentioned nationalist period that swept the Arab countries. All these things did not take
place in Lebanon. In Lebanon , we benefited a lot from the foreign missionaries. You
might want to call the foreign mission imperialism, still we did benefit a lot from them. Up
to this day, many schools that have foreign roots have much higher standards of
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Subject 17 blames the Lebanese people for the following:
We were supposed to be different, this openness should have helped the Lebanese bepioneers in the Arab area after seeing how democratic nations are built They shouldhave been the first to learn that nations are not built on myths. The Lebanese in generalhad a better opportunity for advancement than other Arab nation because of this
openness to the West.
However, he adds, he is perplexed by the Lebanese behavior in Lebanon:
The interesting thing is that the Lebanese who believes in the ideals of democracy whenhe IS outside Lebanon completely changes his mind when he comes back to Lebanon
All the things that he had learned in the outside are refused because these universal
rules do not apply to the Lebanese people who are magically different than others They
think that the Lebanese will be able to advance and develop without following these
universal rules because the Lebanese are different.
Religious and Cultural VariPty
Another aspect in the Lebanese culture that was emphasized by a number of subjects is
the degree of religious and the cultural variety that the Lebanese people have as compared to
other Arab countries.
Subject 14 explains that:
... we can consider that the religious variety in Lebanon can be considered one of the
features of the Lebanese identity. This can be a blessing when it represents the
intellectual richness, and could it be a disaster because of the ethnocentrism and rancor.
When we say that Lebanon represents variety, we mean that it has a variety of cultural
idioms, and this openness to different cultures is something popular. You might find
cultural variety in other Arab counties, but you will not find the public living this variety.
Subject 1 0 feels that:
The distinctive feature of the Lebanese culture is that first it is an Arab culture and is
more Arab than other Arab countries. This is because the Moslem says I am a Moslem
and has the right to stay in the East. The Christian's situation demands that he says I am
an Arab and he thus penetrates the Arab culture and becomes at the top of the culture.
This is their reason for being in the East, that they are Arabs and they are ahead of
everybody in the creation of the Arab culture and promoting it.
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Again, subject 2 associates the Arab identity with the Lebanese cultural variety:
.the Arabs were the first to want an independent Lebanon. The Arab nation wanted to
th^p^H?
^'^^
^^^P^*"9 °f ^^riety in it and thaU wHIgive e different minorities a breathing space in a sea of a Moslem majority.
Subject 20 adds:
The Lebanese culture has the Christian religious dimension that is not present enough in
other Arab countries. It is an advantage that we have different and various culturaldimensions in our culture. Similarly, there are other countries that have not taken
enough advantage of the Islamic cultural dimension
Lebanese Freedoms
Therefore, subjects 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, and 14, 16, 20, 22, 23 and 24 feel that what
differentiates Lebanon from other Arab countries is the degree of freedoms that the Lebanese
individual enjoys.
Subject 6 feels that:
None of the Arab countries have found ways to provide minorities with freedom and
equality of participation. Lebanon, on the other hand, has found a way to deal with the
minorities problem, we have a good system for managing different sociological
identities. This is why I feel Lebanon is a victim of the Arab failure to deal with
differences... Moreover, in Lebanon, no one group can dominate the other.
Subject 15 explains that:
the differences is that our society is not a homogeneous religious society .... this has
prevented a totalitarian system from developing in Lebanon like in the other Arab
countries moreover, economically we are liberal the other Arab
economies have controlled economies
Subject 5 feels that:
we are all the same .... we eat the same we sing the same we are
absolutely the same but there is more freedom in Lebanon no basic differences
.... just the political systems are different if you think about the other surrounding
Arab countries .... the environment is scary there are no writers in the Arab countries
... people stop writing at an eariy age because the culture does not penmit you to write
you can not write because you have to write about peoples' lives and if you
write about peoples' life you have to write about peoples' oppression therefore,
you are not allowed to write....
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Subject 8 remembers that:
Lebanon had the voter system and public freedoms well before other Arab countries
hTT. ^T"^ ^'^^ renaissance the environment of freedomhelped it play a major role in becoming an Arab cultural center
Similarly, subject 4 explains:
In Lebanon there is freedom to a great extent. You can live your cultural life as you want
and express it as you want. In some Arab countries, the cultural life is dead Our people
want openness and our political system permits more cultural expression.
Subject 16:
I want to emphasize the freedom issue. The presence of freedoms in Lebanon makes it
different from the other Arab countries. The journalistic freedom, the economic freedom
the freedom of thought. Lebanon is equal to freedom.
However, at times, these freedoms caused a lot of problems. Subject 16 explains:
Lebanon was considered at times a threat to the Arab regimes because of the freedoms
in It. For example, the Lebanese press became the major danger to some other Arab
regimes. The Arabs considered that this press and media were a loose thing, and not a
freedom of thought. The freedom of thought was considered more dangerous than the
Lebanese war.
Different Degrees of Oppression
Some subjects, however, felt that even though Lebanon enjoyed a certain degree of
freedom, what was still shared between the Lebanese people and the people in other Arab
countries was the political oppression of the governing institutions.
As subject 1 5 explains:
... however .... nowhere in the Arab world and in Lebanon is there democracy in
Lebanon we never had real representation we are still represented by the same
people ... similar to the other Arab countries I do not believe we have a lot of
freedoms people in Lebanon are not equal in front of the law no new elite class
develops in Lebanon
Subject 21 complains of some Arabs who single out Lebanon:
.... they say Lebanon is not a legitimate country because it was created by the French
well ... in that sense all the other Arab countries are not legitimate countries
either ... they were all created by the French and the British but all these countries
created their own legitimacy and their own national identities all except Lebanon
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where the Lebanese individual in this system is not Lebanese but something else allthe other Arab countries have national identities why not Lebanon ...?
Question 4: What are the differences and v^hat are the commonalties between theLebanese culture and the Israeli culture?
Lebanon and Israel
Israel's Religious Ethnocentrism vs. Lebanon's Cultural Variety
The majority of the subject responses emphasized that the most basic difference
between the Lebanon and Israel is that one country is based on religious ethnocentrism and the
other is based on cultural variety.
Subject 7 explains:
The Israeli society, even though it gives the impression of being a civil society, it is still a
racial society. That society rejects any other people unless he is Jewish. This is basic.
The Arab society is much more tolerant of differences. Throughout the Arab history, the
Jew never felt that he was prosecuted from his Arab neighbors and the society. But the
Jews are very racial and believe they are different from other God followers. They are
God's chosen people. That is how we are different from Israel. We do not feel the
superiority that the Jews feel towards others.
Subject 1 emphasizes that:
Israel is a country that is rooted and is originated from a religion. The existence of Israel
is based on religious fanatism. The Israeli people are individuals that came from all over
the world escaping from prosecution. They chose to live on this piece of land because
their Torah which said that this piece of land is yours. God's chosen people. Israel is a
Jewish state by definition. Their mere existence is the opposite of what Lebanon
represents. Lebanon is a mission that stands for the co-existence of all the religious
sects present in it, including the Jewish religion. In Israel, the idea of coexistence is not
possible by definition.
Subject 21 asserts:
Our societies are multicultural ... their's is exclusive There is also a qualitative
difference between Israel and all other countries there has not been any country
like Israel in the history of the world even the Crusaders were people who mixed with
others they can never exist without their Jewishness
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Subject 14 explains the difference between two types of Jewish attitudes:
^.1 would say that the Israeli individual is western on the surface but Jewish at heart
that IS, he IS ethnocentric. Jewishness has become a form of nationalism in which theJew finds self affirmation, this is true of the Western Jews. As for the real Jew it is aform of ethnocentrism in which they believe in their superiority over other peoples TheJew represents a kind of national superiority. The Arabs, the Moslems and the
Lebanese, on the other hand, do not know isolation. The Arabs never had isolationist
feeling against the Jews. The Jews lived among the Arabs without being hated There
could have been some minimal sensitivities, but the Jews lived well within the Moslem
Arab society.
Subject 1 5: "
.... we are opposites by definition in Israel you have a homogeneous
society....we have a very diverse society "
Subject 17 explains:
The Israeli society, unlike the "Democracy' propaganda that they have in the West
which is a mari^eting ploy, is basically a closed society. Our culture is based on the
acknowledgment of the other. Theirs is based on the refusal of others. The Lebanese
that emigrated from Lebanon have followed the basic rules of life and have generally
integrated into the societies where they have settled. As did the Greeks, as did the
Italians,
..
etc. All did that, except the Jews. They are the only ones that insisted in
staying separate. If all people who emigrated to the Americas had behaved in the Jewish
way, then there would not have been any new societies on the American continent.
Aggressive vs. Peaceful Goals
Subjects 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, and 24 felt that the difference between the Lebanese
society and the Israeli society is that Israel is an aggressive, an expansionist society while
Lebanon has no such goals.
Subject 8 asserts that:
Israel wants to divide and disintegrate Lebanon because we stand at an opposite to their
existence Moreover, the Israelis have interests in dominating Lebanon's water
resources .... and also destroy Lebanon's role in the region Lebanon, on the other
hand, has no goals except the maintenance of its freedom and sovereignty.
Subject 4 complains that the Israelis use others to attain their own interests:
biggest proof of that is how Israel used the Christians and then gave up on them, and
how they used some Moslems and also gave up on them as well. Israel followed it's own
interests. We do not need much evidence of Israel's pursuit of their own interests by
using others.
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Similarly, subject 13 asserts that "the Jews have no allies, they have people with whom
they cooperate with but no equal partners. This is a theological fact."
Subject 5 feels that:
..... Israel as a country has a mission
... a goal .... Lebanon has no goal . Israel is aproject to exercise control and dominate the Middle East region you can not even
compare us to Israel Israel would not exist if it were not for its project ofhegemony take away the project and Israel will dissolve there would not be
any justification for this huge capital expenditures on the military arsenal
European Culture vs. Middle Eastern nu itMro
Some subjects differentiated between the Israeli religion and the Israeli culture. They
considered that the Israeli culture was basically rooted in the European culture, while
Lebanon was based on the Middle Eastem Arab culture.
Developed vs. Underdeveloperi
Subjects 4, 5, 15, 15, 16, 20 and 21 compared Israel's level of development and
approach to problems solving with the Lebanese underdevelopment.
Subject 15 explains:
... the Israeli political parties and the institutions have the capacity to plan and
implement their plans...we can not do that .... they have a great pool of thinkers and a lot
of advanced universities we do not have that they conduct studies all over the
worid .... we still can not make scientific studies in Lebanon
Similariy, subject 16 feels that:
I always say that reality changes faster than thinking changes. So the best thing to
do is to follow reality and try to catch up with our thinking. The difference between us and
Israel is that they were always reading the international realities while we were always
late in our readings What we need first of all to read reality in terms of numbers. We
need to know what our resources are, what our needs are etc. In Lebanon we do not
have numbers but rather opinions. We have no census projects. We do not have
research centers. In Israel, every book written by us is translated into Hebrew and is
studied. We, on the other hand, have no idea what they do. Israel spends two to three
times on research centers of what the whole Arab worid spends on research centers. We
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still think in terms of myths and images. We value poetry more than education We areway behind in technology. Arabs have a romantic style of thinking, while we should have
a scientific style when we come to understand politics and economics
Question 5: What are the commonalties and what are the differences between the
Lebanese and the Western Cultures?
Lebanon vs. the West
The subjects' answers to this question tended to be short. The majority of the subjects
tended to associate the Western culture with mainly technological, scientific and human
advances.
Subject 1
:
The differences between us and the West lies in the fact that there are a lot of things that
an individual gets in the West that are not existent in Lebanon. There is the political and
social freedom that an individual enjoys in the West that you can not expect to get here.
Subject 5 feels that:
The Westem Culture dominates the whole world all the world is influenced and
dominated by the Western culture .... the question becomes ... how is the Arab culture
different within the frame of the Western culture? how can we Lebanese evolve
our cultural heritage within this western framework?
Subject 8 feels that:
Lebanon plays a role of the go between we have brought a lot of Western things to
the Arab world such as the democratic system .... the economic freedom translation
of books there are a lot of Western aspects that have benefited the Lebanese
we are the window of the Arabs to the West .... Moreover, I do not believe in a Western
and an Eastern culture .... we have a human culture we take from the West what
we need some things could not and do fit in Lebanon our social values are
different
Similarly, subject 10 explains that:
We have an openness to the West in a moderate form, unlike the Algerians. Even
though the Lebanese knows perfect English he still knows his Arabic perfectly too.
Lebanon took from the West what suited the Lebanese's needs and adapted it to the
Lebanese way.
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Subject 20 agrees with the above stated and qualifies:
Not all the West is the same. We are asking to adopt those aspects of the West that are
Th thlVcl*^^^^^^^ '''' ^^-^'"^ - needt^pT
Subjects 1
,
3, and 14 feel the Lebanese have an inferiority complex when it comes to the
Westem culture. Subject 14:
..
why should we have a complex from our relationship with the West? We should not
L "L A", °^ ^"
EastAA/est complex, but rather we should think in terms of
EastAA/est interests. They have the good and the bad. The Westem administrations
operate on the basis of their interests, the West is no longer associated with Christiandominance, even though there are some Westem countries that still carry some
sediment against the Moslems. We can not separate from the West.
Question 6: What are the problems facing the Lebanese unification?
Problems
The great majority of subjects believed that the primary factor impeding the
development of the Lebanese people and the development of a unified Lebanese identity is
sectarianism. These subjects' responses varied from emphasizing the reasons and roots
of sectarianism to emphasizing the effects of sectarianism. In addition, various subjects
discussed sectarianism in relation to numerous aspects of the Lebanese life and society, past
and present.
Significantly, exposure of the problems of sectarianism was often presented in the
form of criticism around the behavior and interactions of the sectarian leaders in Lebanon.
The Sectarian System
Oppressive Rule of the Sectarian Elite . Most subjects talked about the divisive and
abusive effects of having a leadership structure built around sectarian differences. Subject 6
considers that the problem with the sectarian leadership structure is that it creates a divisive
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political and psychological atmosphere because it is by definition built around sectarian
differences. This, according to subject 2. leads to the following:
" where there has been no
actual unification, the country ends up with a fragile government structure that creates
oppression, abuse of power, and monopolies."
Subject 4 explains:
The Lebanese are still divided due to their heritage and their system of false leadershipsEven though we have a lot of things that unify us, there is still no intention to build on
'
hose commonalties. The false leaders are looking after their own interests and are usinq
the people as if they are sheep. ^
Subjects 6, 17 and 22 emphasize that a small class of people keeps the power from
generation to generation. Moreover, Subject 2 asserts that "it is very hard for me to differentiate
between the Moslems and the Christians in power in what concems their abuse of public affairs."
He adds:
The current form of govemment has at its core sectarian leaders that have raped the
democratic institutions of the country and has come to power by riding and using the
sectarian instincts as a vehicle to reach power, or have used the banner of poverty or the
banner of political loss. This form of govemment created new interests and forms of
gain. This situation has transformed the religions into profit institutions.
Similariy, Subject 16 explains:
In Lebanon, there Is a political, economic and societal elite that even though they are
adversaries still they have a strong alliance that unifies them. Since these forces are the
product of a sectarian system, they unify in promoting the sectarian mentality in order to
maintain their survival.
Subject 4 agrees with subject 16 and gives an example:
Five years after the Ta'if Accord and you still do not have these simple local town
elections. At times they tell you those elections are dependent on the Peace negotiations
in the Middle East, at other times they tell you the electoral lists are still not ready. It is
all a lie. There are a handful of leaders that are afraid to lose their power and are afraid if
the people speak out. It is prohibited to go into demonstrations, it is prohibited to speak
out.
Subject 6 mentions another form of oppression: "Power elite accuses anyone who
disagrees with them with treason."
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lDdivic<ua| Pep^ndgnqg and Marninali7atinn nf Most respondents
emphasized that this type of leadership structure creates a lot of problems that keep people and
society from realizing their full potentials. One of the major complaints about the sectarian
leadership is around the kind of dependence that it creates in individuals due to its power in
determining an individual's chances of getting services and jobs in the country.
Subject 1 explains that "in today's Lebanon, an individual's chances of making it, of
getting a job. of getting projects from the government is dependent on who that person knows in
the goveming class."
Subject 19 agrees: "Qualifications are not important in Lebanon, it is who you know."
Again, Subject 4:
.... individual qualifications are insignificant because no matter how much education he
has, he has to go to his sect's leader because he holds the quotas and the individual has
to take his rights from the leader. His future is in the hand of the leader.
Subject 2 emphasizes the govemment's responsibility in maintaining this situation:
When the govemment is providing you with your rights every body is well. But when the
government fails to do that, then each one finds himself obliged to go get his rights from
his sectarian leader or religious leader.
Similariy, Subject 17 feels that:
The way the system is set, the govemment is the major element that is impeding our
society's unification. Moreover, it is not encouraging to qualifications of the people. It is
destroying the society's chances for development and advancement.
All this, according to subject 9, increases an individual's dependence on the sectarian
leader. He believes that "an individual holds on to the traditional sectarian leaders in the same
way as babies hold on to their blankets~a need for security-they breed dependence by
controlling an individual's source of basic needs."
Moreover, Subject 15 complains of the lack of people-people communication:
We do not determine our own interaction with each other. We come together when
others want us to come together. All the discourse is limited to the upper echelons of
society, which is, in tum, limited and associated with outside influences. Therefore, the
Interaction looses it's meaning to the self It is not self determined. In the past, on the
Internal level, there could never be a meeting or a new dialog between the Druzes and
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the Maronites for example, outside the parameters that were defined by the sectarian
elite such as Pierre Jumayyel, Kamal Jumblat, Shammoun etc."
Subjects 6, 8, and 15 point out the irrational approach to problem solving caused by this
kind of leadership structure. Subject 6: "People depend on 7-8 people that can solve national
problems or create a crisis."
Subject 15: "Leaders define what issues are of national importance and which are not
according to their personal opinions rather than scientific evidence and the conclusions of the
intelligencia."
Subjects 4, 8 and 12 complain that sectarian leaders and the government are
discouraging the new generation from participating in public affairs because they feel that they
are not represented by either of them.
The Institutionalized Divisive Sectarian Culture. All subjects, without exception,
focused on the divisive and oppressive effects of the sectarian culture in general. The issues
they focused on were related to the ones they discussed in relation to the sectarian leadership as
well as other issues.
Subjects 14, and 20 differentiate between sectarianism and religion.
Subject 20:
The most important of Lebanon's problems is sectarianism. And here we need to
differentiate between sectarianism and Religion. Religion is a personal relationship
between the person and his God. Sectarianism is opposite to what religion stands for.
Sectarianism is used as a means towards an end more than it represents religious
ideologies.
Subject 5 feels alienated in Lebanon because he feels that:
This is a place that is against people and this place belongs to the sects to the
leaders and to the oppressors the enemy of Lebanon is its sects these people
who say Lebanon was made for them the Maronites and the Shiites and the Druzes
feel that this country is theirs because they are not present in other places as political
minorities they are the enemies of Lebanon. ..sadly enough .... we have not been
able to develop an idea about Lebanon beyond those groups
Subject 2 wonders;
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How can you have democracy when you have sectarianism? these are two
contradirtory concepts individuals end up defending the rights of their sects instead
of defending their individual rights. I believe we have a long way to go to qet to ademocracy and I think we are going backwards.
Subjects 1 and 16 complain that sectarian identities are imposed on individuals since
eariy on in life and are maintained throughout life with very little choice to break out of these
sectarian identities.
Subject 16 explains:
In Lebanon the individual is bom in a sect and dies in a sect, and when you are growing
up, you go to schools that represent different religious groups. Moreover, in everyday life
you see that the Christian wants to woric with a Christian lawyer. And the Moslem with a
Moslem. The current system got stuck to the financial economic system. The vicious
circle. On the one hand, this sectarian system is producing political forces and an
intellectual elite that defends that system. On the other hand, these elite are incapable of
getting out of that system and thus they feed each other.
Subjects 16, 17. 21
,
23 explain the role that the Lebanese form of government has on
maintaining and promoting society's divisive sectarian identities:
Subject 17 explains that "you need your sect much more that your central govemment.
You have to go through your religious sect in order to reach your govemment."
Subject 21 complains that:
People are made to remember their distinct religious belongings when they need
something from the govemment. At those times the Christian has to go to somebody
from his sect in the govemment that will help him with his necessities. The govemment
nowadays is saying that if you want your civil rights you need to go through sectarian
channels.
Subjects 1, 4, 5, 12, 20, 22 point out the relation between sectarianism and the current
educational system as they ponder the reasons behind the Lebanese's problems with unification.
Subject 20: "Education, is also sectarian. The weakness of the public educational system
Is due to sectarianism. This is a great obstacle for unification."
Subject 5: "I believe a lot of problems stem from the current educational system and
education there Is no common educational system there is no common civil education ..."
Subject 4: "The problem in Lebanon is that there is no agreement over the heritage and
the history, and that is all due to the disagreement over the identity."
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Moreover, the fact that Lebanese of different sects follow different personal status laws
was seen by subjects 7. 20. 22. and 23 as creating serious differences among the Lebanese
people.
Subject 22:
there are no common laws .... the religious laws are different from each other
there is no common civil law which will subject us all to the same civil laws that can
organize our lives this is very important in terms of women's rights which differ
significantly from one sectarian system to the other
Subject 20 reveals some of the illogical consequences the can result from the absence
of a common civil law:
I am afraid that sectarian feelings are on a rise in Lebanon Today, the Lebanese law
accepts civil marriages provided it has been performed outside Lebanon and not in
Lebanon. It is. of course, very illogical to not accept civil mamages performed in
Lebanon especially that the Lebanese judges can have a say in the marriages performed
in the exterior. How can you accept it and be able to judge it inside and still not accept
Lebanese civil marriage.
On the other hand, Subject 5 warns of the prevalence of religious expression and fears
that if it becomes the only form of expression it could create a divisive environment among
people.
Subject 5 explains:
religious expression can become very divisive when these religious expressions
become representative of a sect ... then people from other sects react negatively to each
other imagine a Christian who thinks of the Shiites as those who do "Ashura" and hit
their heads until they bleed or the Christians who worship a cross can be seen as
atheists by a Moslem etc. people generalize
Subjects 5, 17, and 21 complained of the divisive effects of sectarianism on city life. As
subject 17 explains:
instead of the city blending people the villages, instead, divided Beirut. The
current sectarian system is transforming the city from a melting pot into a religious stock
market, while each sect has its particular capitals in their corresponding areas People
from different religious sects come to Beirut to play their sectarian stocks. Different
sectarian leaders come to the city in order to play their sectarian cards and try to provide
favors for their sect's constituents
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Subject 19 blames the election laws on maintaining a sectarian culture:
elecTral^reoiof V -
'"^9'°"^ '"^o one commonecto region. Small electoral regions increase sectarianism. In one electoral regionthe discourse becomes national as opposed to sectarian and regional, moreover we
'
would feel responsible for each other... ,
ui uver,
Subject 1 0 also wams of the dangerous role sectarianism can play in times of economic
difficulties:
;
's a danger when the economic and social machinery fail to reach the
Lebanese individual. The continuation of a sectarian environment during a social and
economic cnsis threatens the Lebanese unity. Unity is a dynamic concept When the
Lebanese people do not have their basic needs the Lebanese start blaming the
others. Each sect blames the other. So justifying the self and blaming the other is verv
dangerous '
In a related manner, subject 19 feels that 'Ihe more people feel oppressed, the more
they feel sectarian."
The effects of sectarianism on personal initiative and motivation were also pointed out
by subjects 4, 8, 17
Subject 17:
Sectarianism is not only having a negative effect on the level of identity, but it also has
important negative effects on development. Why would people be motivated to work for
obtaining educational qualifications when they know that is not what provides
opportunities for them but rather their sectarian identity and their connections
Subjects 1
, 4, 9, 7, 19 were also aware of the negative effects that the sectarian
environment has on the country's development since it is causing a large brain drain from the
country. Subject 4 explains:
A major negative effect of sectarianism is that all the positive aspects of the Lebanese
people are not being invested nationally, on the public level. These great potentials,
these great dreams, these great aspirations, all these are not being nationally invested.
Well ... yes ... the Lebanese is intelligent, his intelligence is shown by the fact that he is
resourceful .... wherever he goes around the worid he is able to make it, in the States, in
Venezuela, in Brazil, in Africa, etc. Why doesn't he live in Lebanon? Why can't we
benefit from his intelligence in Lebanon? Here we go back to the original basic political
problem that has forced the Lebanese to emigrate.
156
SQct9ri9nism an« Foreign Relations. Subjects 2, 8, 9, and 14 refer to sectarianism i
terms of foreign relations. Subject 2 protests the use of foreign powers in intemal conflicts:
I am against the Christians' use of the help of foreign powers to win over the Moslems
fh" "1^ T'"^ Moslems' use of the other Arab forces to become stronger thanthe Chns^ians. Moreover, in the same way that I was against the Christians when thev
exercised power over the Moslems. I am now against the Moslems overpowering the
Chnstians. I can understand one political party winning over another, but can not accept
one sect overpowering another. This is a formula to reignite the war.
Similariy. subject 7 believes that:
.... we need to stop the practice of falling back on our religious identities whenever a
crisis anses and then we seek help from foreign forces that are allied with the respective
sects. We have no other option than doing that, our common interests mandate that we
accept each other as equal partners.
Subject 9 complains that:
Some groups in Lebanon trade in their identities. Lebanon is used by the Lebanese
groups as a means towards an end. The Christians use Lebanon in order to protect
themselves from the Arabs whereas Lebanon for Moslems was a first step towards an
essential Arab unification. But no one worths for Lebanon for Lebanon per se ....
Subject 24 adds: 'You have to notice the political parties in Lebanon are sectarian
parties or political parties that call for an identity that is supra-Lebanon non of these are
Lebanese parties ..."
Problems Caused by Other Sects
A few subjects pointed out the responsibility that other Lebanese sectarian groups have
In the failure to develop a unified Lebanese identity and Lebanese people.
Christian Complaints
.
Subject 1 explains that he has a problem in defining the
Lebanese identity because:
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We have a problem in defining what Lebanon should be. After the war the Christian
considers that he ost. while the Moslem considers that he won. This unba^nce inthinking leads us to question what the Lebanese identity is.
Subjects 12. 16. and 22 explain that the Christians still have a fear of Islam. Subject 16
explains:
The Christian asks himself, What is my role in this vast Islamic worid?' The MoslemSunni has an extension in the Arab worid. The Christian has no extension except in this
small peace of land, or he emigrates, which is what is happening in reality. As long as
this unbalance persists, and I am talking about the psychological unbalance, there will
always be this question of what Lebanon is
Moslem Complaints
.
Subjects 2. 4. 7 and 1 4 complain of the behavior of some
Christian groups in terms of their effects on the Lebanese unity and the Lebanese identity. They
criticize the tendency of some Lebanese to try to separate Lebanon from its Arab natural
environment.
Subject 4 explains that:
this country can not be separate from its nation, its natural environment. This
particular issue, even at this time, still poses a problem. The Lebanese Identity is in
crisis because there are people who define the Lebanese identity
. differently the
isolationist party .... the imperialist party sought to create a situation where Lebanon is
separated from its nation, and from its natural Arabic surroundings they were used
by the imperial powers who have always tried to obliterate the Lebanese Identity, which
is the Arabic identity. These people are also arrogant because they consider that this
country came into existence for their sake. Had they not been here, there would have
been no country.
However, he later adds:
The differences are not in the people but in the political system that gives different
political rights to different groups. A Maronite has the right to become a president even if
he Is not qualified, but people from other sects have no right to become presidents. You
bury your ambitions from the moment of birth. It is the political system. What is worse is
that those who benefited from this political system were not even a religious sect but
rather a number of individuals.
Subject 7. though, considers that the conflict lies in two definitions:
This issue has been settled forever. There are some who say that Lebanon is made up
of diverse distinctive cultures and that it is different from the rest of the Arab countries. I
think this issue has been settled and Lebanon is Arab an Arab country made up of
minorities.
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Moreover, they complain that some groups feel that they are not concemed with the
problems of other Lebanese living by the Israeli border and that they fail to take a common stand
with the other Lebanese with respect to the Israeli aggressions.
Subject 14 wonders out loud:
... how can you possibly explain that a lot of the Lebanese take a neutral stand with
regards to the issue of the Israeli occupation? When you speak of the issue of
resistance, they consider that a matter that concems the inhabitants of the South of
Lebanon.
Question 7: What are the major future challenges facing the Lebanese people in general
and the Lebanese individual in particular?
Future Challenges
External Threats
Subjects 1. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 7, 8. 9, 10. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22 and 23
emphasized the extemal challenges that Lebanon faces. Mainly, these subjects considered that
the main challenge for Lebanon Is to define Itself In relations to the countries around it as well as
define its future role in the overall global village.
Subject 15 reminds us:
We are also experiencing the emergence of a new tendency on the international level
towards global integration. How are we going to define ourselves and determine what we
want in the shadow of this new internationalization and world integration.
Subject 10 feels that the challenge is to find a common Lebanese challenge:
The challenge is finding a common point of view with regards to the big issues. Such as
the relationship with the Arab countries, the relationship with Syria, etc. There is no one
thing in Lebanon that is a challenge to all parties equally. For example, the Syrian
presence, the two sides do not want it, but each in different degrees. And when one side
becomes excited about a certain opinion, the other side takes the opposite stand. So
there is nothing in Lebanon that challenges both parties equally.
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Especially worrisome among the majority of the subjects is the challenge that the Middle
East process poses for the Lebanese people. The challenges perceived were economic, political
and cultural.
Economic Challfinge??
.
Subjects 12 and 15 worry that the Lebanese people are not
preparing themselves for the peace process. Subject 15 explains:
We are almost jumping into the unknown. We do not know where the Lebanese will
stand at the end of all these changes. Nobody is even thinking about this What is
Lebanon's role in these huge changes that are going to engulf the region. No information
is available.
Subjects 1, 3, 4, 13, 16, 20 and 21 emphasize the important role that Lebanon plays in
the Arab world and the possible Israeli threat to this relationship.
Subject 20 fears for Lebanon's intermediary role with the West:
Most of the dangers that the Arab world is going to face is amplified in Lebanon because
Lebanon will be competing with Israel with what has characterized it, mainly its freedom
and democracy and its openness to the West. Lebanon will have a competitor in terms
of its advantage of having special relationships with the West.
Subjects 1,16, and 21 worry about Lebanon's service economy. Subject 1:
Lebanon has thrived in the past when there was a no peace, no war situation in the
Middle East. The Arabs used to place their money in Lebanon, and they used to come
and spend some money during their vacations. Now Lebanon is dependent on the
outcome of the peace process with Syria and Israel. What is going to be our role? Israel
is trying to get through peace what it could not get through war. Economic power in the
region. That only means that our importance in the Middle East is going to decrease.
Similarly, subject 16 explains:
Lebanon feels that it is a small country and that it serves as an axis to the others'
economies. There is the feeling that it is possible to shut out Lebanon from its
surroundings and thus killing its service economy. We do not have industry nor
agriculture, therefore, our service capabilities are essential to our survival. The threat
now is Israel's technological power. It is a danger not from force but from the economy. It
is not an ideological challenge but rather a technological challenge. The focus among
the Lebanese especially among the Christians has shifted from the ideological threat
from the Arab countries to the technological threat from Israel. That is, the threat of the
cooperation of Israel with other Arab countries, which would mean the diminishing of
Lebanon's crucial role in the area.
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Subject 7, on the other hand, feels that these fears are exaggerated:
No matter how much technological advance Israel possesses as well as its influence inthe world, all that can not eradicate Lebanon's role in the area. For example we
encourage the development of a common Arab market. If Europe is breaking the bordersnowadays, where
.t is planning to have a common monetary unit etc. Lebanon cSn rJay a
cultural, human, and developing role. The Lebanese have an excellent capadtylor
^
adapting to new circumstances and environments no matter what these are.
Po litical Threats
.
Subjects 2 and 13 predict that the economic threat after the peace
process will lead to political instabilities in the Arab region. Subject 2 explains:
The biggest threat is the political threat, that is. is your system of government viable or
not. and this is a threat to all Arab countries. Even though Israel in reality is based on a
military system, it is still capable of presenting itself to the world as a democracy The
Arab countries have been able to avoid democratic reform under the pretext that they
are in a state of war with Israel and that all its energy needed to be directed towards
facing the enemy's threat. At any rate, after the peace process, the people will demand
change from their leaders. The mediocrity of the Arab institutions will be exposed
because you are going to be in direct competition with the Israeli system. The current
oppression can not continue, there is going to be. sooner or later, a minimal dialogue
between the ruling and the ruled which is not the case now. The market forces will force
the leaders to face reality which had been postponed before because of the state of war.
Subject 4 worries about the Israeli cultural threat in light If the internal Lebanese
disagreements. He explains: "Lebanon has no immunity culturally speaking as long as it is in
conflict over it's identity. The conflict over our history, culture, and language etc."
Subjects 7, 13, and 17 emphasize the challenge posed by continual Israeli threat in the
invaded Lebanese regions. Subject 7 explains:
The occupied tenitories are almost 10% of the total land area of Lebanon. Anything that
happens within the occupied lands affects Lebanon very strongly. Let us remember the
war of the "seven days". Around 350,000 Southemers were displaced, many of them
went to Beirut, to the North and to the Bikaa. The majority of the refugees came to Beirut
and had to stay in the schools and in empty buildings. This matter disrupted the whole
living cycle in the capital. Therefore, Lebanon can not tolerate this kind of situation much
longer.
161
Internal Ch^jipnG??
Internqj Reforms. The other type of challenges that were emphasized by many
subjects are the intemal type of challenges.
Subjects 5. 6, 7, 8 and 17 stressed the importance of meeting the challenge of reforming
the political system in such a way that it would help accomplish a number of things.
Subjects 7, 15 and 17 emphasize the role of government in unifying society. Subject 7:
"
....
there is the problem of belonging. What belonging is the individual going to have? Is he
going to feel a belonging to only the small part that directly concerns his sect?"
Subject 8 feels that government should aim at getting more people involved:
The biggest challenge is to permit and convince and raise the awareness of the new
generation to participate in the govemment and the public spheres .... Moreover, the
Lebanese need the efforts of all sides to be rebuilt you can not distance anybody
there is a lot of Lebanese money in the exterior and we need to encourage those to
participate.
Subject 5 and 7 emphasize the service role of the role of govemment in providing
people's needs. Subject 7: "The biggest challenge is answering the question of how can we
create social organizations and systems that can serve the people "
Subject 15 goes as far as saying:
What we are asking is for the govemment to take care of the people. Even from a
sectarian basis, let the govemment take care of the Maronite people, the Druze people,
etc.. .not even as a Lebanese. Give people their rights. Help them satisfy their biological
needs. Education, health, economy. The sectarian government exists for itself.
Subjects 3, 12 and 16 emphasize the role of the govemment in solving the economic
and challenges that face the people.
Maintenance of Freedoms . Subject 16 complains:
The challenges are many. There is the ideological challenge. The challenge of being the
only liberal nation among many socialist regimes. It was a regime based on freedoms in
an area where the most other regimes were based on obedience. Lebanon has a lot of
freedoms. The joumalistic freedom, the economic freedom, the freedom of thought.
Lebanon was considered at times a threat to the Arab regimes because of what it
represented. The Arabs considered that this press and media was a loose thing, and not
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a freedom of thought and they used to consider the regime in Lebanon a threat to their
national security.
Subject 20 explains:
Even though Lebanon is not completely free, it still has the highest degree of freedoms
in this part of the worid. But the challenge is to preserve these freedoms and the degree
of democracy that it already has. Without these two there will be no Lebanon One great
challenge to these freedoms is that we need to build the proper basis upon which these
freedoms can exist. These are economic and social basis. The middle class in Lebanon
IS shrinking today in Lebanon. Therefore, the freedoms are maintained when people
have the proper social and economic structures to survive.
Reality Testing- A few subjects considered that a lot of problems that the Lebanese
people experience are caused by a mythical type of thinking. Subject 15 complains of the
mythical identities:
Lebanon is like any other country. I do not believe in the myth of a special Lebanese
condition, these are myths we made up. We need to eat in dignity, we need to leam in
dignity, we need to protect ourselves from the occupier. These are the realities, all other
things are myths.
Similariy, subject 5 complains:
I believe that all those in the past who tried to define identities like Aflac and Saadi ....
they created a problem to us with all these metaphysical stuff they led us to a dead
end these things have no meaning the issue is man...the issue is having a place
that can provide you with man's basic needs of freedom .... human rights .... democracy
Subject 17:
We also have many myths in Lebanon that are considered truths by some. For example,
there is the myth that Lebanon is a rich place that can survive economically no matter
what. The favorable economic conditions that existed in Lebanon during the 40's, 50's,
and 60's were a result of certain specific regional circumstances that the area was going
through. This created a belief among the Lebanese that Lebanon was distinct and had
special characteristics. This is not true. There were regional circumstances that helped
Lebanon. This conditions are no longer present today. The country is destroyed and all
our brain power is in the exterior ....
Subject 5:
what is left for Lebanon is the Lebanese myth. ...the myth created by the Maronites
this is a strong myth and based on a sect they developed a different culture for
themselves ... around which they developed a Lebanese identity this identity has
been destroyed after the war
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Subject 14:
I say to the new generation, those who came before you lived in an imaginary world andbecause of that they fought each other and wanted to change reality. Even reality has tobe changed with the tools of reality.
Subject 16 feels that:
In spite of the formation of many Arab states after the breakdown of the Ottoman
Empire, the dream of a unified Arab nation and one Arab leader remained This in my
opinion, had led to all the Arab vs. Arab wars because there was no real acceptance of
the different Arab nations boundaries. The problem is that that ideology led to a denial of
reality. When you acknowledge the particularity of each identity, then those identities
would be able to accept the universal. As long as the universal refuses to accept the
particulars, then the particulars would shut in.
Question 8: What do you feel would help Improve Lebanon's situation and increase its
sense of unity?
Solutions
Education and Awareness Raising
Subjects 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. 12. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20 and 21 emphasize the role
that education should have in increasing people's sense of unity.
Moreover, these subjects felt that increasing people's sense of unity meant that
educational efforts should be focused on raising peoples' awareness with respect to a variety of
issues.
Subjects 1
.
2,4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 felt that unifying the Lebanese history school book should
be one of the first Lebanese priorities. Moreover, most of them emphasized that the only way to
write a unified history book is to write about the realities of the people and their live
circumstances.
Subject 6: " write history of people and not leaders de-emphasize past leaders
emphasize people's struggles."
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Subject 4: "Let us put the facts and the realities of this country as they are. Like all other
countries."
Moreover, subjects 3, 5, 6 and 12 felt that it is very important to keep the memory of the
civil war alive and learn from that experience of human suffrage.
Subject 3: "Emphasize common suffrage. Emphasize war memory. Develop strong
memory of trauma instead of forgetting. Develop memory rituals. Remind people of the dangers
of war."
Similariy, subject 5:
Write about the truth let people write about the reality .... let us not deny reality and
let us document the people's experiences during the civil war let us stop preaching
and describe reality as it is the human experience for twenty years of war ..."
Moreover, subject 12 feels that education should also focus on helping the Lebanese
open up to each other. Subject 12 explains:
We have a whole generation that has not left its area of residence throughout the war.
They need to get to know other areas and each other in order to have a better idea of
what the Lebanese identity is. If you have friendships and have been to other areas in
the country, then you start to care about those.
Subject 4 also feels that we should not forget to emphasize Lebanon's Arab heritage:
"For when we say an Arab Lebanon, that has its interpretation in the history book, in the civics
book, in the generalization of the Arabic language. In generalizing the Arabic culture."
Subject 16, on the other hand, feels that the history book should also emphasize
Lebanon's place in history.
agree on a common history. Basically, that Lebanon is not a historic mistake, but
rather a historic constant for all the reasons we have mentioned above (refuge for the
minorities, diversity, freedom, etc.). Even if Lebanon's border changed overtime, the
Lebanese' entity is no product by France or of imperialism. Lebanon is a historic
permanent.
Subjects 3, 4, 6, 14, 17 feel that, in order to increase the sense of unity, it is very
important to raise people's awareness to the common challenges that they face.
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Subject 14 explains:
^ tho ? t 9 """'^^^ educating the people about the serious problems that faceall the Lebanese as a whole. We should take advantage of the crisis that affect all theLebanese in order to make them more conscious of their common plight Then you
would be able to tell the Lebanese that there is no Christian type hunger and a Moslemtype hunger^ It is all the same. Reality provides you with a lot of means that you can use
in unifying the Lebanese.
Subject 3 points out that "education should focus on directing people's attention away
from petty sectarian struggles and towards the real challenges that face them."
Moreover, subject 4 feels that:
Our immunity, first of all, comes from becoming aware of the Israeli dangers and belief
that danger is a common one. We should exercise our role in waming and making all our
social groups aware of this danger.
Subject 6 also feels that people should be made aware of their common financial
interests as well. Moreover, subjects 3, 6, 12, 16. 21 and 22 feel that people should be educated
on human rights issues.
Subject 12:
... people need adult political education. There can be no democracy if there is no
human and economic development. And there can be no such thing if there is no
advanced political plan where part of it is to educate about the values like what
democracy means. What are human rights? What are children's rights? The are many
countries that determined what human rights are and we need to educate our people
about that.
Moreover, subject 14 emphasizes that education needs to raise the Lebanese awareness
on their need to get rid of their past psychological complexes from the East and the Western
worid and deal with others on a more rational level. He explains:
I say that the rudiments of the past has created in us a lot of complexes. A complex, for
example against the Arab worid, a complex towards the West. The problem is that our
political activity is based on those complexes, and when your behavior is a reaction, that
means that the other imposes on you his rules. You start living in the atmosphere of the
other. Therefore, we need to stop approaching our political problems from a
Psychological complex and we need to approach our problems from a reality based
perspective. When I want to determine the kind of relationship that I should have with
the Arab worid, I need to determine the basis of my relationship with the Arab worid. Do I
have common spiritual and economic values that a separation from them is a separation
of the self? What are my gains and losses in my relationship with the Arabs and the
Moslems? Let us define that relationship on the basis of our values and interests. Then
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we consider the West, why should I have a Complex from my relationship with the Westhey have the good and the bad. The Westem administrations operate on the basis of
'
their interests, the West is no longer Christian, even though there are some westem
^"^ sediment against the Moslems. We can not separate fromine West.
He adds;
There is an Eastern kind of ethnocentrism, it is not religious ethnocentrism but rather an
Eastern kind of ethnocentrism. The East is zealous, you find that the emotional side
dominates the Eastem way of thinking. The way out is rationality and objectivity I have
always said that we should give our emotional side a rational dosage so that it will
become balanced, and we should give our rational side an emotional dosage so that it
can mellow.
Government and the Civil Society
A number of subjects emphasized the role that government should play in decreasing
the effects of sectarianism and increasing people's sense of unity. More specifically, most
subjects felt that the govemmenfs civic role should be strengthened and it should make its
primary focus the provision and protection of the individuals' human rights regardless of their
sectarian identity.
Subject 3 clarifies the characteristics of a civic society:
... civic concerns override sectarian differences and makes them less important a
civic society is a pluralistic society based on a progressive and future reference. A Civic
society will eliminate the identity ladder individual/sect/ religion .... in a civic society, the
identity of individual is Lebanese before all other identities.
Subject 8:
we have to make religious trading a losing trade we need coalitions that
represent all the Lebanese such as political parties under a civic government
this civic government is enough to guarantee the rights of the religions this is why.
we call for a civic system .... where individuals are free to exercise their rights Civil
government that negotiates between the government institutions and the religious
institutions harmonize between the two and not the separation of the two
Subject 7 adds:
As much as we can attain a balanced development among the people, that is, as much
as we take care of our sick till they heal. I do not believe that the Lebanese are fighting
over serving God, but are rather fighting over the living matters such as services and
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work and survival. The more we can create a civil society that helps the citizen provide
his needs, the less important the differences would become between the groups.
Subject 2 feels that:
In order to take me away from my sect you have to make me belong to the state The
only hope is that the govemment of the people becomes stronger. This common fate
and common life of the people can be only guaranteed by the state. You need to
strengthen the civil institutions to enable these institutions to override the religious one
Since this is originally a political entity and not a religious entity or a racist entity that
means that the guarantee for its existence is the state. This is the only institution that c
protect the rights of its citizens.
Moreover, subject 16 explains:
I am not calling for the nullification of the sects, but to emphasize the primacy of the
state. You should prohibit the intrusion of religious powers into the govemment
decisions. It is important to take away from the sects all the sect rights that belong to the
govemment. It is not acceptable that there should remain sectarian judicial courts. It is
not acceptable that there can be no civil marriage.
According to subjects 8, 9 and 12, govemment can provide peoples' rights only if
everybody gives primacy to the rule of law:
Subject 8 explains:
We need a govemment that is perceived by the citizens as the protector of his rights ....
only then will individuals stop going to their leaders to get their rights this can only
happen if the govemment is one of laws and institutions Moreover, only then can
we develop external relationships that are based on the real interests of all the Lebanese
and not based on making one group stronger than the other
Subject 12 adds: "We need the right people to apply the constitution. Today's leadership
have agreements over deals and not over national plans and the application of the constitution."
Subject 1 feels explains that:
We need govemment institutions that are independent. In this country the govemment is
divided among different individuals. Here in Lebanon, the prime minister considers the
other ministers his assistants not independent ministers. This is ridiculous, we need
government institutions that stand on their own.
A number of subjects feel that the govemment can not play its proper role unless it goes
through a reform process. Subject 4 explains and complains:
You need to institute political and administrative reform. But I do not see in the horizon
any intention to do that by those who are currently in power. The political reforms would
organize the political life in the country around a democratic basis. The administrative
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reform opens the possibilities for all the Lebanese, across sectarian affiliations to
participate m government institutions and help modernize them.
More specifically, subject 22 explains:
.... we need to reform the political system so that we can stop the current system of
distnbuting jobs on a sectarian basis. Also institute competition on a political party level
where the discourse fomis around different political programs. All these factors together
could probably increase the Lebanese's sense of unity.
Subject 5 and 9 feel that it Is important to strengthen non govemmental civil institutions.
Subject 5:
what makes a country is its society the civil society besides the labor unions
there are no independent non-sectarian civic organizations we even criticize
sectarian institutions through sectarian institutions .... so we need to develop more non-
sectarian civic institutions that can wori^ for protecting
While subject 9 suggests developing independent means to satisfy people's needs,
that is, to depend more on the initiative of private institutions as opposed to govemmental
institutions.
A number of subjects emphasized the importance of the electoral process in
strengthening the role of the govemment. Whereas some subjects felt that there should be
at least regular elections in the country, others felt that the electoral process should be reformed
and modemized to meet the growing changes that the country has witnessed in the last two
decades.
Subjects 4, 8 and 12 stress the importance of the community level elections.
Subject 8 explains:
.... there needs to be Municipal councils and the mayoral elections then we can start
building Lebanon from the bottom up we also need new political parties that are
based on a Lebanese identity ....
Subject 16 feels that the political parties laws should be refomned: "I say that we should
make laws that would require the Lebanese political parties to have a membership from across
the different religious groups."
Subjects 1,19 and 24 also believe in changing Lebanon's electoral base. Subject 1
explains:
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^gior^
"^^^ throughout Lebanon. Let us try to get out of the
eople
official
religious sect's rule. One electoral system might rid us from those problems This wayp are represented in the election. The Christian has a stake in the Moslem elected
Question 9: Do you feel that the definition of the Lebanese identity at the Ta'if, which wasadded to the constitution, sufficiently defines the Lebanese identity?
The Ta'if Accord
The Ta'if Accord added to the constitution that Lebanon was an Arab state and its
borders were the final borders of the Lebanese homeland. Moreover, it was the agreement that
ended the 17 years of the Lebanese 1976-1991 Civil War.
Complaints
Problems in the Identity Definition. Subject 4 complains that it is no longer possible
to unify with another country:
^Lebanon is of an Arab identity and belonging and Lebanon is the ultimate/tenminal/final
homeland to all the Lebanese.' There is a contradiction in terms ... in the title! How can it
be the ultimate homeland to all the Lebanese and be of an Arab identity and belonging?
What if we want to unify with another Arab country at some point, it is now prohibited!
Your entity/existence/being is final, you can not unify with another country. Moreover, we
are on the verge of a peace agreement with Israel, and thus you are equating between
Israel and Syria. This is a disaster. How does that confirm/maintain/emphasize the
country's Arab heritage and history. Even if there is peace, I can not consider Israel and
Syria on the same footing.
While subject 1 feels that it does not do much to decrease the Christian fears:
The new constitution was meant to make the Christians feel safe in being Arabs. But this
is on paper, in reality, it will take time for the Christians to feel safe with the idea that
Lebanon is Arab and not Moslem. That Lebanon is an Arab country, that is a fact. But
this addition was included to say that Arabs can not be your enemies. You are them. For
the Christians. Arabs means Islam. When you differentiate between the concepts of
Arab and Moslem, then the Christians have no problems.
Some subjects also responded that they felt the Ta'if Accord was not a real solution to
the real problem and that the issues it tackled were insignificant.
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Subject 1 wonders:
What do you mean Lebanon is a final homeland.' Have you ever heard of a temporaryhomeland? Imagine in the French constitution saying that France is a final/terminal
country for the French. That is ridiculous.
Subject 2 explains:
I believe there were a lot of lies in that deal. There was no need for this kind of hypocrisy
to appear as if it is the solution to the problem. It is axiomatic that we are Arabs and it is
axiomatic that Lebanon is a final homeland. That is not the real issue anymore. I believe
that the whole accord was a political charade. We now need to agree on a system of
govemment. In both the 1943 and the Ta'if Accord, the deals had a self destructive
element in them. They both avoided the real issue of sectarianism in govemment.
Similarly, subject 17 adds:
The Ta'if has nothing to do with the definition of the identity. And if they think that it has
defined the identity, then it is expressing the worst there is in terms of identity. The
current formula will not lead to what is needed in the future and that is a civil society.
While subject 10 feels that the new definition is not a significant achievement:
I do not consider that there is anything new in the Ta'if Accord. Today it says that
Lebanon is an Arab country while in 1943 it said that Lebanon had an Arab face. But in
1943 that statement was a much more courageous thing to say than saying today that
Lebanon is an Arab country. In those days there was a great fear from France.
Problems with Implementation . A number of subjects feel that part of the problem of
the Ta'if Accord is that it is not being implemented on the ground.
Subject 12 complains:
.... within the Ta'if it was agreed that it was necessary to have a unified history book, a
unified civic book. Five years have passed since the agreement was struck and you still
do not have a unified book. Schools still teach history and civics with different books.
Subject 7 feels that it is still not the time to act:
The Ta'if Accord stipulates that parliamentary committees should be formed whose
responsibility would be to develop the political machine or program that would start the
political system reform. But first you need to prepare people psychologically to accept
the changes that might come.
While subject 8 feels that there are no longer any problems that would prevent the
implementation of the Accord: "Now we have an open road towards the development of a
common civic education program and the building of the govemment and all its institutions '
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Subject 20 hopes for its implementation and explains about the human rights:
What is new in the Lebanese constitution is the inclusion of an introduction which was
not here before. It included clear commitment of Lebanon to the International human
nghts laws. This is new and very important. It is a clear commitment. This would make
enormous changes in Lebanon if we really started to implement this part of the
constitution. But this part is not being implemented
Qpod for Ending the War
Some subjects expressed satisfaction with the fact that the Accord ended the war.
However, beyond that, they did not feel that it is useful for any other thing. As subject 22
explains:
First, there is the part that dealt with ending the war and what is being applied at this
moment. The second part has to do with what is a potential, and that part is not being
approached. The Ta'if, in temis of what is being applied at this point, has been taken to
its limit and has been over used. They developed a formula to end the war. well, now the
war is over. This, however, can not be used as a basis for the future.
General Satisfaction
Some subjects felt satisfied with the results of the Accord for a number of reasons.
Subject 7 feels satisfied that, finally, Lebanon's Arab identity is clear:
The Ta'if agreement came along and settled the question of the Lebanese identity.
Lebanon is an Arab country, while before Lebanon had an Arab face. So the Ta'if said
that Lebanon has an Arab identity. The Lebanese nation can not be separated from its
roots in its people and its Arab heritage.
Moreover, he feels that:
Lebanon being a final homeland settled the danger of having Lebanon dissolve in its
surroundings. The Ta'if Accord circumvented all that, and now we should all fight for a
unified Lebanon under a strong just govemment.
Subject 16, on the other hand, feels that the Accord has solidified the Lebanese identity
He explains:
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The advantage of the Ta'if Accord is that it finalized the issue of the identity in that in the
final analysis the identity is a Lebanese nationalist identity. The important aspect of thisAccord IS that the Moslems admitted in a definitive way that Lebanon is the homeland
That was always a Christian request. Moreover, before, there had always been an
accusation from the Christians towards the Moslems that they think in terms of the Arab
Identity first and then the Lebanese identity. The accusation was that the Moslems were
more concemed with the Arab issues and the Arab leaders than the Lebanese issuesThe Ta If Accord put an end to the accusations and counter accusations that the
Chnstians- loyalty was towards the Western powers. It also canceled the other identitiesYou can no longer say I am an Arab first and then a Lebanese.
Subject 8 is satisfied for the same reasons as subject 7. Moreover, he feels that
Lebanon's existence has became strongly justified due to what the Ta'if Accord stipulated around
the form of the Lebanese political system:
In the Ta'if. there was an emphasis on the issue of peaceful co-existence between all the
Lebanese sects therefore it stipulated a governing body where all sects are
represented, this function of Lebanon is what justifies the existence of Lebanon
Question 10: What photographic image do you get when you think of Lebanon?
Photographic Images
Some subjects offered images while others offered concepts they associated with
Lebanon.
These are the subjects' responses which I will offer without numeral identifications:
-Children killed In a burning bus which is crossing between East and West Beirut.
-A man lying on the ground while still carrying a bag of bread, which is pierced through
with the bullet that had killed him.
-Creativeness, creative ability. The whole Lebanese history represents creative ability.
People came to this country and there was nothing here. The Lebanese has very little
resources and he made a lot out of it. All Lebanese groups came to this peace of land
and used it as a refuge from prosecution.
-You would have an individual who does not know how to behave or act a person
whose image of himself and his reality are separate this is why all his actions
and behaviors are fabricated .... he does not talk well ... does not express himself well ...
he listens to French songs at one time and then to English songs he always wants
give you the impression that he is what he is not
-I see the picture of a child whose determination is much stronger that his circumstances.
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something coming out of the darkness and entering the light. Even though the Lebanese
IS going through a hard period now, he still has the momentum to get out of this realitvhe IS still proud and still wants the best for himself. Lebanon trapped in and surrounded
by successive layers of fences.
-I am in great danger and my ability to defend myself is very limited I see
somebody who is chained and surrounded by people who do not seem like they are
going to release him from his chains
-I am able to move in a very wide playfield in spite of all the restraints that are placed on
me. I feel that I am still different from other players on other playfields because of the
blood I have on me, as a Lebanese, in the name of all the Arabs. We the Lebanese
are the only Arabs who have been spilling blood for the last fifteen years. I am all
of the Arabs. I have paid the most for the Arab cause.
-I see a map. If our neighboring brothers do not step on us, these boundaries can
give me the opportunity to be open to all cultures and I can also breath freely here.
-I see the image of a rebellious people that insist on speaking out and are ready to
die for the right to continue to speak out and be free.
-I see a ship where a camival is taking place on it's top deck and a lot of people are
dancing and having fun and doing all sorts of crazy irrational things. And I see a lot of
people in the lower parts of the ship who are doing all the wori^ to keep the ship afloat no
matter what is happening on top. The base represents the Lebanese' strong desire for
life, this is what carries the upper deck.
-The Lebanese Mountains covered with pine trees and a lot of fog.
-It is the Lebanese screaming, please save me, and wants to understand and wants to
live in the safety of its society .
-I see a complete map of Lebanon.
-The statue of liberty.
-Christ on the cross.
-Martyr Square.
-I see Lebanon as a traveling ship.
-Mountains, Plains, Cedars.
-I see Lebanon as an old wise man sitting in the middle of a cross roads through which
all cultures and civilizations make their voyage through time.
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CHAPTER VI
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
An integration of each of the four item clusters is summarized in the below section in
order to facilitate the reader's understanding of the quantitative results as the variables relate to
the dominant stages.
Stage 1:
Lebanon is a country made up of various groups with different identities who need to live
peacefully together. Moreover, justice and equality can only be protected through a sectarian
political formula and the efforts of traditional sectarian leaders.
Stage 2:
Lebanon is a country made up of different and hostile sectarian groups and .therefore, it
is best for the sects to live separate from each other. I also feel that it is preferable for my
community to have sectarian leaders who fight and do not compromise with other sectarian
leaders over the rights of my sect even if that means that my community should seek external
assistance to protect us from the influences of the other sects.
Stage 3:
Lebanon is a country that has a rigid and unchangeable sectarian political system with a
permanent sectarian leadership class which is oppressive and discriminatory against most
individual Lebanese citizens. In order to avoid the sectarian problems
,
it is best for the
Lebanese people to focus on the provision of their personal and family needs and to avoid public
interactions, especially with those individuals who have strong sectarian views.
Stage 4:
Lebanon is a country where the discriminatory and oppressive effects of its sectarian
system can best be challenged if individuals depend less on leaders and get more personally
involved in activities that can promote equality and individual rights among the Lebanese public.
Two such activities would be the rejection of all non democratically elected leaders and the
institution of civil personal status laws that individuals can choose to use instead of the current
mandatory sectarian laws.
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The four stage means and standard deviations show that on average, people agreed the
most with the stage 4 questions, followed by stage 3 questions and stage 1 questions. Moreover,
people agreed the least with stage 2 questions.
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
SUM1 724 10.0621547 3.4967290 4.0000000 20.0000000
SUM2 724 9.9944751 3.3930973 4.0000000 20.0000000
SUM3 723 12.0982019 3.3680155 4.0000000 20.0000000
SUM4 724 16.9765193 2.5443781 6.0000000 20.0000000
However, in order to determine each subject's stage of identity development
, the
subject's scores have to be computed in reference to the whole sample. Therefore, the subjects
z-scores were computed and a dominant stage indicator was determined by comparing an
individual's four z-scores and assigning the stage with the highest z-score as the dominant
stage. This new calculation revealed that with normalized sample scores, individuals in the
overall sample had a stage distribution as follows:
17. 68 % of subjects were classified in the 1 st Stage of Lebanese identity development.
24- 03 % of subjects were classified in the 2 nd Stage of Lebanese identity development.
21- 69 % of subjects were classified in the 3 rd Stage of Lebanese identity development.
36. 60 % of subjects were classified in the 4 th Stage of Lebanese identity development.
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Moreover, a Chi-square analysis was conducted to determine whether there i
dependence between the subjects' dominant stage indicator and the various socio-ec
variables. A dependence was found between the subject's dominant stage indicator ( Dsi ) and
the followinq variables which are listed below with uieir uni-square Likelihood Ratios:
1^ SourOP of fi^itfl rnllprtinn- X2( 18, N = 724) = 45.69, p < 0.0003
2^ Sectarian idpntitv X2 ( 21, N = 721 ) = p < 0.0039
3) Level of education: X2 ( 15, N = 722 ) = 27.69 , p < 0.0236
4) Profession: X2 ( 24, N = 722 ) = 57.47 , p < 0.0001
5) Dual nationality: X2 ( 9, N == 721 ) == 16.97 , p < 0.0492
However, no significant dependence was found between the subjects* dominant stage
indicators and the following variables: Sex, Age, Yearly Income, Personal Status, Place of
Residence, Years of living in Lebanon during 1976-1989 Lebanese Civil war, Years lived outside
Lebanon.
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Dominant Stage vs. Socio-Economic Fantnrs
Source of Data Collection
The four stage percentages for each variable was determined. The various variable
percentages were compared along each stage and they were ordered in terms of approximate
percentage rank for each stage. A comparison of the percent variations of the four dominant
stage indicators across the various data collection sources revealed that (see Table 6.1
,
Figure
6.1, p.178):
Table 6.1 . Source Of Data vs. Dominant Stage
Source of Data Collection 1 2 3 4 Count
Village/Homes 16.22 27.03 16.22 40.54 37
Lebanese University/Main Campus 20.16 20.93 28.68 i 30.23 129
American University of Beirut/Main Campus 16.88 32.47 12.99 37.66 77
Jesuite University 8 33 33.33 0 58.33 12
Lebanese University/ Jal-EI-Deeb 26.87 38.81 17.91 16.42 67
Beirut/Homes & Offices 17.55 20 24.9 37.55 245
E-Mail 13.38 21.02 19.75 45.86 157
Total 724
100% T
90% --
30%
10%
VARv L.U.mc AU.Bmc JU L.U.JId VARb E-Mail
Source of Data
(Z3 1 0 2
^3 != 4
Figure 6.1. Source of Data vs. Dominant Stage. VARv = Various Village, L.U.mc = Lebanese
University/Main campus, A.U.B.mc = American University of Beirut/Main campus, J.U. = Jesuite
University, L.U.jld = Lebanese University/Jal El Deeb, VARb = Various Beirut, E-Mail.
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Sectarian Identity
A comparison of the percent variations of the four dominant stage indicators across the
various sectarian groups revealed that (see Table 6.2. Figure 6.2, p.179 ):
Table 6.2. Sect vs. Dominant Stage
Sect 1 2 3 4 Count
Moslem Sunni 20.74 25.53 19.15 34.57 188
Christian Maronite 20 29.63 22.96 21 .41 135
Moslem Druze 13.4 24.74 23.71 38.14 97
Moslem Shiite 12.68 20.42 20.42 46.48 142
Christian Orthodox 21.92 17.81 24.66 35.62 73
Christian Catholic 21 .43 26.19 35.71 16.67 42
Christian Armenian 10.53 31.58 15.79 42.11 19
Other 12 8 8 72 25
Total 721
Figure 6.2. Sectarian Identity vs. Dominant Stage. Sun = Moslem Sunni, Mrn = Christian
Maronite, Drz = Moslem Druze, Sht = Moslem Shiite, Ort = Christian Orthodox, Cat = Christian
Catholic, Arm = Christian Armenian, Oer = Other
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Level of Education
A comparison of the percent variations of the four dominant stage indicators across the
various educational levels of individuals revealed that (see Table 6.3, Figure 6.3, p.180):
Table 6.3. Education vs. Dominant Stage
Highest Degree Attained 1 2 3 4 Count
High School 19.47 23.01 28.32 29.2 113
Lebanese Baccalaureate 22.95 21.31 17.21 38.52 122
Bachelor's Degree 17.38 26.23 20.33 36.07 305
Master's Degree 1 1.24 22.47 23.6 42.7 89
Doctoral Degree 15.56 13.33 13.33 57.78 45
Other 16.67 31.25 31.25 20.83 48
Total 722
Figure 6.3. Education vs. Dominant Stage. H.S.= High School, L.B.= Lebanese
Baccalaureate, B.A.= Bachelor's Degree, M.A.= Master's Degree, D.D.= Doctoral Degree,
Other
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Profession
A comparison of the percent variations of the four donninant stage indicators across the
various professional groups revealed that (see Table 6.4, Figure 6.4, p.181):
Table 6.4. Profession vs. Dominant Stage
P rofession 1 2 3 4 Count
Student 18.69 26.23 20.33 34.75 305
P rofessor & Lawyer 20.83 12.5 12.5 54.17 24
E ngineer 9.09 25.45 20 45.45 55
M ed ica 1 D octor 21.74 4.35 26.09 47.83 23
School Teacher 12.9 12.9 19.35 54.84 31
E m ployee 20.29 26.09 28.26 24.36 138
N ot Applicable 32.76
1 24.14 12.07 31 .03 58
Self Em ployed 7.14 30.95 30.95 30.95 42
Other 4.35 17.39 21 .74 56.52 46
Total 722
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Figure 6.4. Profession vs. Dominant Stage. St = Student, P&L = Professors or Lawyers, En =
Engineer, M.D. = Medical Doctor, S. T. = School Teacher, Em = Employee, N/A = Not
Applicable, S.E. = Self-Employed, Other
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Dual Nationality
A comparison of the percent variations of the four dominant stage indicators across the
various Lebanese groups carrying or not carrying various dual nationalities revealed that (see
Table 6.5, Figure 6.5, p.182):
Table 6.5. Dual Nationality Vs Dominant Stage
Dual Nationality 1 2 3 4 Count
Only Lebanese 17.56 23.48 21.81 37.15 541
North Am erican 18.37 16.33 16.33 48.98 49
Europe 15.38 18.46 32.31 33.85 65
Other 21.21 37.88 15.15 25.76 66
Total 721
Figure 6.5. Dual Nationality vs. Dominant Stage. Only Lebanon, North America, Europe,
Other
.
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Questionnaire Items vs. Socio-Economic Fartnrg
Questionnaire items that showed a dependence on some socio-economic factors are
presented in this section. For simplification purposes, each respondent was given a score of 2
points for each " Strongly Agree" and " Agree" responses to indicate general agreement with an
item. Similarly, each "Strongly Disagree" and "Disagree" responses were given a 1 score to
indicate a general disagreement with an item. Finally, the "Not sure" responses were given a
score of 1
.
What follows are the significant results of the analysis:
Q1: It is best to trust and depend on traditional sectarian leaders to protect the rights of
individuals in the various communities.
The statistical analysis showed that there is significant dependence ( p < 0.05 ) between
survey item 1 responses and an individual's sectarian identity as well as an individual's
profession (see Table 6.6, Figure 6.6; Table 6.7, Figure 6.7 below ).
Table 6.6. Q1 vs. Sectarian Identity
Q 1 V s Sect Agree N 0 t S u r e D i s a g r e e
Sunn! 11.17 9.04 7 9.79
M a r o n 1 1 e 14.07 11.85 7 4.07
D r u z e 12.37 10.31 7 7.32
S h lite 4.93 4.93 9 0.14
0 r t h o d 0 X 12.33 9.59 7 8.08
C a t h 0 li c 16.67 7.14 7 6.19
Arm e n i a n 10.53 2 1.05 6 8.42
Other 8 0 9 2
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Figure 6.6. Q1 vs. Sectarian Identity
Table 6.7. Q1 vs. Profession
Q 1 Vs Profession Agree iNotSure D i s a g r e e
S t u d e n t 10.82 10.16 7 9.02Professor or Lawyer 1 2 .5 8.3 3 7 9.17
E n g i n e e r 3.6 4 5.4 5 9 0.91
M edical Doctor 13.04 13.04 7 3.91School Teacher 9.68 3.2 3 8 7.1Em p 1 0 y e e 9.4 2 7.9 7 8 2.61
N ot A pplicable 2 7.59 5.17 6 7.24
Self Em ployed 14.29 16.67 6 9.05
Other 0 6.52 9 3.48
Stu Prof&La Eng M.D. S T Emp N/A S.E, Other
r
.1 Agree ( -" ' ' i Not Sure D Is a g re e
Figure 6.7. Q1 vs. Profession
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Q2: Even though the sectarian Lebanese political system is discriminatory and
oppressive against most individuals in Lebanon, there is very little we can do to replace
it.
The statistical analysis showed that there is significant dependence ( p < 0.05 ) between
survey item 2 responses and an individual's nationality status as well as an individual's
profession (see Table 6.8, Figure 6.8
; Table 6.9, Figure 6.9 below ).
Table 6.8. Q2 vs. Nationality
Q2 Vs Nationa lity Agree Not Sure D is a g re e
Only Lebanese 3 3.46 12.57 5 3.97
North American 2 4.49 10.2 6 5.31
Europe 5 2.31 6.15 4 1.54
Other 3 4.85 12.12 5 3.03
Figure 6.8. Q2 vs. Nationality
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Table 6.9. Q2 vs. Profession
Q2 Vs Profession lAaree Not Sure D i s a a r e eS t u d e n t 3 4.43 13.77 5 1.8Professor or Lawyer 12.5 12 5 { 0E n q i n e e r 2 7.27 12.73 6 0M edical Doctor 3 9.13 4.35 5 6.52School Teacher 2 9.03 12.9 5 8.06Em p 1 o V e e 41.3 9.42 4 9.28Not Applicable 3 9.66 6 .9 5 3.45Self Em ployed 4 0.48 2 1.43 3 8.1Other 2 6.09 4.35 6 9.57
Stu Prof& La Eng M.D. S.T. Emp N/A S.E. Other
Agree Not Sure ! Disagree
Figure 6.9. Q2 vs. Profession
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Q4: It is very important for my sectarian community to cooperate and get assistance from
any friendly non-Lebanese group that is ready to help us protect ourselves from the
influences of other Lebanese sectarian groups.
The statistical analysis showed that there is significant dependence ( p < 0.05 ) between
survey item 4 responses and an individual's educational level and profession (see Table 6.10,
Figure 6.10; Table 6.11, Figure 6.11 below).
Table 6.10. Q4 vs. Educational Level
Q4VsEducation Agree Not Sure D is a g r e e
High School 2 7.43 14.16 5 8.41
Lebanese Baccaleurate 2 3.77 5.7 4 7 0.49
Bachelor "s Degree 16.72 11.48 7 1.8
M aster's Degree 14.62 12.36 7 3.03
Doctoral Degree 2 0 6.6 7 7 3.33
Other 4 1.67 8.33 5 0
Figure 6.10. Q4 vs. Education
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Table 6.11. Q4 vs. Profession
Q4 Vs Profession Agree N 0 t Sure D j s a 0 r e eStudent 2 0.66 12.79 6 6.56Professor or Lawyer 2 0.83 4.17 7 5
I- 11 y 1 n c e r 3.64 12.73 8 3.64M edical Doctor 8 .7 4.35 8 6.96School Teacher 2 5.81 3.23 7 0.97Em p 1 0 y e e 2 6.09 10.87 6 3.04
N ot A pplicable 2 2.41 6 .9 7 0.69Self Em ployed 3 8.1 9.52 5 2.38Other 17.39 8 .7 7 3.91
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Figure 6.11. Q4 vs. Profession
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Q5: The best way for a person to deal with the negative effects of the sectarian culture is
to restrict involvement in social or public activities and to focus on securing his
individual and family needs
The statistical analysis showed that there is significant dependence ( p < 0.05 ) between
survey item 5 responses and an individual's educational level (see table 6.12, Figure 6.12
below).
Table 6.12. Q5 vs. Educational Level
Q5 Vs Education Agree Not Sure D is a g re e
High School 14.75 6.5 6 7 8.69Lebanese Baccaleurate 3 1.86 3.5 4 6 4.6
Bachelor's Degree 13.44 7.2 1 7 9.34
M aster's Degree 13.48 14.61 7 1.91
Doctoral Degree 15.56 8.8 9 7 5.56
Other 4 1.67 6.2 5 5 2.08
Figure 6.12. Q5 vs. Educational Level
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Q6:
1
prefer my sect leaders to stand up and fight for the rights of my sectarian
community rather than have them compromise with other leaders over some of these
rights in the name of the "common good".
The statistical analysis showed that there Is significant dependence ( p < 0.05 ) between
survey item 6 responses and an individual's educational level (see Table 6.13, Figure 6.13
below).
Table 6.13. Q6 vs. Educational Level
Q6 Vs Education Agree NotSure Disaqree
High School 2 3.89 7.08 6 9.03
Lebanese Baccaleurate 3 7.7 9.8 4 5 2.46
Bachelor's Degree 2 7.21 10.82 6 1.97
M aster's Degree 17.98 8.99 7 3.03
Doctoral Degree 2 4.44 4.44 7 1.11
Other 4 3.75 12.5 4 3.75
Figure 6.13. Q6 vs. Educational Level
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Q7:
1
believe there is no such thing as a common Lebanese identity; there are only
groups with different sectarian identities living on the same piece of land.
The statistical analysis showed that there is significant dependence ( p < 0.05 ) between
survey item 7 responses and an individual's educational level (see Table 6.14, Figure 6.14
below).
Table 6.14. Q7 vs. Educational Level
Q7 Vs Education Agree NotSure Disaaree
High School 4 9.56 7.96 4 2.48
Lebanese Baccaleurate 5 8.2 4.92 3 6.89
Bachelor's Degree 3 9.67 7.87 5 2.46
M aster's Degree 3 3.71 7.87 5 8.43
Doctoral Degree 3 7.78 13.33 4 8.89
Other 5 2.08 8.33 3 9.58
Figure 6.14. Q7 vs. Educational Level
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Q11: Other than a common desire to live in peace, the Lebanese people have very little
common
m
The statistical analysis showed that there is significant dependence ( p < 0.05 ) between
survey item 11 responses and an individual's educational level, profession as well as sectarian
identity. ( see Table 6.15, Figure 6.15; Table 6.16, Figure 6.16; Table 6.17, Figure 6.17 below ).
Table 6.15. Q11 vs. Educational Level
Q11 Vs Education Agree Not Sure Disagree
High School 4 2.48 12.39 4 5.13
Lebanese Baccaleureate 2 9.51 13.11 5 7.38
Bachelor's Degree 2 8.85 11.15 6 0
Master's Degree 16.85 11.24 7 1.91
Doctoral Degree 3 1.11 2.22 6 6.67
Other 4 3.75 14.58 4 1.67
100%
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Figure 6.15. Q11 vs. Educational Level
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Table 6.16. Q11 vs. Profession
vj 11 vs Profession Agree Not Sure D is a a r e e
o t u d e n t 3 1.48 15.08 5 3.44Professor or Lawvpr 4.17 6 6.67
E nJ i n e e r 9.09 5.45 8 5.45M edical Doc 3 0.43 4.35 6 5.22School Teacher 2 2.58 1 2 .9 6 4.52Em p 1 0 y e e 3 5 •. 5 1 10.14 5 4.35
N o t JK p p 1 i c a b 1 e 3 9.66 12.07 4 8.28Self Em ployed 5 0 7.14 4 2.86Other 15.22 6.52 7 8.26
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Figure 6.16. Q11 vs. Profession
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Table 6.17. Q11 vs. Sectarian Identity
Q 1 1 V s S e c t Agree N 0 t S u r e D i s a g r e e
S u n n i 2 8.19 12.77 5 9.04M a r 0 n i t e 3 9.26 8.89 5 1.85
D r u z e 3 7.11 8.25 5 4.64
S h i i te 18,31- 12.68 6 9.01
O rthodox 3 4.25 10.96 5 4.79
C a t h 0 1 i c 4 2.86 19.05 3 8.1Arm e n i a n 3 1.58 5.26 6 3.16Other 2 0 1 2 6 8
Figure 6.17. Q11 vs. Sectarian Identity
194
Q12: Individuals in my sectarian community would live in peace if it were not for the
fanaticism and militancy of the other sectarian groups who hope to control our lives.
The statistical analysis showed that there is significant dependence ( p < 0.05 ) between
survey Item 12 responses and an individual's educational level and profession (see Table 6.18,
Figure 6.18; Table 6.19, Figure 6.19 below).
Table 6.18. Q12 vs. Educational Level
Q12 Vs Education Agree Not Sure D is a q re e
High School 4 6 9 2 1.24 3 1.86
L^e banese Baccaleureate 4 9.18 15.57 3 5.25
Bachelor's Degree 4 8.52 19.02 3 2 4 6
M aster's Degree 2 6.97 2 5.84 4 7.19
Doctoral Degree 4 0 8.891 51.11
Other 5 8.33 10.42 3 1.25
100%
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Figure 6.18. Q12 vs. Educational Level
195
Table 6.19. Q12 vs. Profession
Q 12 Vs Profession Agree N 0 t Sure D i s a g r e eStudent 4 5.57 2 0 M .3 4.43Professor or Lawyer 3 3.33 16.67 5 0engineer 2 5.45 2 5.45 4 9.09
M edical Doc 4 3.48 17.39 3 9.13School Teacher 2 9.03 2 9.03 4 1.94Em p 1 0 y e e 5 1.45 15.22 3 3.33
N ot A pplicable 5 6.9 8.62 3 4.48Self Em ployed 6 1.9 14.29 2 3.81Other 4 5.65 19.57 3 4.78
° Stu Prof&La Erg IVID. ST. Enp IWA SE Other
Agee NotSue » Disa^
Figure 6.19. Q12 vs. Profession
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Q13: There is little the Lebanese can do to change the fact that most leaders in Lebanon
represent their own personal interests and the interests of various outside countries
more than they represent the interests of the Lebanese public.
The statistical analysis showed that there is a significant dependence ( p < 0.05
)
between survey item 11 responses and an individual's educational level, profession, sectarian
identity as well as dual nationality status ( see Table 6.20, Figure 6.20; Table 6.21
,
Figure 6.21
;
Table 6.22, Figure 6.22; Table 6.23, Figure 6.23 below ).
Table 6.20. Q13 vs. Educational Level
Q 13 Vs Education Agree Not Sure D is a q r e e
High School 6 3.93 7.3 8 2 8.69
Lebanese Baccaleureate 7 3.45 8.8 5 17.7
Bachelor's Degree 6 1.18 9.5 4 2 9.28
Master's Degree 4 9.44 13.48 3 7.08
Doctoral Degree 3 7.78 6.6 7 5 5.56
Other 7 2.92 10.42 16.67
Figure 6.20. Q13 vs. Educational Level
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Table 6.21. Q13 vs. Profession
Q 13 Vs Profession Agree N 0 t S u r e D i s a g r e eStudent 5 9.54 8.88 3 1 fi ftProfessor or Lawyer 3 7.5 0 6 2.5E n g i n e e r 4 0 2 0 A n
M edical Doc 6 0.87 4.35 3 4.78School Teacher 7 4.19 9.6 8 16.13Em p 1 0 y e e 7 1.01 8 .7 2 0.29
N ot A pplicable 6 8.97 8.6 2 2 2 4 1Self Em ployed 6 9.05 9.5 2 2 1.43Other 5 8.7 10.87 3 0.43
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Figure 6.21. Q13 vs. Profession
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Table 6.22. Q13 vs. Sectarian Identity
Q 1 3 V s Sect Agree N 0 t S u r e D j s a g r e e
S u n n i 5 7.22 8.56 3 4.22M a r o n i t e 6 8.15 8.89 2 2.96
D r u z e 6 9.07 6.19 2 4.74
S h lite 5 5.63 14.08 3 0.28O r t h o d 0 X 6 3.01 6.85 3 0.14
C a t h o 1 i c 7 8.57 7.14 14.29Arm e n i a n 4 2.11 15.79 4 2,11Other 4 4 1 2 4 4
Figure 6.22. Q13 vs. Sectarian Identity
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Table 6.23. Q13 vs. Nationality
Q 1 3 V s Nationality
Only L e b
g re e
North American
Europe
Other
6 2.78
NotSure Disagree
9.4 4
3 8.78 16.33
2 7.78
6 6.15
6 3.64
4 4.9
7.6 9 2 6.15
6.06 3 0.3
Figure 6.23. Q13 vs. Nationality
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Q14: A democratic political system that is not based on a sectarian political formula,
could never guarantee the equal opportunity and equal human rights of individuals i
Lebanon.
The statistical analysis showed that there is significant dependence ( p < 0.05 ) between
survey item 14 responses and an individual's profession. ( see table 6.24 below ).
Table 6.24. Q14 vs. Profession
Q 14 Vs Profession Agree N 0 t S u re D i s a g r e eStudent 3 5.41 13.44 5 1.15
Professor or Lawyer 2 5 16.67 5 8.33
E n g 1 n e e r 18.18 5.4 5 7 6.36
M edical Doctor 2 6.09 13.04 6 0.87
School Teacher 3 2.26 3.23 6 4.52
Em p 1 0 y e e 4 4.2 9.4 2 4 6.38
Not Applicable 5 1.72 12.07 3 6.21
Self Em ployed 2 8.57 7.14 6 4.29
Other 15.22 8 .7 7 6.09
Figure 6.24. Q14 vs. Profession
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Item Data Analysis
Each question was assigned a stage, therefore, it would be expected that the individuals
in that stage would have the highest agreement among all subjects for that particular question.
However, what is of special interest is to examine the patterns of agreements, not sure, and
disagreement of the other subjects to see if they comply with the stage theory.
This section is presented to analyze the discriminatory nature of each item in terms of a subject's
Dsi. Table numbers are percentages where each column sum is a 100% .
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Figure 6.27. Q3 vs. Dsi
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
74.22
16.41
9.38
49.43
34 48
66 88
20.36
12.74
88 3
6.04 5 66
Disagree Not Sure Agree
Figure 6.28. Q4 vs. Dsi
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Figure 6.29. Q5 vs. Dsi
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Figure 6.36. Q12 vs. Dsi
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CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION
Qualitative Data
The qualitative study results show that there are different levels of identity
consciousness among the various research subjects. These levels of consciousness were
revealed directly and indirectly through the subjects' interview responses. In the following
sections I will briefly discuss the subjects' responses to each of the questions asked.
Initial Definition of the Lebanese Identity
The initial exploration of the subjects' views around their definition of the Lebanese
identity, through the first interview question, showed that there were various aspects of the
identity that were emphasized by the various subjects.
Some subject responses emphasized the supra-Arab identity nature of the Lebanese
identity, while others emphasized the inter-sectarian nature of the Lebanese identity. Moreover,
some responses defined the Lebanese identity as simply an individual's ownership of a
nationality and a belonging to a country defined by a set of borders and a political system. Other
responses offered a more dynamic view and felt that the Lebanese identity is defined by a
continuous process of development and integration of various human and cultural trends, which
directly result from the interactive process between the Lebanese individual and his specific
physical and human environments.
As the results show, sometimes the same subjects emphasized various aspects of the
Lebanese identity, while others emphasized one aspect only. Therefore, we can see that these
different response pattems correspond to the various stages of Lebanese identity consciousness
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described eariier in this study where individuals differ in their emphasis and awareness of the
Lebanese social self.
Especially significant, subjects who defined the Lebanese identity as mainly a supra-
Arab identity complained that others who define the Lebanese identity differently are attempting
to destroy the Arab identity as well as the Lebanese and the Arab interests. Others, however, felt
that those who do not emphasize Lebanon's identity in temis of its Moslem-Christian character,
are attempting to deny the Lebanese self.
On the other hand, sometimes, those who defined the identity in terms of an inter-
sectarian identity complained of either the Moslem Arab oppression of the Christian Lebanese
nature or the Christian-Westem oppression of the Moslem Lebanese nature.
These subject responses are reflective of some of the Stage 1 and Stage 2 levels of
identity definitions, where the subjects who offered the definitions with no complaints were more
likely defining the Lebanese identity at a Stage 1 level, while others were more reflective of the
Stage 2 level of identity definitions.
Subjects who were reluctant to define the Lebanese identity as anything other than
simply carrying a nationality might be more reflective of Stage 3 identity definitions because they
are defining the Lebanese identity in function of characteristics that exist at the Lebanese social
self level and not at a supra or inter sectarian level. However, these definitions do not reflect any
of the deeper Lebanese identity characteristics.
Also, those subjects who defined Lebanon as an Arab nation but qualified their definition
by adding that Lebanon had some specific circumstances that differentiated it from other Arab
nations, such as the minorities in it, or its cultural variety, can also be considered to reflect a
Stage 3 identity definition because these responses can be considered more integrative than the
more polarized one-side identity definitions.
However, those responses that emphasized the interactive and dynamic nature of the
Lebanese identity as it results from the individual's relationship with his physical and human
209
environments can be considered to be nnore reflective of Stage 4 identity levels of development.
The reason for that is because it focuses attention on the psychological characteristics that result
from such an interactive process.
The Lebanese Characteristics
However, a different, less polarized, pattem of self awareness began to emerge across
the interview subjects as other questions were asked about the Lebanese self. This pattem first
started to become clear as the subjects answered the question about the Lebanese
characteristics. As mentioned before, there was some resistance, almost a fear, on the part of
some subjects when this second question was asked. But once some of the initial hesitations
were overcome, there appeared to be a high level of agreement among the subjects around the
characteristics of the Lebanese people.
According to the subjects' responses, what basically defines the Lebanese people, is
that they are Arabs living on the Mediterranean coast whose daily life circumstances have
required them to develop a relatively high degree of flexibility, adaptability, and acceptance of
variety and acceptance of change. The subjects offered the following examples as proofs of the
above mentioned heightened Lebanese psychological characteristics: The well known traditions
of the inhabitants of Lebanon in the fields of trade, travel and emigration, cultural innovations
and knowledge.
These descriptions of the Lebanese characteristics are very much a reflection of a Stage
4 understanding of the Lebanese identity since they are basically descriptive of the psychological
effects of the Lebanese individual's interaction with his natural environment. It should be noted
here that, when the subjects were asked about their definitions of the Lebanese identity , their
responses were different and sometimes polarized. However, when the subjects were asked to
simply describe the Lebanese characteristics, and after their initial hesitation, almost all
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respondents described some psychological aspect reflective of the common Lebanese theme of
dealing with the rapid changes in the various environmental demands that are placed on the
Lebanese individual.
Lebanon Vs Other Arab gtat^y
The subjects' perception of the Lebanese identity was further revealed through the
examination of the response pattems to the questions about the Lebanese self and the external
other. In comparing the Lebanese culture, or cultural life, with that of other Arab nations, all
subjects agreed that the Lebanese culture is solidly rooted in the cultural Arab heritage.
However, having established that the Lebanese share the same cultural heritage with other Arab
nations, the majority of the subjects referred to a number of dimensions on which the Lebanese
and the other Arab nations differ in terms of degrees. Most significantly, subjects felt that
Lebanon is defined by a higher level of personal and religious freedoms, a higher level of
acceptance of change and acceptance of the new, a higher acceptance of variety, a faster
exposure to and acceptance of technological and human cultural advances, and a higher
tolerance of differences with others.
It must be emphasized here that most of the psychological characteristics of the
Lebanese people that were mentioned by the subjects in the last two questions, appeared to be
defined in reference to the state of affairs of the other Arab countries off the Mediterranean
whose majority populations are Moslem Sunni Arabs and whose political regimes are mostly
highly restrictive of individual and religious freedoms and the expression of cultural variety.
More specifically, there was a clear differentiation among the subjects between identification with
the Arab cultural heritage on the one hand, and the rejection of and a non identification with
other fonms of expression of this Arab heritage, as manifested by the different Arab nations of
today, on the other hand.
211
Israel and Lebanon
Once again, the subjects emphasized that the main Lebanese characteristics of
acceptance of cultural variety and differences represented the polar opposite of what the Israeli
culture stands for.
In addition, a few subjects pointed out that real and significant developmental
differences exist between the Lebanese and the Israeli states in terms of technological and
scientific advance as well as differences in the efforts placed by each of these nations into
developing and implementing scientifically researched programs. The Lebanese state, the
subjects feel, is far behind Israel in all these fields of development.
Finally, the Israeli state was seen an expansionist and aggressive political and military
entity whose goal is to dominate other nations in the Middle East area. While Lebanon was
perceived as a non aggressive state whose primary goal is to live in dignity and freedom and
under a state of sovereignty within its internationally defined borders.
Lebanon and the West
The majority of the subjects associated the West with a different set of social values as
well as technological, and human advance. Therefore, the West was defined more in terms of a
source of modemization and development for the Lebanese people. The subjects also
emphasized that, even though the West is a source of more advanced survival strategies, it is
very important to adopt and adapt these advanced survivlal strategies to the realities of the
Lebanese environment and carefully maintain the past accumulated survival strategies that the
Lebanese people have developed and that are still relevant in today's environment.
While some believed that its is possible to develop rational relationships between the
Lebanese people and the various Westem nations based on a true reading of the common
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interests of both, others felt that the West's immense technological advances could result in a
Westem cultural domination and cultural hegemony over the Lebanese people.
These various views about the West show that there is a general awareness of the
importance of the West for the Lebanese people in terms of development and advance in a
variety of fields. However, there seemed to be different levels of sense of security in the
Lebanese self of the subjects. Those with a lower sense of security feared that openness to
development would lead to the disintegration and the marginalization of the Lebanese social self,
while others felt secure enough of the Lebanese self to develop mutually beneficial rational types
of relationships without fearing that these relationships would lead to domination and loss of self.
Obstacles to Unification
The question around the unification obstacles revealed that the blame for not fully
realizing the potential of the true and natural Lebanese social self was placed on the oppressive
institutionalized sectarian system which maintains, and is maintained by, an oppressive sectarian
leadership class. That is, all respondents were aware that the Lebanese sectarian environment
and the sectarian system were responsible for the oppression of the Lebanese individual and the
Lebanese common identity.
Each subject, however, was able to describe only part of the picture of the negative
effects of sectarianism. Some of the subjects believed that the divisive and negative effects of
sectarianism was caused by the misbehavior of some specific sects, while others blamed the
sectarian system as a whole but differed in terms of their level of awareness of the scope of
problems caused by the sectarian system. This, again, reveals different levels of identity
consciousness. The higher the depth and scope of awareness, the more advanced is the stage of
identity development. Whereas those going through eariier stages have a more limited and
specific awareness level of the destructive aspects of sectarianism.
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Most significantly, most of the respondents pointed out different ways in which the
sectarian system, which is led by a sectarian leadership elite class, imposes sectarian identities
on the individuals in society. Some of the systemic sectarian mechanisms that were mentioned
included the govemment as it plays a role in failing to properly protect its citizens' basic rights
and in relegating this responsibility to the different sectarian elites, who exercise this
responsibility in a selective and self serving way, thus putting the citizens at the mercy of the
whims of individuals instead of being solidly protected by institutional standards.
Moreover, the government was also seen as responsible for the country's
maintenance of a sectarian educational system, its maintenance of scattered religious personal
status laws, its maintenance of election laws that promote sectarian feelings, as well as its
maintenance of financial differences along sectarian lines, etc. That is, all these means are used
in order to discourage the citizens from developing their individual identities and national
identities and accept as a matter of need and survival their sectarian identities as defined by the
system.
The detrimental results of the sectarian system was also seen by the subjects as
affecting all growth and development aspects of the Lebanese people. They pointed out the
divisive and corrupt type of environment it creates where sectarian loyalties and leadership
loyalties are reinforced through financial and status rewards while an individual's educational and
experiential qualifications do nothing to help him survive in his environment.
Moreover, the important economic and political decision making processes at the
collective levels are guided by the extent to which these decisions can maintain and promote the
power of the sectarian leadership class. Rational actions that promote the citizen's, the public's
growth and well being are discarded.
In terms of foreign relations, some subjects blamed specific sects for getting
assistance from external sources and using this power to attempt to dominate the other sects.
Others, however, point out that the sectarian system is basically responsible for creating an
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environment where divided sectarian foreign loyalties is seen as a necessary survival
defensive tactic by the various sect leaders and their followers.
Challenge?
The subjects' responses to the question about the Lebanese challenges emphasize
Lebanon's identity in terms of its function in the cultural, economic, developmental, and
technological interchange that takes place between the developing Arab countries off the
Mediterranean and the developed Westem countries.
First, a number of subjects showed concern over Lebanon's role in the aftermath of a
Middle East peace agreement between the different Arab states and the Israeli state. Israel's
competitive edge over Lebanon was seen as a threat to Lebanon's traditional role as a cultural
and developmental interface between the Arab East and the West, especially that the Lebanese
do not feel secure in regards to the expansionist and dominating intentions of the Israeli State.
Second, Lebanon's oppressive sectarian environment was also seen as a threat to
Lebanon's ability to develop and face its future challenges. This was emphasized by the need to
reform the political system and the necessity of strengthening, maintaining and respecting the
Lebanese freedoms as a prerequisite for any type of development and developmental role that
Lebanon is currently playing and expects to play in the future.
Moreover, most subjects emphasized the immediate Lebanese challenge of developing
a just and sound economy in order to face the immediate dangers of poverty and
underdevelopment.
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Means of Development and Unifir.atjnp
The subjects were in most agreement when asked about the means to developing a
more unified Lebanese environment and the minimization of its current problems. Some subjects
emphasized the importance of the role of education and some subjects emphasized the
importance of developing better means for providing individuals with their basic human needs.
Some felt that the govemment should take a leading role in reforming the current situation while
others felt that the chances for development are dependent on the activity and strength of
independent civic organizations who should take a lead in moving the govemment in the
direction of civic reforms.
Most significantly, the majority of subjects emphasized in one way or another that the
point of reference of any future developmental efforts should be based on the basic human
individual aspects of the Lebanese self While some subjects called for the development of
educational cumcula that emphasize certain specific cultural aspects of the Lebanese people,
most other subjects emphasized that the cumcula should be focused on teaching the Lebanese
all about the common human aspects of their present, past and future. Examples were given,
such as maintaining the war memory of people's suffrage and collecting and developing stories
about people's daily struggles.
Moreover, most subjects emphasized that unity can be strengthened if the collective
emphasis is on serving the individuals in society instead of focusing on the needs of whole
sectarian groups where defining Lebanese commonalties becomes difficult and mostly irrelevant
to the everyday man.
Therefore, most individuals are aware that stage 4 identity solutions, where the
individual human aspects of the Lebanese people is the focus instead of the group aspects of the
sects, are likely to solve the Lebanese problems and unify the Lebanese people. It would seem
that even if the subjects' conscious awareness is focused on the sectarian concerns, instinctually
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they seem more concemed and aware of the importance and universality of individual human
concems and needs,
Iain
The different opinions about the Ta'if Accord can also be a reflection of the different
levels of Lebanese identity development. More specifically, it would seem that individuals who
are satisfied with the overall outcome of the adjusted sectarian formula bias of the Accord are
more likely to have a stage 1 identity level of identity development, that is, they are more likely
to have a non integrated level of Lebanese identity development. Similarly, those who complain
about the Accord because it is not satisfactory enough to the needs of their particular sects, are
also more likely to reflect a stage 2 identity development.
Moreover, stage 3 and 4 levels of identity development are reflected by the responses
which emphasize the positive aspects of the Accord in terms of its provisions around
strengthening the individual rights and the civic rights of the society. Moreover, they are more
likely to reject the sectarian aspects of the Accord and feel that the Accord did not live up to their
expectations and aspirations.
In short, most subjects agreed that the Accord was good because it resulted in, at least,
ending the Civil War. However, they start to differ around how satisfied they are about the extent
to which the Accord is being fully implemented in actuality as well as around the content of the
Accord itself. Finally, these differing views seem to follow pattems that are dependent on the
individual's level of identity development.
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Photographic Pictures
Most importantly, I feel, are the psychological image associations that the subjects
provided regarding their perceptions of the Lebanese self or the Lebanese identity.
While some subjects offered concrete types of images such as a map drawing, or a
pine tree, or a mountain, others offered richer and more abstract images in terms of their
symbolic contents. Since images and art bring out different subjective emotions in the observer, I
have decided not to offer any theoretically based psychological interpretations of these images. I
will, however, present my own personal list of word associations to these images. I also hope that
the readers will form their own associations to the images which will help them better understand
and share the Lebanese reality and sense of self as experienced by this select group of subjects.
My personal associations are the following: Sense of oppression, suffrage, pain,
desperation, bondage, pride, responsibility, sense of duty, rebelliousness, ambition,
determination, confusion, acting out, refuge, creativity, fear, submission to overwhelming force,
sacrifice, physical sense of self, liberty, desire for life, life Vs death, travel, adventure, voyage,
timelessness, witness, awareness...
Conclusion: Levels of Identity Development-Cognitive and Emotional Levels of
Functioning
In the above passages I have attempted to understand and analyze the subjects' varied
and wide ranging views around the Lebanese self within the four general levels of Lebanese
Identity Development presented in the SILM model eariier in this study.
In general, it was seen that most of the subjects' views are reflective of the various
stages of identity levels of awareness. Moreover, it must be emphasized that within the same
subject responses, various levels of identity development were reflected at various times.
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It was noticed that the most polarized views around the Lebanese self were brought
about by direct questions about the "Lebanese Identity." However, other questions about the
Lebanese group or Lebanese social self that did not mention the "identity" issue brought about
more common themes across the subjects' responses. Specially significant, is that those
subjects who offered stage 1 and stage 2 identity definitions and identity characteristics, also
offered a lot of concepts and characterizations of the Lebanese self that were more relevant to
higher stages of identity development. That is, it seemed that individuals functioning at less
advanced levels of identity development did not lack a higher sense of awareness, but it would
rather seem that they were more likely to initially offer lower level identity definitions and
concems since they might not have resolved the emotional conflicts relevant to these stages.
On the other hand, those individuals with higher levels of identity development seemed
to be those who emphasized the higher level identity concems, while minimally mentioning lower
level identity definitions or conflicts. This would suggest that these subjects have successfully
negotiated the conflicts faced at the earlier stages.
Therefore, we can generally conclude that, the results of the qualitative study show that
identity of the Lebanese individuals seem to be more developed at a conceptual level than it is
at an emotional level. This conclusion is in agreement with the theoretical basis of the Lebanese
identity development model, since the model suggests that less advanced levels of development
around attitudes towards certain issues are more likely to be affected by unresolved or
unsatisfied emotional needs, such as fear and security, or sense of deprivation or justice, etc.
This phenomenon might also be reflective of the specific oppressive Lebanese
environment where an individual's declared loyalty to a certain definition of the Lebanese identity
could sometimes become a matter of life or death. The same phenomenon could be clearly seen
in Instances during the Lebanese Civil War where militia road blocks were set by the various
sects all over the Lebanese areas. When individuals passing through the road blocks were asked
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about their identities, their responses had better be the right response, that is. the proper
sectarian identity for that specific road block, or else their lives would be very much over.
If, however, we were to ask the individuals going through these road blocks who they
really are, at a time when they were feeling safe, you would find a common answer among all the
Lebanese who have experienced that. This answer would probably be something like this: "I am
a Lebanese individual who unfortunately happened to pass through this road block manned by
criminals. My misfortune also lied in the fact that if I did not declare the right sectarian or family
identity. I was going to be dead." Therefore, this second, more relevant response to our
understanding of the individual's social psychological identity, is more likely to be offered by
individuals who have already safely negotiated the danger situation than others who still feel in
danger.
Quantitative Data
General Results
The initial data analysis showed that most subjects agreed much more with the
questionnaire Items that were classified as stage 4 items. This would give the impression that
most subjects in Lebanon are functioning at a stage 4 level. While it might be true that the
majority of the Lebanese people believe in democracy and in the importance of civic institutions
and public participation, it is still important to understand these beliefs in the general context of
the other beliefs that an individual might hold.
Therefore, the data normalization was intended to factor in the effects of the individual's
other beliefs in trying to determine his dominant stage of development. As I have compared each
of the individual's score to his other scores as well as to the other subjects' scores, it is important
to remember that the results derived from the normalization of the data are more indicative of
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relative scores as opposed to absolute scores. That is, when we say that 36 % of the individuals
in the sample have a dominant Stage 4 level of identity development, what this means is that 36
% of the sample had a higher level of identity development than the other subjects in the
sample. In other words, in this study, it would seem that most subjects are in a stage 4 level of
development. But by normalizing the data, we are saying that within this overall developed
sample, there are still developmental differences between subjects that can be highlighted by
including their other responses to items reflecting other stages of development.
Dominant Stage of Identity Development vs. Socio-Economic Factors
The analysis of the results in this section reveal that the primary psychological factors
affecting an individual's level of Lebanese identity development can be summarized in three
concepts: level of education, psychological security, and exposure to others. This conclusion is
derived from the fact that the empirical results show that an individual's level of identity
development is most affected by his sectarian identity, his level of education, his profession, his
nationality, and his environment.
Sectarian Identity vs. Lebanese Identity Development
The "Other" Group. The group with the highest percentage of individuals with a Stage
4 identity level of development are those who classified themselves as "others." This can be
explained by noting that the great majority of those who classified themselves as such, added
the word " Lebanese" in the "Specify" space provided on the questionnaire. In other words, this
group identified itself as the " Lebanese Sect." Therefore, the fact that this subgroup turned out
to have the highest percentage of individuals with advanced levels of identity development
should not be any surprise since they had also made it indirectly clear that they refuse the
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sectarian classifications. Moreover, this particular set of results also reflect the appropriateness
of the research instrument since it clearty reflected the "other" group's high identification with the
integrated Lebanese Identity defined by a stage 4 level of development.
The Maronitg
,
Armenian and Catholic Groups The results show that the Maronite
and the Armenian sects have the highest percentage of individuals at a stage two level identity
of development. However, the Catholic and the Maronite groups have the highest percentage of
individuals in the combined stage 1 and stage 2 levels of identity development.
This might seem like an understandable result since they might be more likely than other sect
members to feel that they have had the greatest losses during the war in terms of power and
influence in the overall life of the Lebanese Republic.
In addition, these particular Lebanese sects feel the farthest from, and identify the least
with, the majority Sunni Arab environment in the Middle East, and would therefore be the most
likely sects to feel insecure about their sects' future and well-being in light of the war losses that
they have had. Moreover, the high percentage of Catholic individuals with a stage 3 level of
identity is indicative that they seem to be the group who are most aware of the Lebanese real
situation but also the most with a feeling of disempowerment.
It must be noted that the Armenian group also had the second highest percentage of
individuals at a stage 4 level when compared with individuals in other sects. This would suggest
that there might be a significant percentage of Armenian individuals who feel fully integrated in
the Lebanese society. Further studies need to be done to explore this issue in more depth
because the sample number of 19 Armenian individuals in this study is too small to make any
significant general conclusions.
The Shiite Group and the Sunni Group. The Shiite group of subjects had the highest
level of individuals among all the other sectarian groups who had a stage 4 dominant level of
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development. This might be explained by the fact the Shiite sect has gone through a significant
demographic growth and has gone through fast changes in economical development when
compared to the other Lebanese sects. This has probably led to a faster rate of modernization
which would have meant that the Shiite individuals are less likely to have maintained strong
traditional beliefs in traditional leaderships and traditional feudal style practices, and would,
therefore, have a stronger identification at the national Lebanese level. Moreover, their
increased population and their increased influence in the Lebanese political and social life might
have made them safer in the Lebanese environment which would also explain why they would
have a higher percentage of individuals at advanced levels of identity development.
The Sunni sample group had the lowest percentage of individuals with a combined stage
1 and stage 2 levels of identity development within the general Moslem group of subjects.
This might be a reflection of the Sunni Moslem traditional position in relation to the Sunni Arab
majority in the Middle East where they have traditionally identified more than other Moslem
groups at the supra - Lebanese Arab identity level than at the Lebanese national level. The fact
that the other Moslem Shiite and Druze groups have the highest percentage of individuals with a
combined stage 3 and stage 4 levels of identity development might also be a reflection to the
fact that they feel more secure with a Lebanese identity where they are still part of the traditional
Moslems majority, but they are minorities within minorities in Lebanon and are not directly
subjected to majority rule of the Sunni Arab sect.
Educational Level vs. Lebanese Identity Development
The results of this section clearly show that the higher the individual's educational level,
the higher this level of Lebanese identity development. Moreover, if we combine the stage 3 and
stage 4 individuals in each educational category, we also find the higher levels of education are
correlated with higher levels of Lebanese identity development.
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It must be noted here that the "Other group is mainly made up of those individuals who
classified themselves as having a technical type of degree. As a group, these individuals feel the
most disempowered and the most angry among all the other educational classifications.
Profession vs. Lebanese Identity Development
In general, the results suggest that the more secure the individual's profession is. the
higher his level of identity development. Moreover, those individuals in the humanity fields are
less likely to have a stage 2 of identity development. This can be seen in the case of the medical
doctors and the school teachers. This would suggest that the type of exposure that an individual
has with others is likely to affect his level of Lebanese identity development. This would also
suggest that a greater awareness of the human aspects of individuals would positively affect the
individual's feeling of social integration.
Dual Nationality vs. Lebanese Identity Development
The results show that the individuals* specific type of nationality affects his level of
identity development. It would seem that those Lebanese individuals with an additional
nationality from one of the developed countries are more likely to have a stage 3 or a stage 4
level of identity development. Moreover, those individuals who have a European dual nationality
seem to be less likely to believe that they can have any personal effect on change for the better
in Lebanon while those with a dual North American nationality are more likely to feel that their
participation in public life can lead to democratic improvements in Lebanon.
The group that has a dual nationality from the "Other countries are mostly individuals
who carry a nationality from one of the developing countries. This group has the highest
percentage of individuals who are functioning at a stage 2 level of identity development.
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These results can easily be explained by pointing out the fact that the North American
identities are more representative of the idea of change and development. While the European
countries are as developed as the North American countries, individuals in Europe are more tied
down with older traditions and political systems and, are therefore, less likely to feel that change
is too easily achieved.
The fact that the "other group is more likely to have high numbers of individuals at a
stage two level of identity development could be a reflection of their maintaining traditional views
at the time of their emigration and not having a chance to develop more enlightened views in the
country where they have emigrated since they are more likely to lack the individual rights that
most individuals enjoy in developed nations. Moreover, they might also reflect the feelings of
those individuals who have had to leave Lebanon and settle somewhere else due to the war and
feel that they are still at a disadvantage because in addition to losing the connection to their
homeland, they did not gain much in terms of increased individual rights with their additional
nationality.
Source of Data vs. Lebanese Identity Development
The differences that appear among the various sources of data collection suggest that
the educational and work environments of individuals have a significant effect on their level of
identity development.
Most significantly, those individuals who answered the survey through e-mail seem to
have the highest percentage of individuals with higher levels of identity development. This would
be logical in light of the fact that, those with an e-mail account and who were ready to volunteer
and send back their questionnaire answers, are more likely to have higher levels of Lebanese
national feelings.
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Integration
In this study I have attempted to show that the events and dynamics that have made up
Lebanon's history in the past decades can all be understood within a human development
framework that guides the behavior of any human society. However, two aspects of nomial
development are especially problematic in the Lebanese society, mainly, modernization and
social integration. This Lebanese problem has been emphasized by numerous other Lebanese
researchers such as Hudson (1985), Khalaf (1987). and Odeh (1985) among others.
As was have seen through this presentation, both of these two processes are hampered
by the rigidity of the current form of the Lebanese sectarian system. While the current system
evolved from a real need to protect and maintain sectarian equality and justice, this system is
basically fit to deal with the dynamics that result from the interactions and the psychology of a
society going through the first two stages of identity development proposed in this study. As
history has shown, the system itself has made Lebanon incapable of going through the normal
social mobilization that always accompanies development and modernization without turning into
a sectarian conflict. Moreover, the survival needs of the various sects within this system have
rendered Lebanon highly vulnerable to changes in the balance of power of extemal groups
associated with Lebanon, which most of the times gets translated into a sectarian conflict of one
form or another.
The key to understanding the causes behind the vicious developmental circle that
Lebanon finds itself in is in realizing that the current sectarian system is unnatural, in the sense
that it neither gives voice nor does it represent a very large segment of society that is functioning
at levels three and four in their Lebanese Identity development. While the current system fully
portrays the traditional and insecure elements of the Lebanese society through representing the
Lebanese people at the sectarian group level, it strongly fails to represent the Lebanese people
at the individual civic levels as well as the forces of change and the future.
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In order to resolve this Lebanese problem, a serious scientific approach should be
adopted geared towards developing the current system until there is a fomi of an institutionalized
dialogue between the two developmental forces affecting Lebanon. One the one hand, the
system should represent the traditional concems of the Lebanese people at the sectarian group
level, as the current system does, while, on the other hand, the system should be able to cleariy
represent the civic aspects of the Lebanese individual as well as the future directions that the
society sees itself taking.
In that case, society would be able to move through its development according to the
results of the dialogue between the above mentioned institutional forces. Under such conditions,
all Lebanese individuals, regardless of their identity level of development, would be able to find
representation in the political system.
Finally, along with the development of a political system that better fits the Lebanese
reality and psychology, it must be emphasized here that normal development can be greatly
facilitated and enhanced by decreasing the insecurities and fears currently present in the
Lebanese society. While this fear and suspiciousness in society is partly due to the after effects
of the collective trauma of the civil war, another cause of this fear is the sense in society that
speaking out has negative consequences on the individual and, therefore, most people opt to
stay silent and stay away from participation in public matters and voicing out their concems and
opinions.
In conclusion, as the results of this study show, the strains on the Lebanese integration
forces and the current fears seem to be best counteracted and resisted by increasing the
education and the awareness of the Lebanese people about their objective human reality as well
as strengthening their sense of security and belonging. This is best achieved by protecting the
individuals' human rights and increasing their sense of physical and economic securities in the
absence of all forms of physical and psychological oppression.
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APPENDIX
SURVEY QUESTIONS
Approximate completion time = 10 min.
Please read the whole statement carefully and indicate your preferenceby placing a mark in the appropriate space below:
P^ i
Strongly Agree = 5
Agree = 4
Not sure = 3
Disagree = 2
Strongly Disagree = 1
in meraro^'^ml'iSeT
°" '"''"^
'° ''^'^^
'•^'"^
<"
( )5 Strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
( )2 Disagree ( )1 strongly Disagree
mnt"i!Il?"?I' ^'J^^^.^f
^" Lebanese political system is discriminatory and oppressive againstmost individuals in Lebanon, there is very little we can do to replace it.
( )5 Strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
( )2 Disagree ( )1 strongly Disagree
3) The Lebanese should actively reject those leaders whose source of power is not based on the
fair democratic choice of the people.
( )5 Strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
( )2 Disagree ( )1 Strongly Disagree
4) It is very important for my sectarian community to cooperate and get assistance from any
fnendly non-Lebanese group that is ready to help us protect ourselves from the influences of
other Lebanese sectarian groups.
( )5 Strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
( )2 Disagree ( )1 Strongly Disagree
5) The best way for a person to deal with the negative effects of the sectarian culture is to
restrict involvement in social or public activities and to focus on securing his individual
and family needs.
( )5 Strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
( )2 Disagree ( )1 Strongly Disagree
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( )5 Strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
( )2 Disagree ( )1 strongly Disagree
Hifflfn?!^^'^
^^'"3
^
^"^^^^ "-^b^^^se identity; there are only groups withdifferent sectarian identities living on the same piece of land.
( )5 Strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
( )2 Disagree ( )1 Strongly Disagree
Si'Jus Lw SllTr?; 'k""'" h"k °^ °f ^ ^*vic personalstat law that can be used by individuals as an option instead of the currently used
religious personal status laws.
( )5 Strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
( )2 Disagree ( )1 Strongly Disagree
9) In light of the differences that exist between the different Lebanese sects it is best for
individuals from different sectarian groups to live relatively separate from' each other.
( )5 Strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
( )2 Disagree ( )1 Strongly Disagree
10) I try to participate in activities or organizations that work to promote Lebanese unity through
fighting the effects of sectarianism and divisions in society.
( )5 Strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
( )2 Disagree ( )1 Strongly Disagree
11) Other than a common desire to live in peace, the Lebanese people have very little in
common.
( )5 Strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
( )2 Disagree ( )1 Strongly Disagree
12) Individuals in my sectarian community would live in peace if it were not for the fanaticism
and militancy of the other sectarian groups who hope to control our lives.
( )5 Strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
( )2 Disagree ( )1 Strongly Disagree
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( )5 Strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
( )2 Disagree ( )1 strongly Disagree
( )5 strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
( )2 Disagree ( )1 strongly Disagree
more actively
s that can
( )5 Strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
( )2 Disagree ( )1 strongly Disagree
6) I otten try to avoid interacting with people who have strong sectarian
( )5 Strongly Agree ( )4 Agree ( )3 Not Sure
Please answer the following questions by marking the appropriate box:
17) What is your age?
() Under 18 () 19 to 23 () 24 to 28 () 29 to 33
() 34 to 38 () 39 to 43 ( ) 44 to 48 ( ) 49 to 53
() 54 to 58 () 59 to 63 ( ) Over 63
1 8) What is your gender?
( ) Male ( ) Female
19) What is your sectarian Identity?
( ) Sunni ( ) Maronite ( ) Druze
( ) Shiite ( ) Greek Orthodox ( ) Roman Catholic
( ) Christian Armenian ( ) Other (Specify)
( )2 Disagree ( )1 Strongly Disagree
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20) What is your civil status?
( )Single ( )Married with no children ( )MarTied with children
( )Divorced with no children ( )Divorced with children
( )Widowed
21) What is your current place of residence?
( ) Lebanon ( ) Arab country other than Lebanon ( ) Europe
( ) North America ( ) Africa ( ) South America
22)^ How many years did you live in Lebanon during the 1975-1989 civil
( ) None ( ) 1 to 3 ( ) 4 to 6
()7to9 () 10 to 12 () More than 12
23) How many years of your life have you lived outside Lebanon?
( ) None ( ) 1 to 3 ( ) 4 to 6
( ) 7to9 () 10 to 12 () 13 to 15
() 16 to 18 () 19 to 21 () More than 21
24) What is the highest degree you have attained?
( ) Lebanese Baccalaureate ( ) High School
( ) Bachelor's Degree ( ) Master's Degree
( ) Doctoral Degree ( ) Technical Baccalaureate
( ) Vocational Degree ( ) other (Specify)
25) What is your yeariy estimated income? [You can choose not to answer
this question]
( ) Less than 2,000 $ ( ) Between 2,000 and 5,000 $
( ) Between 5,000 and 10,000 $ ( ) Between 10,000 and 20,000 $
( ) Between 20,000 and 30,000 $ ( ) Between 30,000 and 40,000 $
( ) Between 40,000 and 50,000 $ ( ) Between 50,000 and 70,000 $
( ) Over 70,000 $ ( ) Not Applicable
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26) What is your profession?
( ) Student ( ) Professor ( ) Lawyer
( ) Salesman ( ) Engineer ( ) Medical Doctor
( ) School Teacher ( ) Skilled Laborer ( ) Employee
( ) Not Applicable ( ) Self-employed ( )other (Specify)
27) Do you have a Lebanese nationality?
( ) Yes ( ) No
28) If yes, do you carry an additional nationality?
^ ( ) Yes , a North American nationality
( ) Yes, a South American nationality ( ) Yes, a European nationality
( ) Yes, an African nationality ( ) Yes, another Arab nationality
( ) Other (Specify)
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